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Synopsis
Grain production and utilisation in Russia and the USSR before
Collectivisation
Stephen G. Wheatcroft
This thesis is concerned with analysing the available data on grain 
production and its utilisation from the time when the earliest grain 
statistics became available in pre-revolutionary Russia until the eve of 
mass transformation of Soviet agriculture that was associated with mass 
collectivisation in 1929. The pre-revolutionary period and post revolutionary 
period are treated separately in two separate parts of the thesis. In each 
part I describe the methods of collecting and organising statistics related 
to the production and utilisation of grain. I discuss the circumstances in 
which these statistics were gathered and I attempt to assess the reliability 
of these dat§ and place them in a more meaningful and more comparative form.
I then present an account of the available works that have attempted 
to analyse the balance of grain production and its utilisation. I conclude 
by making my own assessment of the balance and compare it with the general 
conceptions held on the nature of the grain problem. I conclude that the 
balance of grain production and utilisation was a highly complex phenomenon 
dependent upon the inter-relationship of demographic, economic and agronomic 
factors that differed from region to region and from time to time. The 
full complexity of these inter-relationships was little understood by the 
political leadership of the time.
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Introduction
The nature of the grain problem and the way in which it was resolved 
arr. generally acknowledged as having the greatest significance for the 
economic and political history of the Soviet Union. ret there remains 
considerable uncertainty as to what exactly the grain problem was and what 
caused it. Stalin and his colleagues had no such doubts as to what they 
thought the nature of the grain problen was. The subsequent path of 
Soviet agricultural history and Soviet society as a whole has been to a 
large extent conditioned by how Stalin saw the problem and how he saw the 
solution. In order to appreciate the rationality of Stalin's solution 
it is necessary to accept his conception of the problem. This conception 
of the problem was forced upon Soviet society and has taken a very strong 
hold of many of the best western conceptions of the problem, but it has 
been challenged by historians both in the Soviet Union and in the West. 
In its time in the mid and late 1920s it was far from being the only or 
the best analysis of the problem; it was, however, the most politically 
influential. It is natural that the view of the victors be given sig- 
nificance; after all they won. But it is a mistake to consider that they 
won because their analysis was correct or the most appropriate. Stalin's 
interpretation x-;as accepted because of his political dominance which 
unfortunately was based on other things than the quality of his analysis of 
this problem.
The best presentation of the Stalin conception of the grain problem 
came in the published extracts of Stalin's talk with the students of the
1. Here I differ strongly with the late Professor :\arc z who described 
Stalin's analysis as 'the first attempt at the quantification of 
the grain problem', J.Karcz, Thoughts on the grain Droble*^' Scrviet 
Studies, April 1967, p.401. ( >Ty emphasis).
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Institute of Red Professors, the Communist Academy and the Sverdlov 
University on May 28, 1928 in 'On the grain front' . In this work 
Stalin claimed that even though the pre-war level of grain sown area and 
grain production had been reached the amount of grain produced for the 
market was only a half, and the amount exported only about one-twentieth 
of what it had been in the pre-^ar neriod. ^ile initially admitting 
that 'faulty planning and mistakes in economic coordination have played 
a considerable part', he went on to consider this as superficial, and 
stated that the underlying cause is 'primarily and chiefly the change in 
the structure of our agriculture brought about by the October revolution, 
the change from large-scale pomeshchik (landowner) and large-scale kulak 
farming, which provided the largest proportion of marketed grain, to 
small and middle peasant farming, which provides the smallest proportion 
of marketed grain.
The following famous table was then presented to illustrate the change 
in structure of grain production and grain marketings (see over nage).
From this Stalin argued that a shift to large scale preferably 
socialised farming was therefore needed to increase the commodity nature 
of grain production to ensure the needed supplies for urban consumers, 
industry and export.
Such a transformation was achieved with the move to mass collectivisation 
that began in the autumn of 1929.
In the Soviet Union in 1928 and early 1929 nearly every aspect of 
Stalin's interpretation was challenged by economists and statisticians. 
The statisticians challenged that the harvest was as high as Stalin had
1. See I.V.Stalin, Sochineniya, M.1949, Tom II, pp.81-97.
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Period
Pre-war
Pomeshchik
(landowners)
Kulaks
(rich peasants
Middle and
poor peasants 
Total
1926/27
State and coll-
ective farms
Kulaks
Middle and
poor peasants 
Total
Gross grain production
rain. tons
9.8
31.1
41.0
81.9
1.3
10.1
66.4
77.8
7/o
12%
38%
50%
100%
1.7%
13%
85.3%
100%
Marketed grain 
(extra-rural)
mln. tons
4.6
10.6
6.0
21.3
0.6
2.1
7.6
10.3
%
21.6%
50%
28.4%
100%
C /D
20%
74%
100%
% of 
marketed
grain
47%
34%
14.7%
26%
47.2%
20%
11.2%
13.3%
Source: I.V.Stalin, Sochineniya.M.1949, Tom 11, p.85.
Note: The figures have been converted from millions of puds into the 
more familiar millions of tons. C 1 ton = 0.01638 pds) 
These figures are sometimes referred to as the Stalin/Nemchinov 
figures.
claimed it to be . Many agricultural experts, particularly those concerned
with the livestock industry emphasised the progressive developments within
2 Soviet agriculture as it was becoming more intensive . The trade experts
continued to emphasise the comDlexity of the measurements of marketings.
The production-organisation school of agricultural economists were repeatedly
1. In July 1928, Osinsky who had just been removed from the
directorship of TsSU (in March) challenged the current official 
evaluations of the jrrain soxm area at a central committee plenum 
and incurred Stalin's displeasure for it. See E.H.Carr and 
R.W.Davies, Foundations of a planned economy 1926-1929 ^ ''pp .76-8, 
(citing from the Trotsky archives) , See also S.G.I.Tieatcroft, 
; Views on grain output, agricultural reality and planning in the 
Soviet Union in the 1920s, M.Soc.Sci.thesis, Birmingham 1974, 
pp.108-10.
2. See in particular articles by V.Drozdov, Ekon.Zhizn., 28/12/1927, 
p.2, Voprosy torgovly , 1928, no.7, p.24.
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emphasising the problems involved in applying a crude socio-economic 
differentiation of the peasantry. And Vainshtein, Urlanis and 
Bogoslovskv directly challenged Stalin's account of the splintering of 
the peasant households and their increase in numbers .
However, by the end of 1929 when the political opposition to Stalin 
was smashed, the statisticians and economists were easily suppressed and 
silenced. From then on the Stalinist conception of the grain problem 
was the only one allowed in the Soviet Union.
With the end of the cult of the personality, Soviet historians have 
become more critical of this conception.
Danilov, while keeping strictly within the bounds of the orthodox
2 
conception , noting that the splitting of productive forces had a negative
effect on the development of agriculture, delaying its increase and
transition to a higher technical base, nevertheless warns against the
3 
tendency to exaggerate the degree of splintering .
In 1968 Gazalova published a work specifically analysing the
solintering of peasant households in European Russia 1921-1929 which
4 
emphasised the positive effects of the redistribution of land . In the
following year I.A. Chemerissky at a Conference of Soviet Agrarian 
historians noted the great inadequacies of work on analysing the economic 
consequences of the revolution and redistribution of land in 1917-21.
He specifically cited the earlier works of Vainshtein, Urlanis and
i
1. See A,Vainshtein, Chislennost i dinamika krestyanskikh dvorov, SO.,
1929, no.7, ,p.ll. D.Bogoslovsky,^Razmer semy' i chislo krestyanskikh 
khozyaistv\ SO, 1929, no.9, pp.29-36.
2. V.P,Danilov, Sozdaniye Tnaterialno-tekhnicheskikh predposilok 
kollektivizatsii selskogo khozyaistva v SSSR, y.1957, pp.25-6.
3. V.P.Danilov, ibid., p.26.
A. See K.M.Gazalova, Statisticheskiye istochniki odroblenii krestyanskikh 
khozyaistv v Evropyeiskoi Rossii v 1921-19 29 ggJ. , in Is 
istorii Sovetskogo obshchestva. vyp.2,M.1968, pp.265-95.
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Bogoslovsky, noting that no-one had given an adequate reply to these 
articles, but then he added rather wistfully, no-one had paid any attention 
to them .
In 1966 Yu.A.Moshkov produced a detailed study of the grain problem
2 in the years of collectivisation but in his introductory chapter on the
emergence of the grain problem in the USSR, Moshkov reproduces the standard
3 Stalin explanation with no modification . The Soviet economist A.A.Barsov
on the other hand was most scathing about this argument in his book the 
following year on the balance between urban and rural value exchanges .
Barsov argued that the difference in commodity production between the large
Jiuc Co
pomeshchik estates and the peasantry at large was not so much the increased
yields of the former, because they were not so much higher, but rather to 
the greater exploitation of their peasant labourers and to their greater 
allocation of land. Barsov therefore argued that the dispersal of the 
pomeshchik lands in itself would have provided the basis for increased 
peasant production. The real reason for the decrease in commodity share 
of grain produced in the 1920s was not so much the liquidation of large 
scale production but an increase in peasant consumption once the exploiting 
classes had been removed.
In the West, Maurice Dobb accepted the Stalin interpretation completely
1. I.A.Chemerissky» Vliyaniye agrarnoi revolyutsii 1918-1918 gg. na sel. 
khoz.proizvodstvo v SSSR, in Problemy Agrarnoi Istorii Sovetskogo 
Obshchestva, M.1971, P.70.
2. Yu.A.Moshkov, Zemovaya problema v gody sploshnoi kollektivizatsii 
sel.khoz.SSSR (1929-1932gg). M.1966.
3. See Yu.A.Moshkov, ibid. , pp.23-5.
A. See A.A.Barsov, Balans stoimostnyikh obmenov mezhdu gorodom i derevnyei, 
M.1969, pp.22-3.
5. 'With his strong instinct for essentials, Stalin early in 1928 emphasised
that the fundamental reason was to be sought in the very character of 
the agrarian revolution of 1917'. M.Dobb, Soviet economic development 
since 1917, p.216. (First published 1948, quoted here from 6th revised 
edition). The Stalin-Ne^chinov table is reproduced on p.217.
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And in his 1958 volume on 'Socialism in One Country', accepted in 
principle the main features of the Stalin interpretation. Carr argues 
that the peasants farming 'midget holdings' were struggling to extract 
a bare subsistence from the soil before Stolypin and that the Revolution 
'restored cultivation for subsistence and offered no adequate incentives 
for production for the market' . He sums up by stating 'Nothing seemed
to have been settled by the Revolution, theproblem had once again to be
2 faced from the beginning' . From this position collectivisation appears
almost inevitable.
In the later volume 'Foundations of a planned Economy' the Nemchinov
3 Stalin figures are considered critically for the first time , but nothing
is mentioned to qualify the overall assessment of the agricultural picture 
made in'Socialism in One Country', which appears to rely so heavily on 
Stalin's 'On the grain front' analysis.
Professor Nove in his Economic History, similarly accepts the negative 
influence of the agrarian revolution on the grain problem . But Professor 
Lewin was far more cautious in noting that'since the Revolution they 
(the peasants) had not yet had sufficient opportunity to determine what 
real advantages it had to offer' . In 1967, however, Professor Jerzy Karcz 
launched an attack on the traditional Stalin conception of the problem, 
describing it as 'completely misleading' and providing 'an exceedingly 
distorted picture' . Professor Davies subsequently pointed out that
1. See E.H.Carr, Socialism in One Country, vol.1 p.229
2. See E.H.Carr, ibid., t>.230
3. See E.H.Carr and R.V.Davies, Foundations of a planned economy 1926-1929, 
volume 1, part 2, pp.916-9.
4. 'The effect of the revolution (agrarian) was, in a technical sense, 
reactionary 1 , Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, p.106.
5. M.Lewin, Russian peasants and Soviet power, p.37.
6. J.Karcz, 'Thoughts on the grain problem', Soviet Studies, April 1967, 
No.4, p.403.
-vii-
although the Stalin conception of the problem may well be somewhat 
misleading and distorted, it was not as 'completely misleading', as 
'exceedingly distorted' and as 'magnificent a Stalinist hoax', as
Professor Karcz was claiming . Professor Karcz subsequently admitted
2 that he had somewhat overstated his case and both Professor Davies and
Professor Karcz were in agreement that more work was needed in order to
3 
analyse exactly what the grain problem was ,
Since this time social and political historians, in particular 
Professor Lewin, have described the way in which the alleged problem was 
resolved by the organised 'taking' of the grain'. All of this subsequent 
work goes beyond the grain problem of the mid 1920s but to some extent is 
based upon assumptions concerning it. Clearly the need for a full scale 
reassessment of the basis of the grain problem is more urgent than ever.
This thesis is aimed at being a contribution to such a reassessment.
The thesis presents a detailed analysis of all the available data on 
grain production and utilisation from the earliest available grain statistics 
in the pre-revolutionary period , through the first decade of Soviet power 
and up to the year of the great mass transformation of the Soviet countryside 
in 1929. It pays particular attention to the question of how these grain 
statistics were constructed and attempts to assess the reliability of these 
data. It also regroups much of the data into more comparable units and 
regions in order to carry through the analysis over a more lengthy period
1. R. TJ .Davies, 'A note on grain statistics', Soviet Studies, January 1970, 
No.3, pp.314-29.
2. 'The likelihood is still that a comparison was made between incomparable 
magnitudes, though the difference between these magnitudes is much 
smaller than I believed it to be in ''Thoughts'". J.Karcz, 'Back on 
the grain front', Soviet Studies, October 1970, no.2, p.291.
3. Professor Karcz was himself intending to work on this nroblem, before 
his untimelv death.
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and on a more detailed plane than is otherwise available.
The thesis is in two parts and contains a detailed appendix. 
Part One concerns the pre-revolutionary period including the pre-October
1917 war years. Part Two concerns the post-revolutionary period from
1918 - 1929. The appendix contains much of the original data on grain 
production and elements related to grain consumption and utilisation, i.e. 
population data, livestock data and transportation data.
Part One begins with a chapter (1) on the organisation of pre- 
revolutionary grain statistics. This is followed by a chapter (2) that 
compares the indications from the different types of data and assesses 
their reliability. The third chapter (3) presents an account of the 
available utilisation and transportation data. Each element within 
utilisation is treated separately. Separate sections being allocated for 
a) seed use, b) personal consumption, c) livestock feed, d) industrial 
use, e) military use, f) stock changes, g) exports, h) losses and 
i) on transportation. Within each section I consider the available data 
concerning the utilisation of grain by each of these elements. I describe 
how the data v^r-e collected, discuss the<r reliability and present an account 
of the general changes in its level over time, where that is possible to 
ascertain. The fourth chapter (4) presents the available data on grain 
production, presentjmy own regroupings of these data and analyses them. 
The fifth chapter (5) reviews the available grain utilisation balances that 
have been drawn up for this period and analyses them. Chapter six (6) 
presents a summary of the conclusions on this part of the thesis.
Part Two of the thesis has roughly the same pattern only with con- 
siderably more attention being given to the complex and changing methods
of evaluating sown area and yield. Chapter One presents a general account 
of the setting up and organisation of the new Soviet Central Statistical
-ix-
Administration (TsSU) and the problems it faced in raking its evaluations. 
The internal conflicts between the statisticians are described and the 
influence of political factors on their action is also briefly described . 
Chapter Two (2) considers how the data on grain sown area w collected, 
processed and adjusted. It presents an account of the available data and 
comments on their reliability. Chapter Three (3) carries out a similar 
analysis of the grain yield data and results. Chanter Four (4) is 
concerned with data on grain production, but since the analysis of yield 
and sown area have been carried out separately this chapter is relatively 
short and is mainly concerned with the presentation and analysis of the 
available data. Chapter five (5) presents an account of the available 
utilisation and transportation data by separate elements and is directly 
analogous to chapter three of Part One. Chapter Six- (£>) reviews and
t_i
analyses the available grin utilisation balances. Chapter ievoi (^) presents 
the conclusions to this chapter.
A very brief section on general conclusions completes the thesis.
1. This has been dealt with at more length in my earlier work, See 
S.G.Wheatcroft, Views on grain output, agricultural reality and 
planning in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, Birmingham, 1974, M.Soc.Sci. 
thesis .
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Part One: Grain production and utilisation in Russia before 1918 
1. The organisation and collection of grain statistics.
In comparison with later periods the organisation of grain statistics 
in this period was relatively simple and straightforward. I will deal 
first with grain production statistics, which were the most traditional 
and well developed. Later I will discuss what few grain utilisation 
statistical data x^ere available for this period, 
a) Grain production statistics before the First World War
Grain production statistics had not been used for major fiscal 
purposes since well before the reign of Peter the Great , and so the 
peasants were quite used to supplying the administration with grain stat- 
istics without there being any apparent disadvantage to themselves. This 
situation and the peasant appreciation of it only gradually began to 
change during the late stages of the First World War. Until the intro- 
duction of the grain levy the peasants had little incentive to conceal 
their real level of production and similarly the statisticians and local 
agents who collected and worked out these statistical materials were 
under little pressure to distort the level of production one way or another. 
We should not therefore expect a large degree of underestimation at this 
time. There were differences in the scale of evaluation between the 
different agencies making these calculations, but these were based primarily 
upon technical aspects of how these different agencies collected their data,
1. The very earliest Russian State statistics on land and its produce
go back to 'Pistovye knigi 1 (the cadastral surveys used for collecting 
Tatar tribute in the thirteenth century). These were very similar 
to the English Doomsday Book. Surveys were repeated for taxation 
purposes at infrequent periods until the disorders of the beginning 
of the seventeenth century. Towards the end of the seventeenth 
century attempts were raade to restore the land tax and a new cadastral 
survey was begun in 1676. However this survey was never comnleted. 
It was replaced first by a household tax and then under Peter the 
Great by a poll tax. For an account of these surveys and taxes see 
J.Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia, Princeton, 1961, pp.230-34.
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the relative coverage of the different systems of the different agencies, 
the representativeness of samples, etc. Political and ideological con- 
siderations based upon what policy implications or value judgements would
\ 
be made from the statistics appear to have been far less significant
than they were to become later
Although ideology did not play an important role in pre-revolutionary 
evaluations of grain production, it did paradoxically enough play an 
important role in the liberal intelligentsia's assessment of the official 
evaluations of grain production. The liberal Professor A.F.Fortunatov 
was perhaps the most outspoken and certainly the most frequent critic of 
the official statistics. But as we will see below much of this criticism 
was without basis. Part of the authority of Fortunatov's attitude appeared 
to come from the apparent fact that the central statisticians did not 
themselves have any faith in their own statistics. Fortunatov cites a 
distinguished gallery of high officials from the Central Statistical 
Committee TsSK who all appear to be saying the most damning things about 
their own statistics. We may thank the Soviet historian Nifontov for 
tracing most of these quotes to their sources and discovering a curious 
law of bureaucratic organisations; namely, that new office holders imm- 
ediately began their term of office by describing how badly their job
2 had been done by their predecessors . As we will see in this section the
1. We should note that on ideological lines we could have expected 
the evaluations of the critical zemstvq (local government) stat- 
isticians to have been less favourable than those made by the TsSK 
which was attached to the Tsarist Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Quite the opposite was the case, indicating I think that ideology 
was not very important in this case.
2. See A.S.Nifontov, Zernovoye ProizvodstvQ Rossii vo vtoroi 
pp.(.ovine- XIX veka, M.1974, pp.16-20, 25-28
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organisation of central state grain statistics in this period was 
relatively simple, but quite adequate. The sown area data could well 
have gained by there being more frequent censuses, but w^e^ still not 
all that bad as the 1916 census was to show. And the yield data seem, 
to have been as good as any. Other branches of statistics e.g. livestock 
and demographic statistics were in a very sorry plight and it is probably 
true that technical crop statistics were very inadequate. But my 
conclusions on the question of the reliability of pre-revolutionary grain 
production statistics are that they were totally adequate, quite accurate 
and that they were unjustly maligned. These conclusions rest upon the 
arguments and analysis which follow and not upon the authority of any of 
the recognised specialists .
Grain production statistics in this period were therefore organised in 
a simple way with few controls. All the different systems relied basically 
upon peasant assistance and honesty in revealing the level of production 
sowings and yield to the statisticians and officials x-rtio regularly asked 
him about these things.
If an estate steward or a keen representative of the local administ- 
ration wanted to be very thorough and check up on the level of production, 
and especially if he wanted to know in advance what the yield was likely 
to turn out like he could always carry out for himself trial thrashings 
(probniye umoloty ) as soon as the harvest was ready. This procedure of 
carrying out trial thrashings or the measurementof the first thrashings 
probably dates back to the earliest times of organised agriculture and,
1. Host Western attitudes seem to rest on Jasny's authority. Jasny 
leans heavily on Groman. Groman and his colleagues in Gosplan 
seem to have been politically inspired in some of their attitudes 
and certainly leant heavily on the pre-revolutionary zemstvo 
tradition of great hostility to central TsSK statistics.
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as a recent Soviet historian has pointed out, is recorded in historical 
documents from at least the seventeenth century . By the second half of 
the eighteenth century, according to the historian Rubinshtein, the local
administration were already carrying out these experimental harvestings
2 
and thrashings in order to make a preliminary estimate of the yield .
And, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, references to taking
trial thrashings were already appearing in official documents as an
3 
obligatory, standard operation . By the middle and late nineteenth
century, there is much evidence to indicate that trial thrashings were
indeed being carried out by agents of the administration throughout the
4
country . The existence of such an established procedure for establish- 
ing the preliminary scale of harvest should be borne in mind. There 
appears to have been little conflict over its use. This is presumably 
because it was primarily used for making preliminary harvest forecasts; 
there was no need to use it for correcting grain yield statistics because 
no-one was systematically attempting to conceal the true level of grain 
yield.
We will now consider the main sources of statistical material on grain 
Droduction. There were basically three agencies engaged in collecting 
statistical materials. First, central state statistics were collected 
by the agents of the local administration and the police for the Ministry
1. See A.S.Nifontov, Zernovoye proizvodstvo Rossii vo vtoroi polovinye 
XIX veka, M.1974, pp.36-37. Nifontov is here citing the accounts 
of the Morozov estate in the beginning of the 1660s. (Knigi posevniye, 
uzhinniye i umolotiye v imenii Morozova, in Vremennik Moskovskogo 
obshchestva istorii i drevnostyei, Kn.7, M.1850, pp.7,10,13,14).
2. N.L.Rubinshtein, Selskoye khozyaistvo Rossii vo vtoroi polovinye 
XVIII v., M.1957, p.358.
3. See A.S.Nifontov, ibid., p.37 citing PSZ 1, t.XXXVIII, 1822, No. 
29025, art.21.
4. See A,S.Nifontov, ibid., pp,37-41, see also N.N.Ulashchik, Otchety
gubernatorov Litvyi i Zapadnoi Belorussii kak istoricheskii istochnik 
(1804-1861), in Problemy istochnik-ovedeniya, kn.IX, M.1961, p.18.
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of the Interior, via the Central Statistical Committee (TsSK) once it 
was formed. Secondly, an alternative series of yield statistics 
covering a large area of Russia were collected by the Department of 
Agriculture of the Ministry of State Property, later the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Thirdly, statistics were gathered by the local government 
(zemstvo) statistical departments. All these agencies collected stat- 
istical materials until at least 1915. In the last two pre-revolutionary 
years there were considerable changes as the agencies of the central 
administration collapsed and the agencies of the local government offices 
and the Ministry of Agriculture expanded. The organisation of statistics 
in this complex, revolutionary sub-period will be dealt with separately 
after I have discussed the pre-war period. 
(i) Statistics of Ministry of Internal Affairs
The main drive behind collecting central state statistics had been 
the wish of the Tsarist Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) to be acquainted 
with the factor likely to be the most decisive in fermenting unrest. This 
of course was the state of the harvest. Ever since Peter the Great had 
reformed local government and created a network of local Governors in 
charge of the different gubernii into which the country was divided, it 
had been one of the tasks of the Provincial Governor to send an annual 
report to the Emperor on the condition of his gubernia. These reports 
had always included an account of the state of agriculture in the gubernii. 
But when the Ministry of the Interior was formed in 1802 the provincial 
governors were requested to present statistical materials on the state of 
agriculture and in particular an indication of the level of the yield of 
the major grains. From this time the Ministry began employing officials 
(at first only 10) to systematically collect and sort this material .
1, See A.I.Gozulov, Ocherky istorii otechestvennoi statistiki,
M.1972, pp.52-54, N.A.Kablukov, Kurs Statistiki, M.1911, pp.64-67.
-6-
Yhis is the source of the materials cited by Mikhailovsky, 
Fortunatov, Kovalchenko and Nifontov, that will be described below.
For administrative purposes the country was divided into gubernii 
uezds and volosts, 3y 1917 there were 101 gubernii in the Russian 
Empire, each gubernia having on average a population of about 1,7 million. 
Each gubernia was split into about 8 uezds and each uezd into about 20 
volosts. The volost therefore had an average population of about 10,000. 
Below the volost level the peasants were subjected to their own trad- 
itional form of local administration based on their representation in the 
rural societies Ls.ej£kij£e_obshches t y_a) . There were on average 10 rural 
societies within each volost covering about 35 villages or separate 
population points.
At first no special administration was provided for collection of 
these statistics. Only in 1835 were Gubernia Statistical Committees 
(GSK) set up to administer the collection of statistical data at the 
gubernia level. These committees were presided over by the local 
Governor. Its members included the heads of all the appropriate gub- 
ernia organisations. Local inhabitants with special knowledge of 
statistics could be co-opted. Each committee also had one secretary, 
who was the only person with full time responsibility for carrying out 
the statistical work . Intermediary between GSK and the volost officials 
was another commission formed at the uezd level. This was called the 
Commission of National Food Supply (Kommissiya narodnogo prodovolstviya) 
(KNP) and varied in its activities according to the time and the inclin- 
ation of the local gentry. It was presided over by the Marshal of the 
fVobility for that uezd and had as its members local officials from the 
1. N.A.Kablukov, Kurs Statistiki, M.1911, pp.66-67.
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Ministry of State Property and elsewhere and some other persons.
In 1857 a Central Statistical Committee (TsSK) was formed to co- 
ordinate, oversee and check the work of the GSRs and collect homogeneous 
empire-wide data. The first Director of TsSK was the very able statis- 
tician P.P.Semyonov. Soon after the formation of this professional 
committee a new super-supervisory council was formed to tighten author- 
itarian control in these matters. This was the Statistical Soviet formed 
in 1863. The chairman of the Soviet was appointed directly by the Tsar, 
and the members included ! the Director of TsSK, senior editors of TsSK, 
various academics and the representatives of the Ministry of the Interior. 
At first this Soviet was given the ultimate supervisory and planning 
control over all statistical investigations. However this was changed 
somewhat after 1875 when its powers were limited to the supervising 
of central state statistics. This allowed the zemstva to develop their 
statistical organs, but as will be explained below considerable power 
was still to be exercised over the zemstvo statistical agencies by the 
local governors and the MVD.
At first under Serayonov's leadership TsSK was able to progress and 
develop its statistical work. Later in more reationary times it was to 
suffer the stagnation and bureaucratisation characteristic of the whole 
Tsarist state,
In 1864 and 1865 the TsSK worked out harvest statistics for the 
period 1860-64 from the data of GSKs. But Semyonov decided that their 
reliability was so suspect that the results were not even worth publishing 
In the first issue of a TsSK journal Semyonov stated his conviction that 
it was essential to drastically reform the means of collecting these
1. Vremennik TsSK no.l, 1866 > p.xxiii^
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harvest statistics; production should no longer be ascertained by 
allowing local agencies to estimate gross production using their own 
resources and own methods. Instead, a full and accurate census of sown 
area of all grain cultures every five years should be accompanied by the 
collection of annual data on average yields per desyatina (1 desyatina 
= 1.093 hectares) via special forms distributed annually to a representative 
section of householders
However, Semyonov's proposal was not implemented at the time. It was 
fourteen years later, after the serious harvest failure of 1880 in the 
Central and Lower Volga regions that the government and MVD began to 
look specifically into the problem of improving the quality of grain 
statistics. A special commission under Senator Bippen was given the task
of working out a plan of organising harvest statistics on the basis of
2 Semyonov's suggestion . But, instead of a census of sown area every
five years,as originally proposed by Semyonov, a full census of all land
3 (ugodya) was held for 1881 and 1887 , and from 1893 there was a move to
taking an annual registration. This registration covered all cultivated 
crops and also areas under hay (including water and other meadows). The 
gathering of these data was timed to occur at the moment of the finishing 
of the spring sowings. For the private lands the local police officials 
circulated and collected a questionnaire; for the peasant lands the volost 
authorities either did the rounds themselves and questioned each household 
or they called upon the services of the village elders to do much of this
1. See also V.E.Den,Kurs Ekonomicheskoi Geografii, M.1926, Vinogradova 
in V.S. 1925, no,10-17, p.37.
2. See Vinogradova in V.S. 1925 no.10-12, p,38
3. See Vinogradova in V.E.Den & B.I.Karpenko (eds.) Khozyaistvennaya 
Statistika SSSR, L.1930, p.
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for them. The data then passed on to GSK, with a copy to KNP . Data 
on sown area were officially collected in this way up till 1915.
Data on yields were collected by questionnaire. Every year TsSK 
allocated 12 questionnaires for the peasants to each volost, six for 
winter crops, and six for spring crops, As with sown area, these were 
distributed for the peasant lands by the volost authorities and for 
the private lands by the local police officials. Initially both sets 
of yield data passed to TsSK through GSKs ; after 1894 the volost 
authorities sent the peasant replies directly to TsSK . Copies were 
presumably sent later to KNP and GSK.
The area covered by these questionnaires substantially expanded 
between 1881 and 1907. In 1881-88 they covered only the 50 gubernii 
of European Russia. In 1888-90 the 10 gubernii of Privislinia (i.e. 
the Polish and Baltic Provinces) were added, and in 1892 North Caucasia. 
This brought the total to 64 gubernii, this covered the whole European 
Territory of the Empire. In 1895 the 4 gubernii of Western Siberia and 
the Steppe regions were added, and between 1904 and 1907 Transcaucasia, 
Central Asia and Eastern Siberia. From 1907 the figures included 92
,»
out of the 93 gubernii of the former Empire; only Kamchatka gubernia 
was excluded, an area of no agricultural significance. The coverage 
of croDS also increased. In 1881-88 the questionnaires covered Winter 
and Spring Rye, Winter and Spring Wheat, Oats, Barley, Millet, ^aize, 
Buckwheat and Spelt; after 1888 Flax, Hemp and Hay were included; from 
1889 there were different classifications for Water Meadows and Plain 
Meadows and for Strax-7 from each grain; after 1893 Beans and Lentils 
were also included; from 1905 Rice and Cotton and from 1912 Sunflowers
1. /*. /, Sirinov, thcrkl f><? <s*qr<xrr\0j statist (
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were also added ,
From 1903 TsSK also began to collect data about the conditions 
of the crop during the growing period. Data were used to calculate 
the probable gross production of grain, which was known by the end of 
July or the beginning of August. It was collected by the same mechanism 
used to collect the data of the factual harvest, but much earlier. 
The householder gave his own subjective evaluation of the size of the 
crop. This evaluation was made on the basis of several systems, the 
most common of which was a five point scale (Point 5: excellent, Point 
4: fine, Point 3: normal, Point 2: just below average and Point 1: bad). 
To translate these evaluations into factual yields the following con- 
versions were used: - point 3 (normal) equals the average factual yield
for the past ten years. For other points one or two times a third of
2 this average was added or subtracted as the case required , Yields
were measured in puds per desyatina (1 pud per desyatina = 0.164 
tsentners per hectare).
It should be noted that the yields data, unlike sown area data were 
not a full registration, but only a sample survey. Initially apparently 
a sample of only 6 households (3 peasant and 3 landowner) per volost was 
taken. Later the number was doubled, but still remained very low,
roughly at a level of 12 reports per volost, 114 reports per uezd, or
3 
about 60,000 reports for all the Empire .
1. Data on coverage from Vinogradova, in V.E.Den & B.I. Karpenko (eds.) 
Khozyaistvennaya Statistika SSSR, L.1930, p .
2. After the Revolution these data were used by the Scientific 
Methodological Department of TsSU to provide a scale for the 
conversion of correspondents subjective reports of the yield on 
a five point scale to actual yield. In the uncertain times of 
grain production after the Revolution this was a very useful piece 
of control data. (See section below on post-revolutionary 
statistics of grain output and corrections applied to it).
3. See M.A.Sirinov, ibid. , M.1923, r>.505,
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The local authorities were charged with ensuring that the lists were 
distributed throughout their area as evenly as possible and in such a 
way that the replies were reliably and responsibly filled in. But at 
the same time official sources emphasised that the role of the adminis- 
tration in collecting was only that of an intermediary between the 
producer and the TsSK. [In circulating these questionnaires the lower 
organs of administration were held to be acting not as organs of 
investigation; it was claimed they were only acting as a distribution 
mechanism] The head of the household himself, or the village elder 
(starosta), had to fill in the sheets himself in a concrete manner 
after the harvest. Consequently it was claimed that there was no guess- 
work involved; only the absolute data were being recorded.
Later analysis calls into question this official account of how the 
collection was made. Vinogradova notes that the volost authorities 
also had to produce their harvest accounts for inclusion in the governors 
annual report. She suggests that as they were overworked many of the 
replies did not come from the producers at all but were estimated by 
volost officials who filled in the forms themselves. In the first 
publication of the new grain statistics this certainly occurred. In
the introduction to the first statistical handbook devoted to grain
2
statistics under the new system TsSK itself complains about this .
Moreover, according to Yinogradova, the absence of such criticisms in 
later works of TsSK does not so much reflect a change in the pattern -of 
the work of the local authorities as a decline in the critical faculties 
of TsSK; we could add that it may also be the case that with practice
1. N.M.Vinogradova, V.S. 1925, no.10-17,pp.37-38.
2. 'Urozhai 1883^.SP'b 1884, Introduction p.6.
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the local clerks filled in the forms less crudely! Vinogradova, who 
analysed some of the 1916 returns herself, claims that nevertheless 
there are clear signs in many cases that they have been fabricated, 
and many of them produced by the same person, 
(ii) Ministry of Agriculture grain production statistics
The Department of Agriculture of the Ministry of State Property 
also had a long involvement in the working out and aggregation of local 
grain production statistics, predating the formation of TsSK under the 
MVD. As early as 1851, I.Vilson of the Department of Agriculture had 
compiled the first detailed compendium to the Department's Economic- 
Statistical Atlas of European Russia. By 1869 the fourth edition had 
appeared . This x^as a very detailed (523 page) collection of data. 
'The sole source' of data on grain production used in these volumes was 
described as being 'the data collected by the Commissions of National 
Food Supply (KNP) that were presented in the Governors' Annual Report. 
Even after the creation of TsSK, Vilson still emphasized the independent 
access of the Department of Agriculture to these data.
The figures given in this early Department of Agriculture source
 \
covered the main winter and spring grains in 49 provinces of European 
Russia. As already noted above, although TsSK had worked out national 
figures for 1860-64, it refused to publish them. These early figures 
of the Department of Agriculture, covering 1857-63 in the fourth edition
of the compendium were consequently the only aggregated figures available
2 
at the time.
In 1880, at the time that TsSK put the organisation of their
1. Obyasneniya k khozyaistvenno-statisticheskomu atlasu evropyeiskoi 
Rossii, izd.4, SPb.1869. This fourth edition is the only one 
that 1 have been able to consult.
2. Obyasneniya....., izd.4, SPb ., 1869, p.75.
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grain production statistics on a more organised footing and began the 
regular publication of these statistics, the Department of Agriculture 
also began collecting and producing its own grain production statistics. 
The Department of Agriculture had no machinery for collecting statistics 
of sown area, and so they had to use the data of the TsSK. In collecting 
its yield data, the Department, unlike TsSK, used a network of voluntary 
correspondents. In this respect it copied the American, English and 
German systems, as it readily acknowledged . These correspondents were 
in most cases farmers themselves; (in the early years they were over- 
whelmingly landowners, not peasants). The yield on their own farms was 
universally acknowledged as being higher than average because they were 
more literate and tended to be more progressive in their farming tech- 
niques. This was counteracted to some extent because they also reported 
on the yields of their less progressive neighbours. But undoubtedly 
the major drawbacks of the Department's system of gathering yield statis- 
tics was the untypical sample, the small size of the correspondence net- 
work and their unlevel distribution throughout the country. The following 
table shows the size of the network and how it developed:
Absolute No. of No. of correspondents No. of correspondents 
Year correspondents per uezd per volost
1881-85
1886-90
1891-95
1896-1900
1901-08
1913
1 . Svod
2,600
3,000
5,600
6,900
6,949
8,486
Statisticheskikh
5
6
11
14
14
17
Svedinii po Sel .Khoz.Rossii
0.27
0.32
0.59
0.75
0.75
0.91
k kontsu
XIX veka, SPb 1902, p.IX.
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Sources: Numbers of correspondents for 1881-85/1896-1900
from Svod. Stat. Svedenii SPb.. 1902 p. ,X and N.M, 
Vinogradova V. S. 1925 No. 10/12 p. 39,
Numbers of correspondents for 1901-08 from D.N. 
Ivantsov, K Kritike Urozhainoi Statistiki.SPb 1915, 
p.54 and N.M.Vinogradova,ibid., 1925, p.39,
Numbers of correspondents for 1913 from V.E.Den, 
Istochniki vazhneishikh otraslei Ekon.Stat. v SSSR 
L.1926, p. 3tr
I have assumed that there were 504 uezds and 19 
volosts per uezd.
55
142
154
65
37
14
15
20
10.9
28.3
30.7
12.9
7.4
2.8
3.0
4.0
The correspondents were spread extremely irregularly between uezds 
(the year concerned is 1900):
No.of correspondents
in one uezd No. of uezds as %
1-4
5-9 
10-14 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-39 
40+ __ ___
502 100
Source: from Svod Stat.Svedenii SPb.1902, p.X 
and N.M.Vinogradova, ibid. , D.40.
The Department did not use data of those uezds for which it had less 
than 6-7 correspondents: this was about 20% in 1900, but the percentage 
fell in later years.
Statistics on yield were collected for three periods. In July, 
approximate figures were given of the preliminary winter harvest, in the 
form of a percentage difference from the average yield. In September, 
the expected results of the winter and spring grain harvests were cal- 
culated by means of test thrashings. Finally, in November, the factual
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yield was recorded after the full harvest had been completed.
Gross production could be calculated from these figures for yield 
by multiplying the regional sown area by the regional yields and adding 
the regional totals. Sown area could be obtained from the TsSK and 
yield data from the Department of Agriculture where available and from 
TsSK when no other data were available, 
iii) Zemstvo grain production statistics
The Zemstva were formed in 1864 at the gubernia and uezd levels of 
local administration. They were to act as supplementary agencies of 
local government. They were particularly concerned with relief work, 
health, education and agricultural improvements. In the grain surolus 
areas they also participated in the state purchase of grain for the array . 
This was a role which was to greatly expand during the war and to cause 
the zemstvo statisticians to have a central role in organising grain 
procurements. The Zemstva had played a very important role in organising 
famine relief in the early 1890s. And this was a role which continued 
to have importance.
The Zemstvo expenditure on agricultural measures had been fairly 
minor (less than 3 million roubles a year) before 1900. By 1907 it was 
still under 5 million roubles, but then it rose extremely rapidly in the 
immediate prewar years. It reached 16 million roubles in 1913. This 
dramatic rise in zemstvo agricultural measures was in many respects a
reflection of the increased activities and expenditures of the Ministry of
2 
Agriculture much of which was channelled through the Zemstvo .
As the agricultural work of the Zemstva grew, their need for reliable 
statistical materials also grew and so did their ability to organise
1. See section below on grain utilisation by the army, p
2. See Sel.Khoz. Promysel v Rossii, M.1914, pp.234-44.
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their own statistical departments, At first they had relied on the 
statistics of the central administration. The first Zemstvo stat- 
istical collection was published by the Moscow Zemstvo for the year 
1869, and only included central official data collected by the TsSK 
as explained above. But soon the zemstva found these data inadequate 
and began setting about collecting their own. From the beginning of 
the 1870s they began to undertake studies of peasant budgets and their 
own local statistical investigations. Special statistical departments 
were formed within the Zemstva: Vyatka, Moscow and Chernigov Zemstva 
led the way, but were soon follox^ed by nearly all the others.
However the collection of grain statistics by the zemstva stat- 
isticians only really began in the 1880s after the TsSK and Department 
of Agriculture had already started organising grain statistics in this 
field. N.M.Vinogradova and V.F.Karavayev provide the following indication 
of when different zemstva were active collecting grain statistics:
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Date of first
organisation of Provinces organising the collection of harvest
harvest statistics statistics
a) Without interruption b) With interruption
Pre 1890 Voronezhskaya G 
Kazanskaya G. 
Moskovskaya G. 
Orlovskaya G. 
Poltavskaya G. 
Samarskaya G.
Khersonskaya G,
1886 Kurskaya G.
1885
1884 Tlyazanskaya G.
1886
1887 Saratovskaya G. 
1890
1887 Tavricheskaya G.
1880-82.
1896,1898
1889-91,
1897
1888-91,
1899-1906,
1909
1887-88,
1899
1891-1895 Kostromskaya G. 
Permskaya G. 
Leningradskaya G. 
Pskovskaya G.
1894 Vyatskaya G. 
1893
1893 Nizhegorodskaya G,
1894
Tverskaya G.
Tulskaya G. 
Kharkovskaya G.
1892-1908,
1912
1891-1903,
1907
1893-1904,
1908
1895-98,
1908
1891-93,
1901
1896-1900 Kaluzhskaya G. 1896 Vladirairskaya G,
Ufimskaya G. 1896
Yaroslavskaya G. 1897
Yekaterinoslavsk G. 1900 Ulyanovskaya G.
Smolenskaya G. 
Tambovskaya G.
1896-1900,
1902-07,
1914
1900-04
1912
1900-06,
1912
1896.
1897.
1899
1901-05
1906+
Vologodskaya G. 
Chernigovskaya G
Bessarabskaya G. 
Kievskaya G. 
Penzenskaya G,
1901 Olonetskaya G 
1904
1908
1913
1909
1901-05, 
1911
Source: V,F.Karavayev, 'Izdaniya zemstv 34 gubernii po obshchyei 
ekonomicheskoi i otsenochnoi statistikye vyishedshiye 
za vretnya s 1864g. po 1 yanvarya 1911 g., SPb.1911, and 
N.M.Vinogradova, VS, 1925, No.10-12, p.44,
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From this it can be seen that coverage was incomplete and spasmodic 
The main reason for this was the central authorities' suspicion of the 
zemstvo statisticians and their work, vhich led to central attempts to 
control their work and restrict it to the narrowest possible limits. 
This attitude was certainly recognised and resented by the zemstvo 
statisticians themselves. Professor N.A.KabluktoV/ in his 'Text to 
 acquaint (the reader) with the conditions and methods of collecting and 
reworking data in zemstvo statistical investigations' '"» wrote
Frequently, the zemstvo statistician felt and knew 
that as soon as the immediate, direct practical task to 
which the zemstvo investigations were being applied, was 
solved, that all statistical work in the given zemstvo 
would finish. It sometimes happened that the processing 
of already collected material would be abruptly broken off 
and that local investigations would be called off when 
they had just got into full swing .
E.Z.Volkov describes even worse happenings, and also 
in particular emphasises that the zemstve chairmen were
often unsympathetic to the plight of the zemstvo
. . . 2 
statisticians .
After the agrarian unrest in 1902 in a few uezdy of Poltava and 
Kharkhov gubernii, the MVD blamed the local zemstvo statistical invest- 
igations and forced the zemstvo statistical office to be closed down in
3 a number of gubernii . From the 1880s a MVD circular had stated that
1. N.A.Kablukov, Kurs Statistiki, M.1911, p, ? 2_
2. E.Z.Volkov XjgrgrrtoEkonomicheskayfl. Statistiki. Possii, M.1923, p.11.
3. See N.A.Kablukov, Kurs Statistiki, M.1911, pp.227-28.
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the appointment of zemstvo statistical officials was subject to the 
affirmation of the local governor. In reactionary times this often 
meant that many statistical bureauxwere understaffed and even without 
directors although the zemstvo itself wanted to appoint a qualified 
statistician who was willing to take on the job . As we shall see
below there was some basis in the fears which the MVD had of these
2 
radical zemstvo statisticians".
Methods used to collect data varied from zemstvo to zemstvo. 
There was no central coordinating body for zemstvo statistics; each stat- 
istical bureau was left to develop its own mechanism for collecting 
grain output statistics independently. Some zemstva collected their 
data through a network of voluntary correspondents, some through the 
local organs of administration, some used both; at least one zemstvo 
(Yaroslav) also used 'expeditions'. Some used interviews to obtain 
information, some used questionnaires, and others got their agents to 
make subjective evaluations.
The subjective evaluations of the voluntary correspondents were 
perhat>s the most common of all these methods, but still only accounted
for about a third of all the zemstvo investigations of grain production
3 that were carried out .
The zerastvo statistics on grain production cannot be considered as 
either complete or homogeneous. They can be used individually for 
individual gubernia as control data for comparison with other data but 
great care has to be taken,
1. See N.A.Kablukov, ibid., p.227
2. See pp. 20
3. For a detailed examination of the different methods used to gather 
data see N,M,Vinogradova, V.S, 1925, No.10-12, pp.53-60.
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The zemstvo statistu.U.iii> were as we have already stated restrained 
from developing into an Empire-wide statistical network and from 
coordinating their efforts for political reasons. With the approach 
of the evolution and the collapse of the Autocratic political power 
the zemstvo statisticians were able to consolidate their positionsJ in 
fact the attempts of these statisticians to assert themselves were a 
not insignificant part of the Revolution.
The Tsarist authorities had good reason to be suspicious of these 
local zemstvo statisticians many of whom were involved or had only 
recently been involved in revolutionary activities. Many directors of 
zemstvo statistical offices had a revolutionury^paifr. P.I.Popov director 
of Tula zemstvo statistical department 1909-17 (the future director 
of TsSU) had been imprisoned for l\ and exiled for 3 years. V.G.Groman 
director of Penza zemstvo statistical department 1909-15 was an active 
Menshevik who had been imprisoned and exiled on numerous occasions. 
V.M.Obukhov, director of Petrograd zemstvo statistica office during the 
War had been an old Bolshevik and even a delegate to the Party's London 
conference. At a lower level several active 8olsheviks including 
A.D.Tsyurupa, A.G.Shlikhter and V.V.Osinsky had all found regular legal 
cover for their revolutionary activities by working, very competently 
as local zemstvo statisticians.
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While the strength of the zemstvo statistical offices was contin- 
uingly growing, despite hindrances from the authorities, the TsSK 
network was not making any progress and plans to reform it had not gone 
through. Despite attempts to keep the zemstvo statistical departments 
isolated and not to allow any coordination or contact betx^een them 
such meetings did occur.
A,I.Chuprov and N.A.Kablukov were the major early organisers of 
these meetings. Officially they were meetings of academic statisticians 
but the zemstvo statisticians were by far the most numerous group. The 
Statistical Department of the Moscow Juridical Society (known also as 
the Chuprov Society) was the most famous meeting place and this society 
held fairly regular meetings from the 1890s. Chuprov was also respon- 
sible for the formation of the first Congress of Prussian Statisticians, 
which w<er£.' held as subsections of the Congresses of Naturalists and 
Physicians . Commissions were also formed for the coordination of work 
between neighbouring zemstvos. However until the beginning of the war 
meetings of these statistical societies, congresses and commissions did 
not openly gather data and process 6A*/»r they only discussed statistical 
methods and ways of improving the quality of statistics as a whole, i.e. 
usually they adhered to the restriction to academic matters that was 
officially imposed on their meetings.
1. First Statistical Congress sub-section of 9th Congress of Naturalists 
and Physicians Moscow 1894, 2nd Statistical Congress under 10th 
Congress of Naturalists etc., in Kiev, 1898, 3rd Statistical 
Congress under llth Congress of Naturalists and Physicians in 
Saint Petersburg, 1901, 4th Statistical Congress under 12th 
Congress of Naturalists and Physicians Moscow 1910-11 t 5th 
Statistical Congress under 13th Congress, 1913.
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b) Grain production statistics during the First World War 1914-17 
i) Introduction
The war led to a fundamental change in the problems of evaluating 
the level of grain production and utilisation. This ultimately led to 
a change in the methods of evaluation and a greater role for the zemstvo 
statisticans. The zemstva had been allowed to Aerv*-^ an ail-Russian 
organisation the All-Russian Union of Zemstva but the activities of this 
organisation (and of the similar alL-Russian organisation of town auth- 
orities) were initially restricted to organising relief work. The defeats 
of the tsarist army led to a very large flow of refugees . The opening 
up of the Rumanian front in 1916 led to a flow of refugees from Bessarabia. 
And the retreat on the Turkish front in 1917 led to a flow of refugees from 
Turkish Armenia.
According to Volkov the number of refugees entering the area of 
what was to become the USSR, grew from 1.1 mln.on January 1, 1915, to 
4.2 mln. in 1916, 7.8 mln. in 1917 and 9.7 million in 19182 .
Apart from organising relief for these refugees the zemstva very soon 
became deeply involved in procuring grain for the rapidly expanding army .
Under these changed circumstances the zemstvo statisticians were 
at last allowed to spread their activities onto a national level and ult- 
imately to carry out the first All-Fussian Agricultural census. But the 
strain of the wartime change in circumstances also led to the beginning 
of a deterioration in the peasants' attitude to official statistics.
1. By the time of the First wartime harvest (October 1915) the Central 
powers had occupied all of the Polish gubernii, the southern Baltic 
gubernii; Kurland G.,Kovno G., Vilna G., parts of Belorussia, 
Grodno G., parts of Minsk G., and part of Western Ukraine Volyin G.
2. See Volkov, p. 104. See below p, £5"--? for more details.
3. The zemstva involvement in military grain procurement had already 
begun long before the outbreak of War (see below p.!^~^-). But 
the expansion of the army from 0.4 million to over 10 million quickly 
changed their importance.
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This change in peasants' attitude was a direct result of their 
change in circumstances. It had extremely significant consequences 
for the problem of obtaining reliable materials on the level of grain 
production and utilisation, and will therefore be described before we 
deal with the modifications in the organisation of grain statistics 
in this period. The war resulted in a high demand for grain in the 
north-west, and this, together with the relatively poor harvest of 
1916 resulted in regional shortages. The Tsarist and then the Pro- 
visional (rovernment (March-November 1917) moved towards the imposition 
of a grain levy on the peasants, in the form of compulsory purchases 
of statistically determined grain surpluses; this was imposed at a
fixed price, which, in inflationary conditions, was relatively low. 
The peasant automatically reacted to such attempts by denying that he 
had any surpluses, or at least that he had as large a surplus as the 
authorities claimed. In order to carry out the levy and to make eval- 
uations of the level of surpluses a central Special Food Council, 
established during the war, appointed a network of local plenipotentiaries
Its local plenipotentiaries dealt with the local authorities at the uezd 
level, using the services of the local supply commissions (KNP)
1. See above p.e» for the creation of these commissions.
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The local supply coramission and the food council plenipotentiary based 
their assessment of the existence of surpluses on the results of the 
1916 agricultural census, together with the available statistical data 
collected by GSK, the local zemstvo or the Ministry of Agriculture's 
correspondents network.
As soon as the peasants discovered, or even suspected, the use 
which was being made of the statistical data which they had been freely 
and relatively disinterestedly supplying disinterest was replaced by 
extreme caution. The reliability of the data began to suffer.
This was the beginning of a fundamental change in the peasants' 
attitude to statistical materials. The Bolshevik revolution was foll- 
owed by the period of war communism (1918-20), involving severe requis- 
itioning; the peasants' hostile attitude and distrust increased. This 
fundamental change in the conditions in which grain statistics were 
traditionally collected in Russia required a great organisational change 
in the methods of collecting these statistics. Such organisational 
changes in response to these changed circumstances were not fully intro- 
duced by the central statistical agency until the mid 1920s, and they 
will be dealt with in the following chapter. In my view, the significant 
organisational changes in 1914-17, described below were notCcia&eJ by tkc 
mental changes in peasant attitudes, which had not gone far enough at 
that time to be a serious obstacle to accuracy. They were due rather 
to the changed political circumstances, the needs of the state, the 
weakness of the central authorities and the growth in importance of local 
political groups, 
ii) The organisation of grain statistics 1914-17
The conflict between the progressive zemstvo statisticians and the 
central statistical agencies of the MVD in the pre-war period has
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already been described above , Local statisticians were extremely 
dissatisfied with the restrictions which the MVD had placed on their 
scale of operations, and were unstinting in their criticism of official 
central state statistics. 1 have argued above that the considerable 
dissatisfaction with official grain statistics of the TsSK of the T IVD 
was exaggerated. It was possible due to their political outlook, and 
was not unrelated to the demands that they were making for a larger 
role for themselves in state statistics.
Just before the war the demands of these local statisticians
2 
crystalised around the need for an Ail-Russian Agricultural Census .
Much of their later agitation was associated with their demand for this 
Census. In September 1913 the first Mi-Russian Agricultural Congress 
was held in Kiev. At this Congress Professor K.G.Voblyi made a speech 
advocating the carrying our of an All-Russian Agricultural Census with
the participation of local zemstvo and town statisticians, timed to
3
coincide x^ith the planned 1915 population census . The Congress accep- 
ted the proposals and the commission of the Congress worked out plans 
for its implementation and timing in detail, and handed these on to the 
Chuprov Society for methodological revision. The Chuprov Society also 
approved of the plan but it was coldly received by the authorities (the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs,, and TsSK) and the project was shelved.
1. See pp. I&-Z0
2. Censuses of horses had been carried out by TsSK for military 
purposes since 1882, and the first population census was held 
in 1897, but an All-Russian Agricultural Census was beyond the 
means of TsSK unless they were to use the assistance of the 
zemstvo statistical network in the localities.
3. See Trudy of the 1st Agricultural Congress in Kiev, 4-10 September 
1913, vol.1, pp.10-11, vol.3, pp.55-62, 273-78. Quoted from 
E.Z.Volkov 'Agrarno EkonomicA^/i'^Statistikfl. Rossii 1 M.1923, p.248.
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Early in 1914 in connection with the preparations for the re- 
negotiating of the Russian German Trade Agreement that was to take place 
in 1920 a whole series of Congresses had gathered and they too echoed 
the demand for an agricultural census . With the outbreak of war these 
congresses quickly dissolved .
The War brought problems that could not be ignored. In supplying 
the army and the civil population the state had to rely on large and 
increasingly powerful local organisations.
In August 1914 the zemstva and town authorities were allowed to form 
organisations on an All-Russian scale. An All-Russian Union of Zemstva 
and an All-Russian Union of Towns were created for the duration of the War
and initially with the narrow task of working for the relief of sick and
3 
wounded soldiers . Prince G.E.Lvov, who later became the first Prime
Minister in the Provincial Government headed the Union of Zemstva.
For the first year of the War these new organisations appear to have 
restricted themselves to the narrow field of relief work. But the staff 
of the Union of Zemstva and the Union of Towns was expanded, well beyond 
the scope needed purely to deal with relief work and contained some very 
able and ambitious people. The 27-year-old A.V.Chayanov was employed by 
the Union of Zemstva where he headed their economics and statistics de- 
partment. Within this department worked the 23-year-old N.D.Kondratiev
1. See Volkoy, ibid., p.249.
2. For the future history of Soviet statistics it is interesting to note
that V.V.Obolenskii (N.Osinsky), the future director of TsSU and TsUNKhU 
was temporarily employed at this time by the Kharkov Oblast Committee 
for the re-negotiation of the Russo-German Trade Agreement, and produced 
for them a survey of the evolution of grain yields in Southern Russia 
1889-1912, which was published in Kharkov in 1915. (V.V.Obolenskii, 
Urozhai khlebov v yuzhnoi Rossii (1899-1912gg),Kharkov,1915).
3. For this brief account of the rise of the Zemstva see M.T.Florinsky,
The end of the Russian Empire, Collier Books, New York, 1967, ppp.124-44 
(First published in 1931 by the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace).
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and several other economists and statisticians . The statistical 
economics department of the Union of Towns was headed by the slightly
older but no less ambitious V.G.Groman, former director of the Penza
2 Gubernia zemstvo statistical department .
With the disastrous military reversals in Galicia in April 1915 
the Union of Zemstva and the Union of Towns began agitating for a greater 
involvement in economic and political matters under the slogan of the 
need 'to mobilise industry'. But still the government was reluctant to 
give too much power to the zemstva and town organisations and to the 
radical elements like the statisticians who played an important role 
within them.
In March and April 1915 the Chuprov Society in Moscow turned again 
to the authorities with the request to let the zemstvo statisticians 
participate in the carrying out of an All-Russian Agricultural Census. 
When this was opposed by the authorities, the Society modified its request 
and asked for 'a census of stocks of foodstuffs of mass consumption 1 , they 
explained that this was necessary 'for the solution of all questions 
connected with the correct organisation and provisioning of the population 
with necessary products'. However the government still refused to accept 
the initiative.
Three months later, in July 1915, a session of the Central Commission 
of the Union of Towns was held in Moscow concerned with 'economic questions i,f\ 
connection with the high cost of living and the supplying of the army 1 . 
V.G.Groman the new director of the Statistical-Economic Bureau of the Ail- 
Russian Congress of Towns, described 'the correct scientific accounting of 
the production and consumption rate of grain 1 as one of the 'necessary 
measures which had to be taken against the worsening of the food supply
1. See N.Jasny, Soviet Economists of the Twenties, Cambridge 1972, pp.158,200
2. See N.Jasny, ibid., Cambridge 1972, pp.91-5. Groman was 42 years 
old in 1915.
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problem' . With the full support of the Commission he called for a 
census of sown areas, yields, and stocks of grains for the consumption of 
the population and livestock, with the aim of correctly regulating 
commodity exchange (tovaroobmen)'; on behalf of the Ail-Russian Union of 
Zemstva and Towns, he asked the government to affirm the resolution about 
the census in a 'legal manner 1 . But the government still refused.
The creation of the Special Councils and particularly the Special 
Council on Food in the following month in August 1915 somewhat changed the 
position. The important feature about these Councils was that they were
to include within their membership representatives of the new social
2 
organisations: the Union of Zemstva and the Union of Towns . P.V. Struve
(the former legal Marxist) was the representative of the All-Russian Union 
of Zemstva on the Special Food Council, while V.G.Groman became the re- 
presentative of the All-Russian Union of Towns.
Given this encouragement Groman soon started organising the statis- 
ticians. In November a special All-Russian Conference of Town and Zemstva 
Statisticians was convened in Moscow, with the express purpose of 'working 
out the scale of supply needs and of food stocks in the country'. Only 
when this conference rejected all compromises and through its spokesman 
(Groman) underlined the necessity of carrying out an agricultural census 
did the government finally give way and instruct the Special Food Council 
to supervise the carrying out of such a census.
1. See Protokoli Soveshchaniya po Ekonomicheskim Voprosam, svyazannim s 
dorogoviznoi i snabzheniyem armii Moscow 11-13 July 1915. Cited 
from E.Z.Volkov, ibid., p.250. *
2. See M.T.Florinsky, ibid., p.102,
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In the beginning of March 1916 a further Congress of Town and 
Zemstvo Statisticians was called, with the specific task of drawing up 
a plan and programme for the forthcoming census. The statisticians 
elected from amongst themselves an Executive Commission to take care of 
preparation of the census while the Congress was not sitting . Groman 
appears to have been elected chairman of this commission and P.I.Popov 
(the head of the Tula Gubernia zemstvo office) was one of its members.
The Executive Commission of the statisticians soon found themselves 
in conflict with the Special Council. The Special Council wanted to 
speed up the taking of the census and decided to omit the livestock 
census. The Executive Commission of the statistical congress jointly 
with the central commission of the Ail-Russian Congress of Zemstvos 
and Towns, now called an emergency Congress of the zemstvo and town 
statisticians, which met on 5-7 March 1916; this emergency Congress 
categorically forbade such omissions. The Ministry of Agriculture 
decided that it had no alternative but to affirm the plan of the stat- 
isticians, which it did on 3 April 1916. It thus over-rode the plans 
of the Special Council; while the Special Council was formally super- 
vising the census, it in fact had very little power independent of the 
statisticians. On 15-18 April 1916 the Ail-Russian Congress of Zemstvo 
and Town Statisticians took the final decisions on the details of collecting
the
1. See N.Ya.Vorobyev, Syezdy i soveshchaniya statistikov v 
dorevolyutsionnoi Rossii i v SSSR, in Istoriya Sovetskoi 
gosudarstvennoi statistiki,M.1960, p.405.
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data and planning ttew reworking. The census was to be carried out in 
the localities by zemstvo statisticians and by special plenipotentiaries 
of the Special Food Council, These, together with correspondents from 
the zemstvo and Ministry of Agriculture network, were made responsible 
for assessing the size of the sowings in 1916.
Friction between statisticians and the central authorities in the 
end did not too adversely influence the census procedures. The census 
covered 49 gubernii of European Russia (all except Stavropol). Accord- 
ing to its findings these contained 15,645,508 separate households, with 
a population of 84.7 mln. and a sown area of 78.44 mln hectares and 
140.24 mln. head of livestock. But the friction between the statisticians 
and the central authorities had considerable effect on the working out 
of the data. P.I.Popov together with Groman was the main spokesman of 
the Statistical Congress, reported to a further session of the Congress 
of Statisticians, held on 17-21 February 1917 that the results of the 
enquiry in a whole row of gubernii were not fully worked out. This was 
very late considering the urgent tasks the data were required for.
At this Congress Popov launched the slogan that their work was 
directed towards 'the needs and interests of the construction of a new 
society'. In the pursuit of this aim the congress decided to repeat the 
Agricultural census .
The influence of the February Revolution on the collection of 
statistics was very great. According to E.Z.Volkov, 'the revolution 
destroyed with one blow the old argument betx^een the zemstvo statisticians
and the bureaucracy of the old regime, taking the power out of the hands
2 
of the bureaucracy and transferring it to the hands of democracy . But,
1. See E.Z,Volkov ibid., p.256
2. See E.Z,Volkov, ibid., p.258.
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as we have seen, this process was very far advanced before the February 
Revolution; the statisticians had already become openly rebellious 
and their rebellion had almost completely succeeded. For them the 
February Revolution was a mere confirmation of the dominance that they 
had already earned for themselves.
Immediately after the February Revolution a Department of Census
Statistics was created in the Ministry of Agriculture , and P.I.Popov
2 
was placed in charge of it. On 18-22 April 1917 a further Congress
convened by the Executive Commission of the Statistical Congress 
arranged the final details of the repeat agricultural census; this 
census was now to assist with preparation for a land reform. In line 
with the new circumstances the Congress was now renamed 'Congress of 
Zemstvo, Town, and Government Statisticians with Representatives from 
the Statistical Sciences'.
The data for this census were again collected by local zemstvo 
and town statisticians, and by plenipotentiaries of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and by local correspondents. The data were collected before 
the October Revolution. After October, the Department of Census statis- 
tics, now under the renamed Peoples Commissariat of Agriculture (NKZem), 
and still headed by Popov called an All-Russian Conference of Statisticians 
in Petrograd in December 1917; at this conference the plan for working 
out thtfsedata was approved^. The results however were not worked out 
in any complete form and were only published much later after considerable 
delay .
1. Note the Russian use of the word (perepis) is somewhat less
precise than our concept of census as it includes mass surveys. 
The word census is consequently used here in its Russian sense.
2. Popov was aged 46 at this time, N.D.Kondratiev aged 25 became one of the 
Deputy Ministers of Agriculture at this time(see N.Jasny,ibid., 
Cambridge 1972,p.158).
3. See N.Ya.Vorobyev,ibid.,p.4Q6.
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c) Grain utilisation statistics before 1918
The collection of statistics of grain utilisation in the pre-war 
period was not organised in any comprehensive or regular way. As in 
all non-planned economies there was no need for such statistical mater- 
ials; it would have been costly to produce them and the central govern- 
ment was not willing to finance such programmes for the sake of academic 
interest . As we shall see later, local authorities took a more en- 
lightened view and several local studies were carried out.
Very rough estimates of grain in excess of basic rural consumption 
were published occasionally by the Ministry of Agriculture and by TsSK. 
These provided an indication of the material conditions of the peasantry 
in different regions, and consequently served a political purpose by 
indicating the likelihood of peasant unrest. But these balances were 
extremely crudej they incorporated a traditional unchanging grain consump- 
tion norm which, as is explained below, had very little statistical basis.
The only grain utilisation statistics that had been kept for any 
length of time and with any degree of system were those related to the 
payment of taxes; data on military rations and on grain consumption for 
seed (seed rates) were also collected. Data for tax purposes included 
exports and imports, grain cartage and a substantial part of the indus- 
trial processing of grain. Military rations covered personal consumption 
rations and food rations for horses. Data on seed utilisation were 
available because grain yields were initially calculated in terms of 
production per unit of sown seed.
1. In fact the government was quite reluctant to finance such 
basic statistical programmes as the carry^jout c^aregular 
programme of demographic censuses.
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Only with the extension of the activities of the zemstvo statistic- 
ians into budget investigations on a sample survey basis were any stat- 
istically based figures available for the consumption norms of the pop- 
ulation and for the feed norms for livestock.
The earliest available grain consumption studies were those in the 
late 1880s by F.A.Shcherbin on peasant consumption in Voronezh Gubernia, 
and by F.F.Erisman on the consumption of workers in Moscow . But after 
the famine of 1891 the Zemstvo statisticians as a whole became very 
interested in this question, A combined session of the first organised 
Statistical Congress (a sub-section of the IX Congress of Russian Natural- 
ists and Physicians) and the statistical section of the Moscow Juridical 
Society was held in Moscow on 6 January 1894 under the chairmanship of
N.A.Kablukov; this discussed consumption statistics and how the work of
2 
the zemstvo statisticians could be organised to improve them . The
major speech was given by L.N.Maress 'On monographic methods of inves- 
tigation and their application to the food question 1 . All the speakers 
agreed that the accurate knowledge of the level of consumption was 
desirable, and that current knowledge was poor.
Maress began the debate by stating provocatively, 'We know nothing 
or almost nothing about what the population eats and about what quantities 
of food are normally consumed'; 'We have insufficient local investigations 
on this question'; 'Zemstvo statistics hardly touch this important side
1. See Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii PO Voronezhskoi gubernii, 
torn 2, vyp.2, Krestyanskoye khozyaistvo po Ostrogozhskomu uezdq 3 
compiled by F.A.Shcherbin, Voronezh 1887, see also his later study 
Krestyanskiye byudzhetyx-, Voronezh 1900. F.F.Erisman
See A.V.Chayanov and G.A.Studenskii, Istoriya byudzhetnikh issledovanii, 
M.1922, pp. 24-85 for a history of the budget investigation.
2. This account is taken from A.E.Lositsky's introduction to Sostaniye
pitaniya Selskogo naseleniya SSSR 1920-1924 gg. t Trudy TsSU, Tom XXX, 
vyp.2, M.1928, pp,7-15. And from A.V.Chayanov and G.A.Studenskii, 
M.1922, ibid,, Lositsky cited extensively from the stenographic 
record of this Congress 'Trudy podsektsii statistiki IX Syezda 
russkikh yestestvoispitatelyei i vrachyei, Moskva 3-11 yanvarya 
1894g., Chernigov 1894.
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of the life of the nation'. Professor A.I.Chuprov noted correctly 
that even in the west there were very few studies of this important 
question. And N.F,Annenskii pointed out that in the recent famine there 
had been considerable confusion about the 'normal 1 level of consumption: 
'one authority, basing himself on the "works" of the handicraft commission, 
stated that the average level of consumption per person per year was 18 
pds of rye + 5 pds of other grains i.e. 28 pds of rye, but another 
authority found a figure of 18 pds of rye which he considered to be suff- 
icient for one healthy adult; meanwhile the zemstva proposed 12 pds and 
the authorities accepted that 9 pds was sufficient to feed-a full grown 
person'. Annenskii concluded 'This kind of mess needs to be cleared up; 
and in order to do it zemstvo statisticians must introduce the statistical 
study of the scale of the normal consumption of the mass of the population'. 
He added that 'If we had firmer data on the scale of normal consumption, 
they would serve as a useful criterion for verifying the reliability of our 
evaluations of the scale of grain production* .
At the 1894 session the statisticians also discussed how best to 
arrange a series of investigations to improve their knowledge. A.I.Chuprov, 
N.F.Annenskii and F.F.Erisman favoured a monographic method of studying 
consumption. F.A.Shcherbin proposed that in order to get a full account 
of grain consumption it would be necessary to organise an investigation of 
a whole series of utilisation budgets. And N.A.Kablukov proposed that the 
correspondents in the correspondents network be prevailed upon to supply 
consumption data.
The Chuprov monographic method could only be of general significance 
if the individual households which were exposed to detailed monographic 
investigation were truly typical of all the households in the given region. 
1. See A.E.Lositsky, ibid., Trudy TsSU, Tom.XXX, vyp.2,M.1928, p.9.
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A mathematical statistical method was therefore proposed to measure 
all significant elements of variation between different households, in 
order to select a 'typical' household or a 'typical 1 selection of house- 
holds. In this way the Russian statisticians moved towards sophisticated 
sampling techniques for their household investigations.
The Shcherbin full budget balance method had apparently worked well 
in Voronezh and the North Caucasus during the 1891 famine; less detailed 
investigations, which did not check the total production and utilisation 
of all the elements in the household, tended to give faulty results. 
However,,many statisticians considered that such detailed budget balances 
were too expensive and could not be carried out in a sufficient number of 
households to give a typical sample coverage; and Kablukov proposed that 
the additional expense of carrying out detailed budgets could be covered 
by getting peasant correspondents to fill in the budget forms instead of 
the zemstvo statisticians. But Chuprov pointed out that the intelligent 
literate peasants who were likely to be the correspondents were unfort- 
unately entirely untypical of the mass of Russian peasants and so would 
provide unrepresentative data. This led A.N.Leontiev to propose that 
correspondents be requested to provide data not on their own household 
but on a household which they themselves considered to be 'typical'; 
they should provide data on the size and characteristics of their selected 
'typical' household so that the statisticians could verify for themselves 
that the selected household was 'typical' by statistical criteria.
Although Shcherbin refused to accept that 'peasant-statisticians' 
could be as reliable as 'teacher-statisticians' when it came to dealing 
with correspondents, the congress as a x^hole ended in considerable 
unanimity. The enthusiasm was such that Kablukov had difficulty in closing 
the proceedings at well past midnight. In his concluding speech Kablukov 
stated that 'It was impossible to use voting as a method of deciding
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scientific questions' and that different local conditions would 
doubtless make it more advisable to use different methods of invest- 
igation.
During the next 24 years before the creation of the Soviet Central 
Statistical Authority and the creation of a unified department of con- 
sumption statistics under Lositsky , many different methods were used 
to compile consumption data in different regions. Several attempts 
were made to aggregate the results of these local investigations in
order to present a consumption model applicable to the whole country.
2 An attempt by L.N.Maress in 1897 was followed by N.A.Svavitsky's
slightly more ambitious project for the Efron and Brokhaus encyclop- 
aedia
But it was not until the changed circumstances of the war that it 
became possible for A.V.Chayanov and V.Shub, enthusiastically encouraged
by Groman ? to direct teams of statisticians in the analysis and aggreg-
4 
ation of all the available consumption data . The results of these
1. See later chapter for an account of this.
2. See L.N.Maress, Proizvodstvo i potrebleniye khlebov v khrestyanskom 
khozyaistve, in A.I.Chuprov and A.S.Psnikov (eds.),Vliyaniye 
urozhaev i khlebnykh tsejn na nekotorii storoni russkogo narodnogo 
khozyaistva. SPb.,1897
3. See N.A.Svavitsky's article on Krestyanskiye Byudzhety,in 
Entsikloped.slovar Brokgauz i Efron
4. Chayanov was the general editor for the work concerned with analysing 
rural food and feed consumption. (A.V.Chayanov (ed.) 'Normy 
prodovolstviya selskogo naseleniya Rossii po dannyim byudzhetnikh 
obsledovanii', Vyp.l, Materialyi po voprosam razrabotki obshchego 
plana prodovolstviya naseleniya, SPb.1916 and A.V.Chayanov (ed.) 
S.A.Klepikov,'Pitaniye russkogo krestyanstva', chast 1, Normy 
potrebleniya glavnyeishikh pishchevyikh produktov, Haterialy po 
izucheniyu massovogo potrebleniya, vyp.ii, M.1920 and G.Shub was 
the general editor for the x^ork concerned with analysing urban 
food consumption. ( G.Shub (ed.), R.Kabo, Potrebleniye gorodskogo 
naseleniya Rossii (po dannym byudzhetnyik i vyiborochnyikh issledovanii) 
M.1918). Groman wrote the general introduction to Chayanov's first 
book listed above.
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analyses were intended to be used for the food supply plans which Groman 
and others were preparing at this time. These data were included in 
the official report on the prospects for the 1917 harvest and its util- 
isation. This report was drawn up by the statistical department of 
the Ministry of Food, under its director A.E.Lositsky. It appears to
have been modelled on the earlier balances drawn up by Vilson in the
2 
1860s, and was to serve as a model for the grain plans of the 1920s.
The tragedy of the situation was that the zemstvo statisticians 
were not given a chance to demonstrate their statistical and organisational 
ability until the economic position was almost impossible.
Although the aggregations of Chayanov and Shub represent a consid- 
erable achievement for the local statisticians' work,the materials which 
were available to them were extremely incomplete and heterogeneous. A 
revolution in the organisation of grain consumption statistics would come 
not from aggregating data collection under the old system, but from a 
revolution in the organisation of the collection of new statistics on 
consumption. And that was to come about after the creation of the new 
Soviet Central Statistical Authority^TsSU,and the creation of a powerful 
department of consumption statistics dedicated to following the advice 
of Chuprov, Kablukov, Shcherbin, Annenskii and other former great zemstvo 
statisticians in improving the scientific knowledge on food consumption.
1. See A.E.Lositsky (ed t ) Urozhai khlebov v Rossii v 1917g; Valovoi 
i chistyi sbor, prodovolstvenniye i kormoviye potrebnosti, mestniye 
izbyitki i nedostatki glavnykh khlebov., M.1918
2. See later p.
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2. The comparability and reliability of these grain statistics
In this section I will begin by reviewing the pre-revolutionary 
studies of the comparability of the statistical material, and then 
consider the claims of statistical workers in Gosplan SES regarding its 
reliability. These claims rest partly on Strumilin's account of the 
work of pre-revolutionary analysts, and partly on the evidence of 
utilisation data. It will be shown that Strumilin was wrong in his 
account of the claims of the pre-revolutionary analysts, and I conclude 
that the best analyses of pre-revolutionary yield data indicate that the 
level of yield given by central state Statistics was probably 'very 
close to the real level', that evidence concerning the reliability of 
sown area data is much less certain than claimed. It will also be shown 
that the reliability of the pre-war grain forage balances is so slight 
that balances could be, and were, drawn up to justify both corrected 
and uncorrected data. Shcherbin's dream of utilisation data reliable 
enough to verify the reliability of production data had not yet come true 
Therefore Gosplan pre-revolutionary grain forage evidence cannot be con- 
sidered to support the Gosplan corrections which increased the pre-war 
production estimates, 
a) Pre-war data 
i) Comparability of data
One of the earliest studies of the question of the comparability of 
different sources of grain statistics, a very important influence on 
attitudes to the reliability of official statistics, was carried out by 
A.Fortunatov and published in 1893 . Professor Fortunatov compared the
1. See A.Fortunatov, Selskokhozyaistvennaya statistika Evropyeiskoi 
Rossii, M.1893.
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average level of yield of the five main grains in the European part 
of Russia, using data from gubernorial accounts, from TsSK, and from 
the Department of Agriculture and also using the results of concrete 
investigations of individual households. The data are listed below 
(they are given in 'sam' - production per unit of seed used)
Year
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
From
Govern-
ment
Accounts
3.3
4.5
4.2
3.8
4.4
4.2
4.3
5,1
4.8
3.4
From TsSK
Allotment
hh
3.86
4.53
4.54
4.36
5.04
4.85
3.88
Private
hh.
4.60
5.32
5.36
5.22
5.96
5.69
4.65
From Dept,
Allotment
hh.
5.88
5.82
4.65
4.80
4.82
4.60
5.29
5.04
4.04
.Agr.
Private
hh.
7.04
6.91
5.65
5.64
5.68
5.52
6.22
5.92
4.86
From
concrete
investigation
hh
6.4
7.4
6.6
6.7
7.1
7.8
8.2
9.1
8.4
6.5
Source: See A.Fortunatov, ibid., M.1893, p. 192.
Furtunatov himself admitted that the results of the investigations 
of individual households covered 7,603 extremely untypical households \ 
these certainly had a level of culture and technology much higher than 
average and may consequently have been expected to have also had a much 
higher than average level of yield. It will be noticed that the data 
from the gubernorial accounts were very similar to those from TsSK, 
which is not surprising when we remember that they were collected by the 
same agents, although allegedly using different methods. And the 
Department of Agriculture data ar^ in all cases somewhat higher than the
TsSK data. In order to see whether there was any regularity in the 
relationship between these different sets of data, the gubernorial 
accounts data and the concrete investigations on the one hand and the 
TsSK and the Department of Agriculture data on the other were plotted
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on a scatter diagram * " ie*»
This diagram indicates the very close correlation between the TsSK 
and Department of Agriculture data for all years apart from the first 
year of collecting the TsSK data and a fairly high correlation between
the gubernorial account data and the concrete investigations data;
2 
1884-1889 Peasant R = 0.99 y = 051 x = 0.004
TsSK/Dept.Agr. 2 _1883-1889 K ' /CW
2
1884-1889 estates R = 0.988 y = 0.017x-+ 181
TsSK/Dept.Agr. 2
1883-1889 R = 0.648
Gubernorial Accounts /Concrete investigations
2 
1880-1889 R = 0.728 y = 1.387x + 1.595.
The Department of Agricultural data w^^e. regularly 5% higher than the 
TsSK data (although 20% for 1883). The concrete investigations data 
were, slightly less regularly 77% higher than the gubernorial accounts data. 
And the gubernorial accounts data and the TsSK peasant data were virtually 
identical.
Fortunatov was most scathing about the reliability of the TsSK 
data, but if we bear in mind that the Department of Agriculture data 
w<?/-<? based on reports from voluntary correspondents who could be expected 
to have a slightly higher level of culture and of yields than the average 
household, and that 1883 was the first year that TsSK data w^e collected, 
then this comparison of different data would indicate that the pre- 
revolutionary TsSK data wer^very reliable.
The most cited even if little studied comparison of pre -revolutionary 
data was that made by D.N. Ivantsov, that was published in
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1915 , This was the work that was repeatedly cited as justification 
for a 9% correction to TsSK yield data and a further 9% correction to 
TsSK sown area data.
Concerning grain yields Ivantsov studied the zemstva, the TsSK 
and the Department of Agriculture data on rye yields in 18 provinces 
for a period from 7 to 26 years in each province according to the 
availability of the data. The percentage differences between the 
TsSK data and the zemstva and the Department of Agriculture data were 
listed as in the following table (TsSK data = 100). The figures in 
brackets after the names of the gubernia refer to the number of years 
for which the data w-*^ taken.
1. D.N. Ivantsov, K kritikye russkoi urozhainoi statistikye; opyt 
analiza nekotorykh offitsialnyikh i zemskikh tekushikh 
dannyikh, Petrograd 1915,(Zapiski Imperatorskogo Russkogo 
GeografTcheskogo Obshchestva po otdeleniyu statistiki, 
Tom XIV) In his introduction Ivantsov explains that the given 
book was part of a larger work written in 1920 for Professor 
N.A.Kablukov's seminar on the study of the statistics and dynamic 
of Russian yield. The paper was subsequently presented to the 
Imperial Russian Geographical Society at a session on December 
13, 1913.
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Province
Voronezhskaya G. 
Orlovskaya G. 
Samarskaya G. 
Nizhegorodskaya G. 
Ufimskaya G. 
Kazanskaya G. 
Saratovskaya G. 
Kharkovskaya G. 
Chernigovskaya G. 
Poltavskaya G. 
Khersonskaya G. 
Yekaterinoslavsk G. 
Moskovskaya G. 
Vladimirskaya G. 
Kostromskaya G. 
Kaluzhskaya G. 
Pskovskaya G. 
Vyatskaya G.
Average (weighted by 
sown area)
Average (not weighted 
by sown area)
% of difference from TsSK data
Private Land Peasant allotment Land
Zemstva
Dept. 
of Agr, Zemstva
+ 6
10
+11
+ 12
+ 1
+ 9
Dept. 
of Agr.
(23)
(26)
(13)
(19)
(15)
(25)
( 8)
( 8)
( 7)
(23)
(21)
( 9)
(24)
(10)
(15)
(11)
( 8)
(11)
0
+ 7
+ 5
+ 9
0
+ 9
+ 7
+31
+ 12
+25
- 8
+ 12
+ 2
-12
+10
+ 9
-18
-
+ 5
+ 7
+30
+ 6
+ 14
- 2
+ 2
+13
+ 17
+ 10
+ 13
+20
+ 3
+ 18
+14
+ 14
+ 8
 
+ 2
- 2
+ 9
+ 2
- 8
+18
+ 10
+ 4
+ 6
+ 2
- 3
-12
+ 2
-13
+ 9
+24
-18
- 9
+ 9
+ 5
+27
+ 9
+ 16
+ 11
+ 15
+ 8
+14
+ 2
+ 17
+ 5
+ 7
+ 9
+ 5
+ 18
+ 8
+11
+11
+11
Source: D.N.Ivantsov, ibid,, P.1915, p.26.
The only conclusions which Ivantsov himself drew from these results
were that the zemstva data the most reliable, and that peasant data
were more reliable than estates data, and that the data the whole
relatively homogeneous Elsewhere however he concluded:
1. See D.N.Ivantsov, ibid. , p.29.
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As regards the absolute degree of reliability of 
these data. the data are not satisfactory. They 
fluctuate sharply in different directions, making 
it impossible to state which is the most correct 
level in each case . 
According to the statistician M.A.Sirinov, Ivantsov actually
spoke out specifically against the feasibility of applying correction
coefficients to the yield data:
If this huge percentage difference (between TsSK, 
Department of Agriculture and zemstvo data) was 
constant > then the addition of a correction would
make sense. The trouble is that for different
2 years it fluctuates sharply up and down .
As regards sown area Ivantsov was only able to carry out a 
much more limited comparison of grain sown area in only 5 gubernii 
for only 5 individual years. For what <-fc tS worth this comparison
is given below:
Sown area in th.desyatina 
according to
Differences 
Province Year TsSK Zemstva in th.des. %%
Poltavskaya G. 1910 2,113 2,422 +309 +14.6 
Khersonskaya G. 1909 3,690 4,322 +632 +17.1 
Saratovskaya G. 1909 2,761 2,803 +42 + 1.5 
Tulskaya G. 1910 156 134 - 22 -14.7 
(2 uezds)
Sum of all 4 cases* 10,613 11,600 +987 +9.3 
Source: D.N.Ivantsov, ibid., P.1915, p.129.
*Note: Ivantsov did not present an aggregation of thisedata
I have only done so here to indicate where those who
have claimed to have found a justification for a 9%
correction to sown area have got their figures from.
1. See D.N.Ivantsov, ibid., p.148.
2. Cited from a speech by D.N.Ivantsov to the Moscow Oblast 
Agronomical Congress, recorded by M.A.Sirinov. See 
M.A.Sirinov, Ocherkyi po agrarnoi statistikye, M.1923 pp.568-9.
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During the War as the Special Food Council became actively 
involved in surveying food availability^it naturally began considering 
the reliability of the different types of grain statistics. This of 
course became particularly important in 1916 when the TsSK stopped 
producing harvest data. The head of the statistical section of the 
Special Food Council, P.Rumyantsev, quoted Ivantsov's work and stated 
his agreement with Ivantsov's general conclusions.
In as much as it is possible to judge from the analysis 
of D.N.Ivantsov (K kritikye russkoi urozhainoi statistiki) 
TsSK normally gives the lowest indicator, the Department 
of Agricultural Economy on the contrary the highest, and 
the local current statistics are between them. This is 
affirmed by the comparative material of the directorate 
of the special commission for food supply .
The statistical section of the Special Food Council had in fact 
carried out an analysis which covered a more limited number of years 
(1909-13) than Ivantsov's but was nevertheless much more broadly based 
in the kinds of grains included and the number of provinces covered. 
Instead of covering just rye in 18 provinces, the special council 
survey covered 5 types of grain for up to 29 prpvinces. The data 
are listed below:
1, P.Rumyantsev, Materialy k prodovolstvennomu planu, Urozhai 
khlebov v Rossii v 1916g., Petrograd 1916, p.VIII
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Average yield in ts/ha
Winter
Winter
Spring
Barley
Oats
Source
Rye 29
Wheat 9
Wheat 12
17
29
Zemstva 
current 
statistics
7.87
10.10
7.09
8.45
8.59
: P. Rumyantsev, Materialy
Urozhai khlebov v Rossii
TsSK
7
9
6
8
8
k
v
.30
.37
.65
,18
.00
Dept. 
of 
Agr. 
Econ.
8.11
10.04
7,67
8.87
8.59
Zemstva/ 
TsSK
107
107
106
103
107
prodovolstvennomu
1916g. Petrograd
.8%
.8%
.6%
.3%
.4%
olanu
1916 .f
Dept. 
of Agr 
Econ./ 
TsSK
111
107
115
108
107
>
y{[
 
 
 
  t
 
17.
2%
3%
4%
4^
In the following years this kind of analysis was repeated on 
a greater and greater scale. The figures worked out by TsSU in the 
early years of the Revolution for the years 1906-14 covered 8 grain 
types, plus peas, potatoes and sown grass, and 30 provinces in 
European Russia, 3 provinces in the North Caucasus, 4 in Siberia, 
7 in the Ukraine and 1 in Turkestan (i.e. 45 out of a possible 78 
provinces) . The TsSU study, published in 1921, referred to peasant 
and estates lands together; in as much as they were used for comparison 
with later years when there were only peasant lands, these figures 
may have caused some confusion. However in the following year
TsSU published an even more detailed comparison for just the peasant
2 lands and recommended that these replace the series given earlier .
The following table lists Department of Agriculture data for peasant 
lands in 1905-14, as a percentage of TsSK data, as given in this 
latter source:
1. See Trudy TsSU, Tom VIII, vyp.1, M.1921, pp.244-62
2. Trudy TsSU, Tom VIII, vyp.2, M.1922, pp.362-64
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Crop
Winter Rye 
Spring Wheat 
Winter Wheat 
Barley 
Oats 
Millet
All 
USSR 
SCR
European 
Non 
Chern 
Zem
112.1 110.2
103.1 103.4
100.0 85.5
106.5 106.1
108.1 107.9
105.8 115.4
RSFSR 
Chern 
Zem UkSSR Siberia Caucasus
116.7
103.0
93.8
103.8
113.1
107.9
109.0
106.2
102.4
106.6
103.1
103.8
108.8 115.9
116.6
118.2
116.1
The data given by Kondratiev and Oganovsky in their compendium 
of agricultural statistical materials allows us to calculate how
the difference between TsSK and Department of Agriculture data changed
over time from 1901-1915 for different grains.
-47-
A comparison of different yield data as calculated from N.D.Kondratiev (ed.)
Winter Rye
TsSK
Min zem
%
Winter Wheat
TsSK
Min zem
7.
Spring Wheat
TsSK
Min zem%
Oats
TsSK
Min zem
/o
Barley
TsSK
Min zem
7.
Buckwheat
TsSK
Min zem
Millet 
TsSK
Min zem
%
1901/
1905
49
54
110%
61
63
103%
40
44
111%
48
49
102%
50
51
102%
29
44
119%
1906/
1910
45
47
104%
56
57
102%
39
42
108%
48
50
104%
53
51
104%
32
46
100%
19117
1915
52
59
113%
64
66
103%
40
47
119%
50
58
116%
54
57
106%
39
51
111%
1913
76
50
1916
64
63
98%
88
68
77%
36
49
135%
55
56
102%
73
57
78%
50
48
98%
1917
43
50
40
42
45
43
42
1918
41
38
33
40
26
28
46
1919
39
41
39
44
39
16
32
1920
29
26
23
35
\
24
-
1921
34
33
27
25
26
26
100%
36
35
25
19
19
26
Sources
Note:
N.D.Kondratiev (ed.) Selskoye khozyaistvo Rossii v XX vekye,M.1923 
Min Zem data from N.Kondratiev (ed.) ibid.,p.!58. 
TsSK data calculated from production data ibid,, p.196 and 
sown area data ibid., p.106.
The TsSK figure for 1916 was aggregated by using the results of 
the 1916 agricultural census. This census indicated a much 
higher area of spring wheat than earlier indicated, hence the 
untypical low evaluation of Spring wheat yields by TsSK for 1916.
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Having given an account of the pre-revolutionary and early 
Soviet work analysing the comparability of pre-revolutionary sources 
of grain statistics, I now turn to a consideration of the claims 
that were made by Gosplan SES concerning it.
ii) Gosplan's evaluation of the reliability of pre-war grain
production data
The attitude of Gosplan SES was that the pre-revolutionary data 
of TsSK should be inflated by 19%. This was to cover a 9% inflation 
to all sown area and a 9% inflation to all yield data . This corr- 
ection was applied systematically by Gosplan SES to all grains and to
... 2 
all regions without discrimination . The justification for the
application of this crude correction was given by Strumilin in 1924
when he wrote:
In pre-war times zemstvo statistics were considered the 
most exact. In comparison with them the data of the 
Central Statistical Committee for peasant lands, which
now lie at the basis of the calculations of the Central\
Statistical Authority were too small and needed a corr- 
ection which according to Ivantsov came to 9% on average 
for yield and a similar percentage for sown area. 
D.Ivantsov K kritike urozhainoi statistiki, Petrograd, 
1915, pp.26, 129. The TsSK gross harvest therefore 
needs a correction of not more than 19% (1.09 x 1.09 = 1.19). 
In Gosplan we verified by means of the balancing method 
the gross harvest of TsSK for 1906-14 by comparing it 
with data on consumption and export of grain and received
1. Note Production = sown area x yield therefore 1.19 = 1.09 x 1.09
2. See V.G.Groman, Khlebnaya produktsiya i khlebnyi eksport Kossii, 
in Entsiklopediya Russkogo Eksporta, Tom.l, Berlin 1924, pp.158, 
160, 162-175.
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a difference of 19.3% for the given data. Therefore 
it is possible to be in complete agreement with the 
conclusions of Ivantsov, namely, that before the War 
TsSK gave the similar underestimation of sown area as 
it did for yield.
I have already indicated that Ivantsov was personally against 
making the kind of crude correction which Gosolan was advocating 
and that his evidence particularly concerning the need of a corr- 
ection to sown area was not very impressive. I will leave a dis- 
cussion of the evidence of the utilisation balances until chapter 3; 
it should be noted that my conclusions there indicate that this source 
provides little justification for the adoption of such a large corr- 
ection to pre-war TsSK data. Here I will conclude this section with 
a brief account of the thorough and detailed reply which TsSU gave to 
Strumilin's claim. The reply was in an article written by N.Vinogradova
which appeared in the issues of the TsSU journal at the end of 1925 and
\ 
2 the beginning of 1926 .
In this article Vinogradova directs herself to a critique of 
Ivantsov's work. She points out that Ivantsov was incorrect to treat 
zemstvo statistics as a homogeneous category because they employed many 
different methods of collecting and working out statistical data. 
Rather than comparing all zemstvo data with all TsSK data it was, she 
claimed, necessary to group the zemstvo data according to its method 
of collection and only to compare it with the TsSK data. Vinogradova
1. S.G.Strumilin, K reforme urozhainoi statistiki, in Plan.Khoz.,
1924, No.4/5, Ekon.Obozr., 1924, No.9/10, subsequently reprinted 
in Na khozyaistvennom frontye, M.1928 and 1959, Statisticheskiye 
Ekonomicheskie Ocherki, M.1958, and vol.1 of Izbrannye proizvedeniya, 
M.1963.
2. N.Vinogradova, Russkaya Urozhainaya Statistika, V.S., 1925, No.10-12 
and V.S. 1926, No.1-6.
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herself carried out such a detailed differentiated analysis for rye 
yields in seventeen provinces for all the available years. For 
each of these provinces the zemstvo data collected by different methods 
w^tffc compared with the TsSK data and the index of comparison was noted
according to the method of collecting the data. The results of this
comparison are given in the following table.
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The average yield of Winter Rye according to Zemstvo statistical 
data as a percentage of average yield from TsSK data, according 
to the different methods of collecting the Zemstvo data
Provinces
Poltavskaya G.
Nizhegorod- 
skaya
Vladimirskaya G,
Orlovskaya G. 
Yaroslavskava G.
Tverskaya G. 
Ufimskaya G.
Kostromskaya G. 
Penzenskaya G.
Samarskaya G. 
Saratovskaya G. 
Simbirskaya G. 
Tulskaya G. 
Voronezhskaya G.
Moskovskaya G.
Years 
covered
1901-1915 
1892-1901
1896
1898-1900 
1902-1903 
1905
1896-1900 
1905-1910
1911-1913
1898-1901 
1902-1909
1912-1915
1908-1909
1899-1903 
1904-1912
1909-1913 
1912-1913
1911-1915 
1903-1905 
1910-1912 
1910-1912
1886-1909 
1886-1892
1886-1910 
1885-1882
Chernigovskaya G. 1904-1910
Poltavskaya G. 1886-1892
1892-1900
Methods of collecting data by zemstvo 
1234567
103.1
107.7
99.7
102.5
103.7
98.4
105.2 111.1
131.1
99.1
101.9 114.3
92.4 113.3
102.6
100.2
1909-1911 101.0
95.5
104.0 106.3
98.0
106.9
116.9
116.2 122.9
115.3
114.0
120.7 111.7
115.8 93.9
102.0
103.0
103.0
115.0
106.0
116.0
100.0
97.3
96.4
98.2
97.3
85.4
90.2
90.4
89.7
88.8
87.0
88.7
83.1
96.2
99.2
100.0
104.1
93.2
95.0
86.0
Source: N.Vinogradova, Russkaya urozhainaya statistika, V.S. 1926 
No.1-6, p.88.
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The methods of collecting zemstvo statistical data which were 
listed were the following:
1. Subjective evaluation of correspondents
2. Data from correspondents covering their oxm households
3. Investigation by questionnaires conducted by correspondents
4. Investigation by questionnaires carried out partly by 
correspondents and partly agents of the administration
5. Investigations by questionnaire carried out by agents of 
the administration
6. Subjective evaluations of volost authorities and village 
elders
7. Expeditionary investigations
It will be readily seen from these data that the data collected 
by the correspondents network arc higher than that collected by the 
agents of the local administration or by expeditionary investigations.
* 
And that the data collected by the correspondents concerning their 
own households are the highest. This is very much the kind of sit- 
uation which we would have expected.
Vinogradova's own conclusions are as follows:
If it is accepted that the correspondents' data in 
general might be a little high, then from all the given 
data it convincingly follows that the data of TsSK 
describe a level of harvest very close to reality . 
Vinogradova's work and her conclusions which she clearly made 
from it, should in my view be accepted in preference to some conclusions
1. N.vinogradova, Russkaya urozhainaya statistika, V.S. 1926, 
No.1-6, p.90 (emphasis in original)
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which Ivantsov did not make but which Strumilin and Groman claimed 
that he did.
Although Vinogradova' s work has been largely ignored by the 
statisticians of Gosplan SES (Strumilin and Groman), and by Groman's 
admirers abroad (N.Jasny), this work was held in high regard within 
TsSU and amongst some of the leading economists in NKZem. The 
distinguished economist A.L.Vainshtein accepted Vinogradova 1 s results 
and wrote at the time that they were particularly important given 
the current (1927) tendency to apply very substantial corrections 
to all grain statistics . We will return to this in a later section
The current Soviet historian A.S.Nifontov has also taken a 
fresh approach to the reliability of this data for a slightly earlier 
period and has concluded in a veign similar to Vinogradova' s : 
The study of the literature on this question, an 
acquaintances- ' with the realities of the pre-reform 
Russian methods of calculating average yields for separate 
provinces and with the stages of development of harvest 
statistics, a comparison of the materials on harvests 
according to the data of different organisations and for 
different provinces on the scale of large economic 
regions of the country, leads us to conclude that the 
official harvest statistics are fully worthy of invest- 
igators serious attention. There is no basis to deny 
that these materials are related to the real position in 
agriculture. In particular there is no basis to consider 
the harvest data of the MVD as having particularly great 
insufficiencies .
1. A.L.Vainshtein, Plan. Khoz ., 1927 , no.^2, p
2. A.S .Nifontov, Zernovoye proizdovstvo Rossii vo vtoroi polovinye 
XIX veka, M.1974, pp. 78-79.
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Finally as concerns the evidence of the utilisation data, the list 
of available grain utilisation balances for the immediate pre-war 
period, reproduced in the later section illustrates that the existence 
of a balance per se is no indication of the reliability of the data. 
The important question is the reliability of the separate parts of the 
data that go together to make the balance and in particular our know- 
ledge of the state of stock changes and fluctuations in the level of 
livestock feed norms. These latter two elements were always the most 
volatile, and as explained above our knowledge of their magnitudes in 
individual pre-revolutionary years is extremely small.
At this time the reliability of the utilisation data was so low 
that it is possible to create a whole number of balances to support 
a variety of production data. It cannot therefore be argued that the 
balances support any individual series of production data.
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b) The reliability of grain statistics 1914-17
The agricultural census of 1916 was a great success for the 
Zemstvo statisticians. It proved that they could effectively organise 
themselves for a complex operation covering the entire Empire, and that 
they could fairly rapidly process the results. The results as far as 
grain sown area was concerned, showed however that some of the criticisms 
which had been made about the reliability of the TsSK grain sown area 
data were unjustified. The results of the 1916 agricultural census 
more or less confirmed the scale of grain sowings indicated by the 
earlier TsSK data . No TsSK figures are available for grain sown area
in 1916, but if we compare the TsSK data for 1915 with the census data
2 for 1916, there are no major unexpected discontinuities". The major
criticism that has been levied against the earlier TsSK sown area 
grain data after comparing fc/i&cwith the results of the 1916 census is
that the TsSK data may have failed to indicate the rapid shift from
3 
spring to winter wheat sowings that was occurring just before the war .
r 
Despite the undoubted deterioration in peasant attitudes by 1917
the results of the 1917 census also appear to be quite comparable with 
those from earlier sources.
1. This was very different to the state of affairs for livestock 
statistics where the Agricultural census indicated a level of 
livestock considerably in^xcess of that indicated by the TsSK 
data (See A.L.Vainshtein, Iz istorii predrevolyutsionnoi 
statistiki zhivotnovodstva, in Ocherki po istorii statistiki 
SSSR, No.3, M.1960, pp.86-115).
2. This should be compared with the position for livestock. See
p. (23-3"
3. See V.P.Timoshenko, Agricultural Russia and the Wheat Problem, 
Stanford, 1932, p.ISA.
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1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
12.98
12,91
12.50
10.82
10.64
34.39
34.58
33.36
28.83
27.51
27.56
27.50
27.29
24.84
24.86
15.50
15.96
15.82
16.31
11.93
90.43
90.95
88.97
80.80
74.94
In the table below I have presented the TsSK data for grain sown 
area in 1913-1915 with the census data for 1916 and 1917, in comparable 
regional groupings.
Grain sown area in mln.hectares from TsSK sources 1913-1915 and 
from the results of the agricultural censuses for 1916 and 1917
NCR SPR CPR EPR USSR-SCR 
TsSK data
Census data
Sources: See appendix
As the results of the 1916 census indicated a level of grain 
sowing about 10% lower than the 1915 level, the zemstvo statisticians 
would have had to claim that there had been a 20% decline in sowings 
between 1915 and 1916 if they were to persist with the claim that the 
TsSK data under-estimated reality by 9% while their data war^a correct 
reflection of reality. Later'as we shall see below Groman was to claim 
that both the early TsSK data and the census data underestimated reality 
by 9% for grain sowings . However this is based on the belief that the 
TsSK and census data are comparable and that the former required a 9% 
correction for the reasons explained and refuted in our earlier chapter.
Being somewhat more detached than Groman and the other zemstvo 
statisticians I cannot rule out the possibility that the census data 
might have provided an indication of the level of grain sowings with 
a larger degree of under estimation than had the TsSK data. This I 
think is especially possible in 1917 when the extent of peasant distrust
1. See V.G.Groman, Khlebnaya produktsiya i khlebnyii eksport Rossii, 
in Entsiklopediya russkogo eksporta, Tom 1, Berlin 1924, pp.174-75.
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would undoubtedly have grown. This of course does not imply that the 
zemstvo statisticians were less efficient at evaluating the level of 
sowings than were the TsSK, but rather that they faced a more difficult 
task. While stating that the census data might suffer more from under- 
estimation than the TsSK sown area data I would still claim in line with 
. the arguments in Chapter one that the overall level of pre-war under- 
estimation was probably significantly less than 9%
As regards the argument that the census must have been more reliable 
than the TsSK data because it gave a more full indication of the level 
of livestock, I; must ^ point out the exact purpose for which these 
statistics were being gathered.
The government was at this time primarily concerned with a grain 
levy and the levy was made on the level of grain surpluses. Surpluses 
were calculated on the basis of production data (sown area and yield) 
with deductions based on norms for sowing personal consumption and 
livestock feed. A rational and cunning peasant intent on minimising 
his levy would have an incentive to under-estimate his level of grain 
production and over-estimate the level of consumption of his household. 
He would consequently have no incentive to conceal his level of livestock, 
In fact quite the opposite. If he concealed his livestock the statis- 
ticians would not allow him to offset a normed quantity of livestock feed 
in their calculations of his surpluses. He was also unlikely to under- 
estimate the number of people in his household as this would increase the 
evaluation of his surplus. His sown area evaluation was likely to be 
under-estimated but less than that of his level of yield. The level 
of sown area was in any case more difficult to conceal than the level of 
yield. And a high sown area evaluation did at least have the slight
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corapensation of allowing a large quantity of seed to be offset from 
the evaluation of his surplus.
Of course it could be debated to what extent the cunning Russian 
peasant acted as a rational man and was aware of the system of 
evaluating his surpluses. But I think it would be dangerous to under- 
estimate him on this.
From what I have said above we may expect the reliability of the 
yield data to be lower than that for sown area in this period and 
especially after 1916. The task of getting reliable yield data from 
the peasants could certainly be expected to be much more difficult, and 
at this time there was little way of providing a control on this. As 
explained above the reliability of the utilisation data was at this 
time far too low to be of any practical use as a control on the level 
of production for the country as a whole. The best that we can do is 
to examine the different levels of yield as indicated by different 
sources, to see how thsse differences changed over time, and attempt to 
give an explanation of these changes and differences.
A comparison of the available TsSK, Ministry of Agriculture 
correspondents data and the zemstvo data (later, under Popov, the data 
of the Department of census statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture)
is given below:
Wheat Wheat Buck- 
Rye Winter Spring Oats Barley Millet wheat All
Year
1909/13
Min.Agr./TsSK 111.1 107.2 115.3 107.3 108.4
Min.Agr./Zemstvo 103.0 99.3 108.9 105.0 100.0
1916
Min.Agr./Zemstvo 119.3 108.1 141.6 114.3 120.0 143.1 130.6
1917 preliminary
Min.Agr./Zemstvo 112.9 104.4 104.5 110.9 117.5 116.6 108.4
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Sources: 1909/13: Materialy k prodovolstvennomu planu.
Urozhai khlebov v Rossii v 1916g.. Petrograd 1916 
P.Rumyantsev (ed.) p.viii
1916: P. Rumyantsev (ed.) ibid., p.ix.
1917: preliminary: A.E.Lositsky (ed.) Urozhai khlebov 
v Rossii v 1917g., M.1918, p.9.
This presents a far more complex picture which is hard to 
interpret since we are given no indication of the methods employed by 
the individual zemstvo to collect iti-   data.
Another piece of evidence of the changing reliability of the 
different sources of grain yield data during the war period, comes 
from the tables of the yield evaluations and calculations from different 
sources for Winter Rye in Kazan Gubernia which was drawn up by the 
distinguished Soviet statistician B.S.Yastremskii to illustrate the 
relationship between preliminary subjective, final subjective and actual 
yields in connection with his work on calculating a series of scales 
to convert subjective evaluations into physical terms'. In the 
following table I have converted all of Yastremsky's data into tsentners 
per hectare and have used the converted physical quality yield figures 
which he proposed for the sources initially given in subjective (five 
point) terms.
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The yield of Winter Rye in Kazan 1902-1920 from various 
sources, converted into tsentners per hectare
Year
Corres- 
pondents 
data
data
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
6.7
12.0
13.5
6.3
2.7
9.0
10.8
10.0
6.6
3.4
11.7
10.6
7.2
10.3
10.0
6.7
9.1
5.4
2.8
Subjective 
Evaluations 
of GSK
prelim. final
9.9
11.2
5.5
3.4
10.8
9.1
8.2
11.84
13.3
5.5
3.1
9.9
10.6
9.4
5.8
4.5
10.2
9.1
6.1
10.8
11.2
7.8
11.8
8.8
3.4
6.7
10.6
10.2
6.3
9.4
6.3
2.8
Corres- 
pondents 
data
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Subjective 
Evaluations 
of GSK
prelim, final
82.5
83.0
87.3
125.9
120.0
84.3
82.0
87.9
132.4
87.2
85.8
84,7
104.9
112.0
116.4
129.7
163.0
121.4
98.7
98.8
88.0
116.6
109.4
98.5
94.0
93.7
103.3
102.0
93.9
103.7
116.6
100.0
Source: complied from B.S.Yastremskii, Kollchestvennoye vyirazhenie 
subyektivnoi kharakeristiki urozhaya, V.S., 1922, no.5-8, 
this article has been reprinted in a collection of Yastremsky's 
works B.S.Yastremskii, Izbranniye Trudyi, M.1964, pp.290-326. 
The data referring to the yield of winter rye in Kazan from 
the different sources appear on pages 291 and 296.
These data indicate that in the pre-war period the correspondents 
data were generally higher than the converted subjective evaluations of 
the GSK. And that the final subjective evaluation of the latter were 
normally higher than the preliminary subjective evaluations. Exceptions 
occurred to this rule for years of very low harvests in 1906 and 1911. 
and also in the year following the very low harvest of 1906. These 
exceptions could be explained in terms of the voluntary correspondents 
only having an interest in giving a low indication of the harvest in
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times when the local authorities were likely to issue relief. In less 
catastrophic years the voluntary correspondents would have no incentive 
to distort the picture one way or the other, and since the correspondents 
undoubtedly came from the more literate group of farmers we would expect 
their indications of the level of yield to be higher,, :
This position changed during the war. The position in 1914 
corresponded to the standard pre-war picture. But by 1915 we see a 
slight reversal as for the first time in a year not associated with a 
poor harvest the correspondents' evaluation of the harvest is lower than 
the subjective evaluations of GSK. Also for the first time the GSK 
preliminary evaluation is higher than its final evaluation. There are 
two new characteristics in these data which are to become much more 
marked in the later years of the war and war communism. By 1916, the 
first year when an attempt was made to impose a grain levy under the 
Tsarist Minister of Agriculture^ the GSK preliminary subjective evaluation 
was 12% higher than the correspondents' evaluation.
Lest it be argued that the 1916 harvest had already been evaluated 
before the move towards a grain levy had been decided, it is useful 
to note the comments which P.Rumyantsev, the editor of the special 
council's report on the 1916 harvest made on this point:
In many localities the weather at harvest time was un- 
favourable and had a bad effect on the quality and quantity 
of grain harvested, This produced an excessively pessimistic 
evaluation of the harvest on the producers. There were also 
several other factors which contributed towards the same 
effect. These were based on the specific circumstances of 
the time: uncertainty as to when the war would end, whether
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there would be a continued loss of labour force, 
food provisioning problems, the setting of a fixed 
price for grain, rumours about requisitioning,etc. 
All this must certainly have led to a tendency to 
lower the indications of the size of the harvest .
By 1917 this gap had risen to 16.4% and then in 1918 and 1919 
as the experiences of requisitioning grew, this gap w^eneA to 30% 
and 63%. The fall in the gap in 1920 was probably associated with 
the extremely low evaluation which was being made at the time by the 
local statisticians.
These figures strikingly reveal the increased problems involved 
in getting reliable yield data from the peasants at this time and 
the fundamental change in the reliability of the data which w being 
received. Clearly these data must be treated with the greatest 
degree of caution.
These problems were well known and appreciated at the time by 
the statisticians working on the problem of current evaluation of the 
harvest. Among these statisticians the practice developed of using 
the preliminary subjective evaluations of the harvest prospect, as 
these were the ones less likely to be suffering from distortion. 
This practice became institutionalised within TsSU in the early years 
of the 1920s, as will be described later, but it was already well es- 
tablished in these war years. Although I have stated that the utilisat- 
ion data of this period we/^ so unsatisfactory that tkty could serve only
1. P.Rumyantsev, Urozhai khlebpy y Ros.sii v_1916g,, Petrograd
1916, p.ix. This work was published in November 1916. The 
emphasis given above is mine.
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as an extremely rough check on the production data, it is worthy 
of note that in constructing the first serious grain forage balance 
for Russia in 1917, Lositsky used the preliminary harvest evaluations . 
In his introduction Lositsky explains the reason for his use
of the preliminary data as being due to the fact that the final data
2 
would not have been available until the beginning of January 1918 .
At this time Lositsky was confidently looking forward to using this 
final data once feJi^ became available.
The final evaluations of the 1917 harvest have never been 
published and Lositsky never made his revision. But if the Kazan 
data cifg. at all typical, the final evaluation may have been 20% lox^er
than the preliminary evaluation. Such a revision if accepted as correct 
would seriously affect the validity of contemporary analyses of the 
situation. But it is generally agreed that such a revision would 
produce a greater level of peasant distortion.
1. See A.E.Lositsky, Urozhai khlebov v Rossii v 1917g., M.1918, 
pp. 5 and 7.
2. In the main body of the text on page 7 Lositsky states that 
the final results were due to be ready by December 10, 
1917. But in the introduction to this book (page 5) written 
in December he states that the final results would only be 
available in January 1918.
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3. Grain utilisation by item
In order to assess the reliability of the different grain utilis- 
ation balances it is necessary to consider separately all the different 
elements in the balance. It is necessary to consider the sources of 
data for each of these separate elements and the nature of the available 
data on these elements. It is desirable also to get some impression of 
the elasticity of demand for the given element - i.e. to assess the 
sensitivity to the availability of grain of the utilisation of grain for 
any specific purpose. In the sections below I will be considering in 
turn the utilisation of grain for each of its main purposes:
a) for use as seed
b) for personal consumption,
c) for livestock feed,
d) for industrial use,
e) for the army,
f) for changes in stock levels
g) for exports, 
h) for losses.
At>art from these sections dealing more or less strictly with 
utilisation there will be a 'further section which will very briefly 
review the available data concerned with distribution:
i) transportation data.
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In this chapter I will be primarily concerned with the data that 
are relevant to the historical period covered in part one of the thesis. 
Many of the sources will be historically distinct and our knowledge of 
them will be totally dependent on the data collected and processed at 
the time. But other data are less historically distinct. Our know- 
ledge of personal grain consumption and livestock feed norms as derived 
from the extensive studies of the 1920s can certainly improve our under- 
standing of pre-revolutionary grain consumption and feed norms. This 
does not mean that the level of these norms was the same in both his- 
torical periods. It just means that our knowledge of the earlier norms 
is so slight that the later data can help fill in many of the areas of 
uncertainty. In particular the regional coverage of pre-war personal 
consumption and feed norms was very poorly known and can well serve to 
be supplemented by later data.
In this thesis the data have*been primarily presented according to 
the chronology of when fci^ w«/^ produced and when t/>«y refer:- to. But 
since some of the data collected and worked out in the 1920s is of 
relevance to our understanding of pre-war consumption, the conclusions 
from some of these later analyses will be cited in the present chapter, 
a) Grain utilisation as seed
Seed is an indispensable use of grain if the further production of 
grain is to continue. As agriculture becomes more advanced the share 
of grain used as seed declines. This decline is primarily due to the 
increase in yield per unit of seed sown. However it is partly due 
also to lower seeding rates per unit area, the latter being a consequence 
of the substitution of mechanical seeding drills for the more wasteful 
hand broadcast system of sowing. The amount of grain sown per area
-66-
differs for different grains, for different technologies and for 
different areas. It differs according to whether we are measuring it 
by weight or by volume and also differs to some extent according to the 
availability of grain and the recommended sowing norms.
The quality and variety of the grain used as seed is also an im- 
portant matter. It had always been realised that the best results 
came from sowing the best grain as seed. But specialised selection 
farms were not developed in Russia on any scale until the end of the 
nineteenth century and special selected seeds only began to be widely 
used amongst the peasantry from the 1920s. Here I will be mainly con- 
cerned with the quantitative aspects of the use of seed.
The magnitudes of local traditional seeding rates were very well 
known. They did not begin to change much before the introduction of 
special seeding machines and of more specialised seed types, which did 
not come about until after the period being studied in this chapter. 
The statisticians in GSK, the police agents, the local elders, the 
Ministry of Agriculture correspondents and the zemstvo statisticians 
were all able to collect data and supply reports indicating fairly rel- 
iably what the locally established seeding rates were. These were 
traditionally measured in terms of volumes of seed per unit area 
(chetvert per desyatina). Later, from the beginning of the twentieth 
century they were measured in terms of weights of seed per unit area 
(pds per desyatina or tsentners per hectare) . There was little con- 
troversy over the size of the seeding rate. There was, however, part- 
icularly in the 1920s, considerable controversy over the size of the area
1. The conversion of volume measures into weight measures is
complicated because of the different densities of the different 
grains and is therefore highly dependent on the product mix.
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th at was actually sown and that which had been sown before the war.
And this of course had a direct effect on the quantity of grain used
as seed. The question of the size of sown area has already been
discussed above.
In this section I will consider first the proportion of grain
used as seed throughout this period, for the different regions, for 
the different grains and the different producers. I will then con- 
sider the quantity of grain used as seed per sown area. In the final 
part of this section I will consider the available evidence on the 
annual fluctuations in the quantity of grain used as seed, as a con- 
sequence of strain on the availability of grain.
Assuming that the amount sown did not change very rapidly from 
year to year the average yield (v samakh) in units of seed sown would 
approximate to the inverse of the proportion of harvested grain used 
as seed. Fairly reliable indicators of the yield/seed ratio and 
therefore of the seed to yield ratio are available for production of 
rye in the 50 provinces of European Pvussia from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. They are given below:
Rye Production and Utilisation as seed in 
European Russia
Proportion of rye 
Yield/seed ratio used as seed (%)
1801-10 3.52 28.4
1811-20 3.54 28.2
1821-30 3.41 29.3
1831-40 3.44 29.1
1841-50 3.60 27.8
1851-60 3.55 28.2
1861-70 3.70 27.0
1871-80 3.91 25,6
1881-90 4.27 23.4
1890-1900 4.79 20.9
1901-10 5.22 19.2
1911-14 5.69 17.6
Source: V.G.Mikhailovskii, Byulletgn TsSU, No.50, 1921, cited
here from A.V.Chayanov, (ed.), Problemy . Urozhaya,M.1926,p.35.
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The changes in the proportion of grain used as seed in the diff- 
erent regions of Russia throughout the nineteenth century are given in 
the following table:
Russia
Mikhai1ovski i 
Years NCR SPR CPR EPR Russia data
1802/11 34.0% 26.8% 28.2% 33.6% 30.4% 28.4% 
1841/50 35.9% 26.9% 29.2% 28.7% 30.7% 27.8%
1851/60 37.6% 28.1% 30.0% 29.1% 31.6% 28.2%
1861/70 34.6% 27.9% 27.3% 31.8% 29.9% 27.0%
1871/80 31.9% 26.4% 25.3% 28.7% 27.5% 25.6%
1881/90 29.2% 20.0% 23.4% 28.2% 24.4% 23.4%
1891/1900 26.2% 16.7% 21.4% 23.1% 21.1% 20.9%
Source: Kovalchenko and Nifontov's data see appendix.
The proportion of grain used as seed fell by 8-9% f>cint<> dariny eke 
nineteenth century. Nearly all of this fall came in the second half 
of the nineteenth century as there was a rise in the share of grain 
used as seed in most regions in the first half of the century. And 
the fall in proportions of grain used as seed was fairly evenly distrib- 
uted between the different regions.
The decline in the share of grain used as seed affected all grains. 
In the 1850s the proportion of spring grains used as seed was about 4% 
higher than the proportion of winter grains so used. And by the 1890s 
despite a 33% fall in overall proportions of grains used as seed the share 
of the spring grains was still 3% higher than the winter grains:
Years Winter grains Spring grains All
1851/60 29.1% 32.8% 31.3%
1861/70 28.3% 30.6% 29.7%
1871/80 24.8% 29.4% 27.5%
1881/90 21.9% 26.0% 24.3%
1891/1900 19.5% 22.0% 21.0%
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Source: A.S.Nifontov's data, see appendix
Note: The Winter grains are mainly Winter Rye and Winter 
Wheat, the Spring grains are mainly the rest. 
These proportions are according to the volume of 
grain sown (i.e. chetvert). This gives a higher 
share for Oats and Barley (Spring grains) than would 
a ratio based on weights.
Generally the peasants sowed a larger quantity of grain per unit 
area on their allotment lands than did the private owners on their own 
land. For Winter Rye the difference was as much as 6%, but for most 
other grains the difference was less. To some extent some of these 
differences could be explained in terms of there being a higher pro- 
portion of private estates in the Ukraine where seeding rates were 
lower anyway. But an analysis of the regional data indicates that 
even within the same region seed rates on the peasant allotments were 
higher than on the private lands. See table below and in the appendix- 
The difference is likely to be explained in terms of the private lands 
having a more efficient system of sowing and using more seed drills.
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Grain sowing rates in chetverts per desyatina for different 
types of producer. Average data for 1880-1900,
Winter Rye 
priv 
al
Winter Wheat
priv   
al
Spring Wheat 
priv
al
Oats
priv 
al
Barley 
priv 
al
Buckwheat
priv 
al
Millet
priv 
al
NCR
9.3
9.6
8. A 
8.6
9.2
9. A
17.8 
19,2
10,3 
11.0
7.8 
8.0
 
SPR
Novo-"c$.
5.6
5.5
5.5 
5.3
5.9
5.5
9. A 
8.9
7.0 
6.6
-
1.7 
1.6
Yug- Zap
8.1 
8.6
8.1 
8. A
8.6
8.7
1A.1 
1A.6
9. A 
9.7
7.9 
8.0
2.1 
2.2
Malora=£
7.5 
7.6
7.7 
7.3
7.3
7. A
17. A 
12.5
8.9 
9,1
6.3 
6.8
7.2 
2.3
CPR
C.Zem,
8.0 
8. A
8.0 
8.2
8.0
7.7
15.2 
16.1
9.2
9. A
7.8 
8.0
1.7 
1.8
N .Volz,
6.0 
6.0
-
7.0
7.6
12.9 
13.7
8.8 
7.7
 
-
Sr.Volz.
8.0 
8.6
8.0
8.9
9.2
15.2 
16.0
10.9 
11.5
7.7 
8.0
1.5 
1.7
All
8.1 
8.6
7.9 
8.0
8.2
8.3
15.7 
16.7
9.7 
10.1
7.1
7.7
1.8 
1.9
Source: Svod.stat.svednii... Vyp 1, SPh 190 ^  pp.lAA-A7.
Note: priv = private land, al = Allotment land (peasants)
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Despite the lower seeding rates the private lands had higher yields 
in volume per desyatina. Their yields in sam' were consequently even 
higher and so their share of grain production that they used as seed
N
was consequently that much less.
W.Rye
W.Wheat
S.Wheat
Oats
Barley
Buckwheat
Millet
Sowings in 
chet/des
Priv. Allot.
Yield in 
chet/des
Priv. Allot.
Yield in 
sam
Priv. Allot. Priv.
% grain 
production 
used as seed
Allot
8.1
7,9
8.2
15.7
9.7
7.1
1.8
Svod.s
8
8
8
16
10
7
1
tat
.6
.0
.3
.7
.1
.7
.9
.svedenii
48
46
39
68
50
32
36
po
40
39
35
58
44
29
33
Sel.khoz
6
5
4
4
5
4
20
.Ross
.0
.7
.8
.5
.2
.4
.8
ii
4
5
4
3
4
3
18
k kont
.7
.0
.2
.7
.5
.9
.3
su
16
17
20
22
19
22
4
XIX
.7%
.5%
.8%
.2%
.2%
.7% X
.8%
veka,
21.3%
20.0%
23.8%
27.0%
22.2%
25.6%
5.5%
vyp 1, SPb 1902, pp.146-47.
The average pre-war sowing rates per hectare of land for the different 
grains and the different regions in the decade before the war are given 
in the following table:
Regions
l.NCR 
2.SCR
W. W. Sp. Buck- 
Rye Wheat Wheat Barley Oats Millet wheat All
1.54 1.53 1.56 1.69 2.04 0.20 1.17 1.71
3.SPR 
a)Ukr. 
b)S.Kav. 
3.
4.CPR
5.EPR 
a. Sib .
b.Kaz
5.
USSR
1.30 
1.18 
1.29
1.11
1.35 
0.90
1.22
1.28
1.32 
1.32 
1.32
1.12
1.47 
0.90
1.28
1.31
1.29 
1.29 
1.29
1.17
1.62 
0.93
1.25
1,26
1.33 
1.26 
1.32
1.17
1.68
0.94
1.40
1.35
1.42 
1.50 
1.44
1.36
2.08 
1.06
1.77
1,65
0.46 
0.46 
0.46
0.28
0.39 
0.19
0.21
0.33
1.15 
1.02 
1.15
0.97
0.93 
0.75
0.90
1.07
1.29 
1.26 
1.29
1.12
1.73 
0.89
1.34
1.32
Source: Trudy TsSU, Tom VIII,vyp.1,M.1921, pp.264-70 and see
appendices for regional sown area data to calculate aggregates
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It will be noted from the above tables that a much larger quantity 
of Oats \vflS sown per unit area than of other grains. By weight measure- 
ments the weight of Oats sown per unit area was about 25% higher than the 
main food grains, while in terms of volume the quantity sown per unit area 
was about twice as much as for the main food grains. As we shall see 
below the yield of Oats per unit area was also higher than for the main 
food grains, but not proportionately higher so its yield in sown area was 
actually lower.
The sowing rates of Millet, Buckwheat and Maize were much lower than 
those for the main food grains. These yields in volume and weight terms 
were also relatively low. But in terms of yield in 'sam 1 (per unit sown) 
Millet had an extremely high yield .
Indications of the annual level of fluctuations in the quantity of
grain used as seed are available in a highly disaggregated state in
2Chetverikov's compilation of 1883-1915 grain statistics . In a more agg- 
regated form such indications are available by comparing annual yield 
data in 'sam' with annual yield data measured in volumes(chetverts) per 
unit sown area.
For the 50 gubernii of European Russia we see that during the years 
of the famine there was a slight decline in the seeding rates:
1. This applies also for Maize.
2. See N.S.Chetverikov (ed.), Svod urozhainyikh svedenii za gody' 
1883-1915 (materialy tsentralnogo statisticheskogo komiteta 
po urozhayam na nadelnyikh zemlyakh), M.1928
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Year
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
189A
1895
Prodn
in mln 
chet
314.6
247.1
292.3
228.8
265.8
377.5
380.3
347.4
Yield 
in 
sam
4.60
3.63
4.07
3.15
3.94
5.69
5.68
5.06
Sowings
in mln 
chet
68.4
68.1
71.9
72.6
67.5
66.4
67.0
68.6
Sown area 
in mln 
hectare
65.6
65.4
68.9
69.4
67.1
65.8
65.8
64.9
Seed rate 
in chet./ 
hectare
1.04
1.04
1.04
1.05
1.01
1.01
1.02
1.06
Source: A.S.Nifontov data in chetverts and sam,
V.M.Obukhov data in mln hectare. See appendix. 
Data cover 50 gubernii of European Russia.
The famine appears to have resulted in a 3,8% decline in seed rates 
which was important for the three years after the famine. However this 
is very difficult to interpret. The detailed figures available in 
Chetverikov's compilation indicate that this decline came about partly 
from an increase in the sowing of grains such as millet, which had a 
much lower seed rate in normal times, and that only a very small part of 
this observed 3.8% decline could be explained in terms of a change in 
seeding rates.
Instead of affecting the seed rates the effect of strain on the 
availability of grain appears to have resulted in the increase in sowings 
of those kinds of grain which have low seed rates and a fairly sharp 
decline in the area sown. The decline in area sown over the famine 
period is illustrated in the table below:
-74-
Year
Grain sown in mln.hectare
area of
C.Ch.Zem Volga USSR
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
8.63
8.60
8.69
8.67
7.83
7.68
7.84
15.08
15.13
16.02
15.97
14.07
14.46
14.47
70,8
70.8
73.5
74.1
72.3
70.9
71.7
Source: See appendix
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b) Data on grain used as food
The quantity of grain used as food is dependent upon: the size 
of the population, and the consumption pattern of the population. In 
as much as consumption patterns differed between urban and rural areas, 
fered between different regions, differed according to the level of 
ome of the given household and differed according to the age profile 
the total population, all of these elements will have to be considered, 
analysis of the consumption levels for different income groups will 
indicate how the level of consumption is likely to change with overall 
changes in income levels and with an increase in the relative scarcity 
of grain. Grain consumption should not be seen in total isolation from 
the consumption of other basic foodstuffs. An indication of the avail- 
ability of other foodstuffs and the relative share of grain in the total 
diet would help indicate the possibility and possible importance of sub- 
stituting grain by other food products. But such an examination cannot 
be included within the scope of the current work . In the following 
parts of this section I will discuss i) the available population data, 
ii) the available data on grain consumption norms, 
i) The available population data
The first Russian census was carried out in 1897. It was intended 
to be repeated in 1915 but this was stopped by the War. A form of rural 
census was carried out in connection with the 1916 and 1917 agricultural 
censuses, and a registration of the town population occurred after 1916 
in connection with rationing. Before these censuses, a more primitive 
form of head count the 'reviziyV ;was made periodically (about once
1. A preliminary account of all the elements in the diet is
available in S.G.Wheatcroft SIPS No.2, Birmingham University, 
1976, pp.93-6.
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every 15 years since the time of Peter the Great). It was the 
'revizii' which had initially served as the basis for the Poll tax, and 
for the registration of military conscripts. The 'revizii' and sub- 
sequent censuses were supplemented by registration data on births and 
deaths collected by the Church Authorities in the so-called 'Metric' 
books, other registration data on migration eastwards wer-erather in- 
comoletely kept by the immigration offices in certain Siberian and 
Asiatic steppe towns.
The early 'revizii' data have recently been analysed by the Soviet 
historian Kabuzan, on a regional basis . Early TsSK regional population 
data are available for the beginning of the nineteenth century in 
Kovalchenko's work and from 1850 in Nifontov and Pronin's work for 
European Russia and Siberia. From 1871 these data are available on a 
regional and urban/rural breakdown from Zaitsev. Volkov provides a 
very useful computation of the early data from 1850 into an area com- 
parable with the post-revolutionary area of the USST?, estimating the 
population of the non-European territories, giving a breakdown according
to urban and rural location and giving separate figures for the army
2 during the 1914/18 period .
After considering the pre-war population data and the wartime pop- 
ulation data, I will briefly discuss the available data which give a 
breakdown of the population according, to the different types of producer.
1. See V.M.Kabuzan, Karodnonaseleniye Rossii v XVTII-pervoi polovinye 
XIX v., M.1963.
2. I.!).Kovalchenko, ibid., M.1967. A.S.Nifontov ibid. , M.1974,
V.Zaitsev, K voprosu o chislennosti naseleniya Evropyeiskoi Rossii, 
in V.G.Groman (ed.), Vliyaniye neurozhaev na narodnge khozyaistvo 
Rossii , chast 2, M.1927, M.1927 np.66-90, and E.Z.Volkov, Dinamika 
naseleniva SSSR za vosemdesyat let, M.1930.
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Pre-war population data
Kovalchenko 1 s data cover just the rural population of 48 of the 50 
gubernia of European Russia (i.e. all apart from Ufimskaya G., and 
Bessarabskaya G.). The regionalisations used by Kovalchenko and the basis 
upon which they have been converted into my major regionalisations ha:/£been 
described in the appendix. Kovalchenko 1 s figures are given in the following 
table:
Region
NCR
SPR
Ukraine
CPR
EPR
Urals
All*'-,
Baltic States
All inc. Baltic States
Rural population 
1802-11 1841-50
14.
8.
11.
2.
37.
1.
38.
33
66
17
98
14
20
34
17.
11.
15.
5.
49.
1.
50.
11
64
26
02
03
58
61
in mln. 
1851-60
16
12
16
5
51
1
52
.92
.17
.25
.71
.05
.63
.68
Rural population 
1802-11 1841-50
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
119
134
136
168
132
131
132
  ^
.4
.6
.5
.0
.7
.0
in %% 
1351-60
118
140
145
191
137
135
137
.1
.5
.5
.6
.5
.8
.4
Source: I.D.Kovalchenko, ibid., M.1967, pp.78, 386 
(See appendix)
From the table it is readily visible that the NCR is growing at a 
much lower rate than all other regions. The Urals were growing at the 
fastest rate followed by the CPR. Within the CPR the population in the 
lower Volga was growing much more rapidly than the population in the 
more traditionally established areas of the Central Chernozem and Central
Volga.
Nifontov's data cover the second half of the nineteenth century 
for European Russia and Siberia provide the following indication of 
population growth:
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Region Population in millions
All
population 1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s
Average Annual growth rate
of Population
1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1890s 
1890s /1850s/1860s/1870s/1880s/1850j
NCR(N)
SPR(N)
CPR(N)
EPR(N)
fi^W?
USSR(N)
&£$X.CM*tf
Baltic
All incl.
Baltic
Rural
Population
NCR(N)
SPR(N)
CPR(N)
EPR(N)
USSR(N)
Baltic
All incl.
Baltic
Urban
Population
NCR(N)
SPR(N)
CPR(N)
EPR(N)
USSR(N)
Baltic
All incl.
Baltic
19.42
14.57
19.36
4.16
6.99
57.51
60.34
1.76
59.27
17.06
12.99
18.03
4.04
52.12
1.56
53.68
2.36
1,58
1.33
0.12
5.39
0,20
5.59
Urban Population
NCR(N)
SPR(N)
CPR(N)
EPR(N)
USSR(N)
Baltic
All incl.
Baltic
12.2
10.8
6.9
2,9
9.4
11.4
9.4
20.39
16.46
20.42
4.52
7.73
61.79
65.00
1.91
63.70
17.67
14.53
18.85
4.35
55.40
1.67
57.07
2.72
1.93
1.57
0.17
6.39
0.24
6.63
as %
13.3
11.7
7.7
3.8
10.3
12.6
10.4
22.23
18.32
22.37
4.64
8.66
67.56
71.58
2.10
69.66
19.22
16.03
20.60
4.59
60.44
1.78
62.22
3.01
2,29
1.77
0.05
7.12
0.32
7.44
of all
13.5
12.5
7.9
1.1
10.5
15.2
10.7
25.37
22.42
26.19
5.52
10.21
79.50
84.19
2.26
81.76
21.35
19.20
24.11
5.28
69.94
1.85
71.79
4.02
3.22
2.08
0.24
9.56
0.41
9.97
15.8
14.4
7.9
4.3
12.0
18.1
12.2
29.51
28,12
29.22
6.07
11.81
91.92
97.66
2.39
94.31
24.65
24.38
25.78
5.81
80.62
1.79
82.41
4.86
3.74
2.44
0.26
11.30
0.60
11.90
16.5
13.3
8.6
4.3
12.3
25.1
12.6
0.5
1.3
0.5
0.9
1.1
0,7
0.8
0.9
0.7
0.4
1.2
0.5
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.6
1.5
2.2
1.8
4.2
1.9
2.0
1.9
0.9
1.1
1.0
0.3
1.2
0.9
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
1.0
0.9
0.6
0.9
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.9
1.3
-7.1
1.1
3.3
1.2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
3
4
1
+48
3
2
3
.4
.2
.7
.9
.8
.8
.8
.8
.7
.1
.0
.7
.5
.6
.4
.5
.4
.1
.8
.0
.4
.8
.4
1.6
2.5
0.8
1.0
1.6
1.6
1.6
0.6
1.5
1.5
2.7
0.7
1.0
1.5
-0.3
1.5
2.1
1.6
1.7
+ 8.3
1.8
4.6
1.9
1.3
2.3
1.2
1.2
1.7
1.5
1.5
0.9
1.5
1.1
2.2
1.1
1.1
1.4
0.4
1.3
2.6
3.4
2.1
2.9
2.7
5.0
2.8
Source: A.S.Nifontov, ibid., M.1974, pp,200,286,287. (see appendix)
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These tables vividly indicate the increasing rate of population 
growth in the second half of the nineteenth century. The fastest 
growth rates are in the SPR and the EPR. The CPR had experienced a 
rapid growth in population until the 1890s when its rural growth rate 
was more than halved (from 1.7% per year to 0.7% per year).
Finally I am presenting a further series of regional population 
'data covering the period from 1880-1915. This series is required to 
be compatible with the annual regional production data that I am using 
for this period . This series of data covers an area roughly comparable 
with the pre-1939 area of the USSR. The main outlines of these data 
are given in the table below in comparison with the all USSR data 
supplied by Volkov:
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All population in approximate pre 1939 area of USSR
1830
1885
1890
1855
1900
1905
1910
1914
Average
1565/80
1893/35
-895/90
"930/1E9
 935/03
1913/05
1914/12
21.47
22.67
24.07
25.52
27.23
29.13
30.82
32.56
annual
1 . Tl
1 . 2"1.2"
S 1.31
1.41
1.21
1 . 41
4.81 22.16 20.59 10.94
5. 38 23.33 22.22 11.76
6.09 25. 8E 24.26 13.07
6.91 28.44 ^ 25.37 14.52
7.69 31 .31 27.37 16.27
8.30 34.70 30.09 18.42
9.10 37.56 32.30 21.27
9.76 40.54 34.87 23.40
g routh rate
2.4% i . i "_ : .£"- - . =--'-
2 . 6£ 2 . 21 1 . 91 2 . 2 1
2.71 2.01 0.91 2.2;
2.31 2.01 ; .61 2.4-1
".61 2.21 2.31 2.51
1.91 1.6=: :.51 2.-1
1.81 2.3' 2.31 2.51
79.97
85.36
93.39
100.76
109.87
120.64
131 .05
141.13
- - --
1 . 9 1
', . 6 '-.
• . e -1
2.01
" .71
'.-"
Sural oopui eti on (unadjusted)
'£53
1 385
i C ~ u
' = - 3
 953
" 9 0 I-
1910
1914
17.21
IE .29
"9.49
23.75
22.16
23.77
25. 19
25.67
(19.;-) -. = . = :
(20.25) 22.42
(22.49) 22.23
(2^.75) 22.33
(27. "9) 25. i£
(30.17) 27.55
(32.73) 29.69
(35.45) 32.10
Urban ^opulalion ( unati justec )
i860
1 8 B 5
1690
1895
1900
1905
1910
1914
^ Urban
1830
1865
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
1914
4.26
4.36
4. 58
4.77
5.07
5.36
5.63
5.89
to all
19.8
19.3
19.0
18.7
IB. 6
18.4
18.3
18.1
(2.35) 1 .66
(3. OB) 1.79
(3.39) 1.95
(3.69) 2.34
(4. 12) 2.21
(4.53) 2.43
(4.63) 2.51
(5.09) 2.77
population (unaojustec)
(12.5) E.I
(13.2) 6.7(13. O e.o
(13.0) 8.0
(13.2) 6.1
(13.1) 8.1
(12.9) B.1
(12.6) 7.9
73.9''
5 ' . 0 1
1 1 i . 7 7 
1 19.47
10. 16
11.0 1
82
50
06
50
11 .
12,
14 ,
16.
18.59
20.45
Sources:
12.9
13.0
12.7
12.5
12.6
13.7
14.3
14.6
See appendix for regional data compilation , 
Volkov's all union data fron E.Z.Uol^ov, Pi n ami k a 
narodonaselFniva S5SR ra SO let, r.,1930, pp. 254-271
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The total population data given in these tables is probably quite 
reliable, but the urban/rural data require- quite a considerable 
adjustment, as is explained below. The total population data indicate 
the continued high growth rates of the population over this period. 
There are some indications of a slow-down in the growth rate in the last 
ten years before the war, but the rates are still very high. The 
'growth rates of the EPR and the SPR remain the highest, although the 
CPR has recovered somewhat from its spell of low rates in the 1890s.
As explained in the appendix, these data come mainly from 
V.Zaitsev's work. Zaitsev himself explained that the TsSK registration 
data were very unreliable and that the urban population wai sometimes 
registered more than once . Zaitsev himself claimed that a comparison 
of the TsSK data and the results of the 1916/17 census indicated that 
TsSK had over estimated the real level of the population by 5.6%. 
Zaitsev apparently adjusted his figures to take account of the regional 
migration eastwards. But he admitted that the urban/rural division of 
his data <^-.ves a very misleading picture of the dynamic of urban growth: 
Our figures greatly underestimated the level of urban 
population for later years and over estimated it for 
earlier years (i.e. before the 1897 census SGW). There- 
fore the data on the size of the urban population should
2 
not be used directly in this form .
For the 50 gubernia of European Russia, Zaitsev applied the 
following corrections to urban population figures:
1. A procedure existed for registering new arrivals in towns but 
not, apparently, departures.
2. See V.Zaitsev, in V.G.Groman (ed.) ibid., M.1927, p,61. See also 
A.E.Losisky, in Urozhai khlebov...,M.1917, p .10 for a similar 
claim.
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1880 -10.9%
1885 -5.6%
1890 -3.2%
1895 -1.1%
1897 0%
1900 +3.2%
1905 +9.6%
1910 +15.4%
1914 +21.5%
Source: V.Zaitsev, in V.G.Groman (ed.), ibid., M.1927, p.65.
No differentiation was given for the level of correction to be 
applied in the different regions, and so this level of corrections is 
applied throughout for all regions. The adjusted urban and regional 
population figures are given in the following table:
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Urban population (adjusted) ,,
P* U55R USSRYear
18BO
1885
1890 -
1895
1900
1905
1910
1914
~. u r a 1
-350
1EE5
1690
1595
" 9 0 0
'•50 =
191"
1914
u r ^
', £ - !~]
'c 5 5 5
' r 9 ~
"695
"900
1905
1910
'•914
NCR
3.80
4.13
4.43
4.72
5.23
5.87
6.50
7. 16
poouletia
17.67
16. 54
1 9 . 64
20.80
22.00
23.26
/^. 32
25.40
an -o all
17.7.'
i6.2"'
•E.4-'
— £ C: " * D
1 9 . 2v
20.2'=
? 1 . 1 "
22.0'
5CR SPR
(2.54)
(2.91)
(3.28)
(3.65)
(4.25)
(6.96)
(5.57)
(6.18)
i". (adjusted)
"(19.62)
(20.42}
(22.6 0 "i
(24.79)
(27.06)
(25.74)
(31.99)
(34 .36)
population
(n «;-)
(12*. 5;)
(12.?:)
( 1 2 . 5 v. )
(I3.6r)
(14.3-:)
(i4.e ".)
(15.2")
CPR
1.48
1.69
1.89
2.02
2.28
2.66
3.01
3.37
}~ , ~
/ o . i;
2 " . 2 :
- "7 T 
^ ^ • ^'
^ D . J
77 . 4
25 . r
^ " • —
/ , j '.
•7 ^
/" • C
^ *~!
C 1
5 . 5'-.
9 ~
9.7
.77
10.16 i
61.01 i
11.82
'2.50 !
14.06 !
16.50
IE.59 1
20.45
66. -,2 
73.31 
c *i . 1 3 1 
E7.77
Here ue see £ more acceptable oicture of the Dynamic o' 
urDsnizetion uhich uas raoidly increasing in all regions on tne 
eve of the uar.
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Population data during the war.
The figures based on the TsSK annual data only recorded the permanently 
registered population and not the actual 'on hand' (nalichnpye) population. 
It required a census to capture a nicture of the 'on hand 1 population at 
any specific time. Seasonal migrant workers (otkhodniki), students, 
military conscripts and other people temporarily absent from their families 
would be registered as though they were normally present in the TsSK annual 
accounts. Some of these people may indeed have been doubly registered 
as permanently resident in towns as Zaitsev claimed , but most would not. 
In normal circumstances this discrepancy would not be too important, but 
during the war when the temporarily resident population had been inflated 
by up to 10 million refugees and up to 8 million soldiers, and when it was 
intended to use the population data for food supply planning purposes,, the 
size of this discrepancy grew to enormous proportions. In these circum­ 
stances it became essential to get data more representative of the actual 
location of the population. This required a census. Such a census was 
carried out by the zemstva and town statisticians in 1916 and repeated for 
the rural population as part of the agricultural census in 1917. The
results of these censuses are available in the works of Lositsky, Kondratiev,
o 
Volkov and Gayster". Lositsky f s data appear to include the army ----ith the
rural population and includes all the refugees. Kondratiev's data appear 
to exclude the army but include the refugees. Gayster's data appear to 
cover the registered rural population plus refugees. Volkov provided the 
most complete overall picture recalculated on an annual basis and covering
1. See above p. ? /
2. See A.E.Lositsky, Urozhai khlebov v Rossii v 1917g., M.1P18, n.29
N.D.Kondratiev (conniler), Sel.Khoz Rossii v XX veke, v .1922, DD.20-21. 
E.Z.Volkov, Dinamika naseleniya SSSR za vosemdesyat let, M.1930 
pn.104,137-7, 170-81,Gayster (ed.), Osnovniye elementv Sel.Khoz. 
proizvodstva SSSR 1916 i 1923-27 gg., M.1930, pp.2-5.
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just the area of the future USSR in its pre-1939 boundaries. Volkov's 
account of the actual population balance for the war time years is given 
in the table below:
<-
a) Actual population
Urban
Rural
b) Normal civilian
population 
Recruited
Actual civilian
population
c) Army
Recruited
Losses
Army actual size*
of whom on active
service
of whom on n on -active
service
d) Refugees and others
e) All actual
of whom urban
of x<rhom
normal civilian
military 
refugees etc.
"1A7
1914
139.9
20.5
119.5
139.9 
0.4
139.5
0.4
n
0.4*
0
0.4
0
139.9
20.5
20.4
0.1 
0
l/l/ 
1915
142.6
21.8
120.8
142.0 
5.5
136.5
5.5
0.5
5.0
4.2
0.8
1.1
142.6
21.8
20.5
0.9 
0.4
l/l/ 
1916
142.3
23.5
118.8
140.9 
9.9
131.0
9.9
2.8
7.1
5.2
1.9
4.2
142.3
23,5
20.7
1.3 
1.5
1/1 
1917
142.5
24.0
118,4
139.7 
13.0
126.7
13.0
5.0
8.0
5.2
2.8
7.8
142.5
24.0
19.7
1.5 
2.8
1/1 
1918
140.9
25.6
115.3
139.0 
15.7
123.3
15.7
7.8
7.9
0.
7.9
9.7
140.9
25.6
19.3
2.8 
3.5
Source: E.Z.Volkov, Dinamika naseleniya SSSR za vosemdesyat let
M.1930, p.104.
Note: These figures refer to the pre-1939 area of the USSR.
The item refugees etc.would include refugees and prisoners 
of war. In order for the table to be consistent and avoid 
double counting the refugees should only include those 
coming from an area outside that for which these figures 
were calculated, i.e. coming from those occupied areas which 
were lost to the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s. Displaced 
persons living in those parts of the war zone which later 
were included in the USSR will have already been covered as 
part of the normal civilian population.
* There appears to be a mistake here. There were already about
1 million in the army before 1914, so the actual size of the
army ought to be a million larger than the size indicated.
These figures shox%T several very important developments:
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First they show the large fall in the normal civilian population 
due to the recruitment into the army of almost 16 million men.
Secondly they indicate that almost 8 million of these soldiers were 
lost during the war, ~ as a consequence of their having died or been 
taken prisoner. We also see that a rising proportion of the soldiers 
were not on active service.
Thirdly, we see that these military losses of 8 million were totally 
outweighed in the covered areas in these years by the great influx of 
refugees and prisoners of war. By the beginning of 1918 the numbers of 
newcomers had risen to 9.7 million.
"Fourthly we see the actual increase in urbanisation during this 
period, and the fact that this increase ^T as totally the consequence of 
the very large increases in refugees and military personnel in urban areas. 
Whereas in 1914 the normal civilian population had accounted for 99.7% 
of the urban population, by the beginning of 1917 they accounted for only 
82.1% and by the end of 1917 they accounted for only 75.A" of the population.
The position was therefore much more complicated than is often 
realised. The problem was not only the large increase in the size of the 
army and its deployment primarily in the north-west of the northern 
consumer region, there was also the disruotion and additional strain caused•^ w *•
by a large influx of refugees into this area, with a very large proportion 
of them settling in urban areas.
It is somextfhat difficult to give a nrecise regional breakdown of the 
location of this additional burden of soldiers and refugees. The Volkov 
data, which are the most detailed^have been adjusted to the pre-1939 area 
of the USSR and only allow a detailed breakdown between European USSR and
the non-European parts of the USSP. These figures give a good presentation 
1. The disbandment of the ar^y after the Bolshevik Revolution is assumed
to have resulted in many (35%) of the soldiers gravitating to the towns.
The refugees also tended to concentrate in the towns (over 30% of the
refugees x^ere listed as being urban throughout this period, whereas the
general proportion was only 15%).
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of the actual 'on hand' rural population and are Dresented in the table
below:
The actual population on hand according to the 1916 & 1917 censuses
All
. European USSR
SCR
Transcaucasus
Turkestan
SPR
N . Caucasus
EPR
Sib. Krai
Dal.Vost Krai
Steppe Krai
All USSR
Urban
European USSR
SCR
Transcaucasus
Turkestan
SPR
N.Caucasus
EPR
Sib. Krai
Dal.Vost Krai
Steppe Krai
All USSR
Rural
European USSR
SCR
Transcaucasus
Turkestan
SPR
N .Caucasus
EPR
Sib. Krai
Dal.Vost Krai
Steppe Krai
All USSR
formal 
1916
92.50
6.06
6.85
9.55
7.84
2.09
4.14
129.03
14.72
1.44
1.10
1.30
0.71
0.37
0.42
20.07
77.78
4.61
5.76
8.25
7.13
1.7
3.72
108.9
civilia 
1917
89.88
5.51
6.02
8.91
7.65
2.08
3.97
124.03
14.73
1.04
0.95
0.96
0.76
0.51
0.40
19.34
75.16
4.47
5.07
7.96
6.89
1.57
3.57
104.63
n popt»l.
in % \rnyy
-2.8
-9.1
-12.2
-6.7
-2.3
-0.1
-4.2
-3.9
+0.03
-28.3
-13.3
-26.5
+7.3
+ 37.5
-5.0
-3.6
-3.4
-4.1
3.14
1916 
Refu- 
gees
5.21
0.17| 0.24
0.25 0.04
i
0.78
0.58
0.12
0.13
5.17
-12.0
-3.6
-3.3
-8.3
i
-4.1J
-3.9 i
0.17
0.10
0.01
0.07
5.85
1916 
Army& 
Refu- 
gees
8.35
0.41
0.29
0.95
0.68
0.13
0.20
11.02
1.40
0.11
0.09
0.22
0.08
0.05
0.05
1.98
6.96
0.32
0.19
0.73
0.60
0.08
0.15
9.03
1917 
Army& 
Refu- 
gees i
11.61
0.58
0.40
1.33
0.95
0.19
0.27
15.33
1.94
0.14
0.13
0.31
0.11
0.07
0.06
2.76
9.68
0.44
0.27
1.01
0.85
0.11
0.21
12.63
All PC 
1916
100.85
6.47
7.14
n.50
8.52
2.22
4.34
140.05
16.12
1.55
1.19
1.52
0.79
0.42
0.47
22.05
84.74
jpulatic 
1917
101.51
6.09
6.42
10.24
8.60
2.27
4.24
139.36
16.67
1,18
1.08
1.27
0.87
0.58
0.46
22.10
84.84
4.93J 4.91
5.95
8.98
7.73
1.79
3.87
118.^0
5.34
8.97
jn 
change
in %
+0.7%
-6 . 0%
-8.1%
-2.5%
+ 1.0%
+2.3%
-2.4%
-0.5%
+ 3.4%
-23.7%
-13.3%
-16.6%
+ 10.1
+37.8
-2.2
+0.2
+0.1
-0.4
-7.4
-0.1
7.74J +0.1
1.68
3.78
117.26
-6.1
-2.4
-0.5
Source: E.Z.Volkov, ibid., on, 170, 180-1.
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Population data according to type of producer
There are tx^o major sources of data on the different types of 
producers: the demographic census data and landownership statistics. 
I xjill consider first the demographic data. These include the early 
revizii for the pre-reform period, the 1897 census and the 1916 agri­ 
cultural and demographic census. Before emancipation of the peasantry 
in 1861 the grain producers could be classified as: the landowners 
(pomeshchiki), the peasant serfs and the free peasants (the state peasants) 
According to the 1858 reviziy« there were at this time some 52 million 
peasants in the country of whom about 40% consisted of state peasants . 
In Nifontov's book he presents the regional size of the population for 
these three types of grain producer for 32 gubernia of European Russia. 
These population figures are given in the table below:
The rural population in millions according to its distribution 
between the households of different types of producers in the
1850s.
Population
in
Pomeshchik 
households
Population
in
Serf 
households
Population 
in state 
peasant 
households
All 
Population
NCR(15)
SPR(6)
CPR(9)
EPR(2)
AUL.(32)
In %%
NCR(15)
SPR(6)
CPR(9)
EPR(2)
//U,(32)
Source:
Note:
1. See P.I
m -_ 1
0.62
0.33
0.56
0.02
1.53
5.3%
4.3%
5.3%
0.6%
4.6%
A.S.Nifontov
The number o 
indicated in
.Lyashchenko,
M 10^6 r. SRA -
7.34
4.60
4.89
0.48
17.31
63.0%
58.9%
46.0%
15.8%
52.2%
, ibid . , p . 129 ,
f gubernii included 
brackets .
Istoriya narodno^o
3.70 11
2.87 7
5.17 10
2.57 3
14.31 33
31.7%
36.8%
48.7%
83.6%
43.2%
within each region
khozyaistva SSSR
.65
.81
.62
.07
.15
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
is
> f
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From this table the following points can be seen:
First, the population in the Pomeshchik households accounted for 
just under 5% of all the population. This must have included labourers 
and servants as well as just the families of the Pomeshchiki . It acc­ 
ounted for between 4.3 and 5.3% in the NCR, SPR and CPR, but in the EPR 
it represented a much lower proportion, below 1%. The picture in the 
other gubernia distant from the traditional centres of Russian agriculture 
would tend to reflect the position in the EPR.
Secondly, the share of the population in the serf households was 
greater than those in the state peasant households in the NCR and SPR, 
and was just lower than it in the CPR. The position in the EPR was very 
different with the overwhelming majority of the population located in the 
households of the state peasants.
The emancipation of the peasantry in 1861 resulted in the removal of 
the formal distinction between the serfs and the state peasants.
By the time of the general demograohic census of 1897 there were 
reported to be over 100 million peasants in the country in the rural areas, 
0.8 million landowners and their families and 7.2 million of the group 
called raznochintsy (neither Pomeshchik or peasant).
1897 census results for area of Russian Empire excluding 
Poland and Finland. Population in millions.
Peasants
Raznochintsyi 
Pomeshchiki
Foreigners
ALL
Source : Gbskc&a. * vW
All
108.0
15.6 
1.8
0.5
125.6
pa \mperi\ r-t
Wo /l«i-«kn<y<
urban
7.3
8.4 
1.0
16.8
* , Sfibtfi
rural
100.7
7.2 
O.R
108.7
' ra7~rabokrl<i t/annyikh ptr\/ti
5, v*tf,r*6&
The rural population was located in 19.13 million households with an
average of 5.69 people per household . 
1. Obshchii Svod . r. . '~ '-'" _______ -_
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The /domeshchik population as given in these figures clearly only 
refers to the ja'omeshchik's immediate families. The 1886 decree on hiring 
agricultural labour had specifically states as one of the obligations of 
the employer, that he should feed the labourer with normal peasant food . 
So there can be no doubt that the agricultural labourers should be included 
as part of the pomeshchik's household when it comes to calculating the 
grain forage balance by type of producer.
These figures are consequently/icn-comparable with the earlier figures 
and could only be made comparable if some means were available of cal­ 
culating the numbers of the peasant population that were regularly working 
for the pomeshchiki.
The 1916 agricultural census, was much more useful on that score. 
One part of the questions of this census was specifically concerned with 
assessing the labour used on the joomeshchik estates. Unfortunately, the 
results from this part of the census were never published. But the
Soviet historian A.M.Anfimov has discovered in the TsSU archives a pre-
2 liminary draft of the results and has published parts of them .
Before looking at these, more detailed, data I x^ill just give a 
brief summary of the main results of the 1916 census, as available from 
other sources.
Kondratiev noted that the 1916 census gave the following results for 
the numbers of different types of rural household:
1. PSZ, III, Tom VI, 1886, No.3803, article 32, cited from A.M.Anfimov, 
Krupnoye pomeshchichye khozyaistvo Evropyeiskoi Rossii, M.1969, p.49
2. See A.M.Anfimov, Rossiiskaya derevnya v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny , 
M.1962, pp.21-2, 98-100, 138, 151, 161, and A.M.Anfimov, 
Krupnoye pomeshchichye khozyaistvo Evreopyeiskoi Rossii, M.1969, 
(in many placesthroughoutthis book)"and in A.MTAnfimov,in 
Problemv, istochnikovedeniya, Tom VIII, M.1959, pp.31-49, These 
materials entitled sirrroly Svod no Rossii are located in the TsSU 
archives reference (Arkhiv TsSU,otdel S.Kh.op.l, 1916g.,d.62, £.2-3).
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47 gubernii
of European All Russia
Russia less Turkestan
Peasant households 15,492 18.671
Pomeshchik households 0.110 0.120
All households 15.602 18.791
Source: N .D.Kondratiev, Rv'nok khlebov. . ,M. 1922 . p. 16.
Vainshtein informs us that the census indicated that the average size of 
peasant household was 5,84 and that the average size of ^omeshchik household 
was 21.^3 . Vainshtein consequently calculated the 1916 agricultural pop­
ulation to be the following:
Number of Average size
households of households Population
Peasants 18.671 5.84 109.1
Pomeshchik
households 0.120 21.03 2.5
Other l.S- 
ALL 113.1
Source: see A. L. Vainshtein, ibid. , p. 454.
Note: the figures which Vainshtein ascribe's to the pre-1939 
area of the US? 10, are the same as those that Kondratiev 
ascribed to Russia less Turkestan^
Vainshtein does not explain what his 'other 1 category 
includes .
A regional breakdown for peasant households and poDulation only
2 
are given in a 1930 source edited by Gayster*". This will be referred to
later as it gives a good comparison with the later peasant population data 
(for 1923-27). But since its regionalisation is different from all the
1. See A ,L. Vainshtein, Narodnoye bogatstvo i narodnokhozyaistvennoye 
nakopleniye predrevolyutsionnoi Rossii, M.1960, n.454. 
The figure for peasant household size is identical to the one ?,iven 
in A.Gayster (ed.) Osnovniye elementy^. Sel.Khoz. proizvodstva SSSPv 
1916 i 1923-7gg. M.1930, r»p.2-3. But the figure for potneshchiks^ 
households appears somewhat low according to Anfimov; data (see below/
2. See A.Gayster (ed.) Osnovniye elementy Sel .Khoz. proizvodstva SSSR 
1916 i 1923-27gg., M.1930, pp. 2-5
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other series so far mentioned, the figures that it gives by themselves 
would indicate little.
Returning now to the more detailed figures for the pomeshchik house­ 
holds supplied by Anfiraov, we should note that they do not provide a full 
coverage of pomeshchik households, but they do cover a very large prop­ 
ortion of them. The data cover 84,143 households, which were.70.8% of 
^all the pomeshchik households registered in the 1916 census, and these 
households contained 89.2 of all the pomeshchik sown land registered. 
The missing households must therefore have had slightly less than the 
average sown area and so would no doubt have employed slightly less lab­ 
ourers. But apart from this, we can consider this source as providing a 
good presentation of the pomeshchik households, their activities and the 
number-, of people they employed.
Unfortunately, no regional breakdown was supplied by Anfimov, and 
in order to get a rough regional breakdown of the regional location of 
the different types of household we will have to consult the landowner- 
ship statistics. Apart from this there is some uncertainty as to just 
what the figures on employment refer to. Anfimov states that they cert­ 
ainly excluded day labourers and that they also ought to have excluded 
people who were working for the pomeshchiki for only a month in the year.
However, Anfimov did admit that these figures might include the latter,
2 as well as the more long term labourers and employees , The more long
term labourers were classified as srokoviye (working for 5-6 months) or 
annual.
In order to get some form of impression of the relative magnitudes
1. See A.M.Anfimov, ibid., M.1962, p.22
2. See A.M.Anfimov, ibid., M.1962, pp.99-100
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of the different types of labourers Anfimov cited the following data 
from Tula Gubernia in 1917:
The relative importance of different types of labourers working 
on pomeshchik estates in Tula Gubernia in 1917.
"umber of relative share
worker days of all worker
Tyt>e of labourer worked days worked
Annual
Srokoviye
Monthly
Daily
20,400
44,250
1,225
8,926
27.3%
59.2%
1.6%
11.9%
All 74,801 100%
Source: A.M.Anfimov, ibid. , M.1962, p. 108., citing archival 
copies of the results of part of the. 1917 census.
These figures clearly indicate the major importance of annual and 
srokoviye labour and the relative unimportance of daily and monthly labour. 
However, it remains debatable just how representative these figures are 
for the whole USSR and whether they would have been applicable to the 
pre-war period.
Let us turn now to the detailed data published by Anfir.ov. The 
following table presents an indication of the number of hired labourers 
and employees employed by pomeshchik households according to the size of 
the pomeshchik estate measured in terms of their sown area: (see over pa^e)
This table indicates several imnortant points:
First, we see the very large amount of labour that was hired; over 
1.4 million (including employees), an average of 17 per pomeshchik household 
Secondly we see the very skewed distribution of these worker? and employees 
between the different sized pomeshchik households. Twenty percent of the 
households, sowing over 100 desvatintj, of land per household employed over 
68% of these labourers and employees. Although the average numbers of 
workers employed was 17 per household, the average for 63% of the sowing
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Type of 
household
according
to area
sown
No sowings
0-10 des.
10-50 des.
50-100 des
100-250des
250-500des
500-1000
des .
1000-5000
des .
5000-1- des. 
All
Number of
households 
in ths . ! in %
7.97
16.46
28.28
, 14.07
10.29
4.41
2.02
0.68
0.01
I
| 84.18
9.5
19.6
33.6
16.7
12.2
5.2
2.4
0.8
0
100
Hired
labour­
ers
in thsds 1
35.8
38.4
125.6
127.0
236.3
195.3
168.6
151.1
11.0
1088.8
Employ­
ees 
in thsds.
23.4
22.4
47.4
33.3
77.0
68.4
41.4
46.0
0.2
354.5
All employ­
ees & labour­
ers 
in . thsds ,
59.1
60.8
172.8
160.3
308.3
263.6
210.0
197.1
11.3
1443.4
in %
4.1
4.2
12.0
11.1
21.4
18.3
14.5
13.7
0.8
100
[Workers
5 employ
-ees per 
househld
7
4
6
11
30
60
|
104
289
1023
i 
1 17
Workers
per
100 des. 
sown
—
92
24
18
21
17
16
19
16
20
Source: A.M.Anfimov, Krurmoye pomeshchichye khozyaistvo 
Evropyeiskoi Rossii, M.1969, p.51.
groups fell to below 10 while the too 3-4% employed over 100.
Thirdly, we see that the distribution of employment was with the 
exception of the groups with a relatively small sown area (under 50 desyatin^f-) 
very closely related to the area sown. Overall the average was to employ 
20 workers per 100 desyatini^ sown. The proportion was much higher for the 
households with a sown area under 50 desvatin^-, but for all the other groups 
the average density of labour erroloved was fairly stable between 16 and 21 
per 100 desyatin^ Ey comparison we should note that 119 million peasants 
sowed an area of 90 million hectares (82 million desyatinw.) . If we reduce 
the number of peasants by 40% to account for those not engaged in agri­ 
cultural pursuits on their own land and the non-active peasant population
(i.e. the young and very old) we would receive an average figure of 87_____
1. This is quite a generous reduction, if I had reduced the number of 
peasants working their own land bv a smaller amount the proportion 
would of course have been much higher.
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peasants working per 100 desyatinyof sown land. This is fairly close 
to the numbers employed in the 20™ of poneshchik households sowing less 
than 10 desyatin^. But it is over four times as large as the average for 
all the pomeshchik households. This would appear to be the major reason 
for the higher surpluses generated by these households.
As mentioned above these figures do appear to differ a little from 
the figures for the average size of nomeshchik household? by Vainshtein. 
Vainshtein had suggested that the average pomeshchik household contained 
21.03 people. The figures cited here give over 17 for just workers and 
employees. This would allow less than A people for the numbers in 
pomeshchik families and the numbers of private servants . Since the 
pomeshchik family was likely to be no smaller than the peasant family with
5.8 persons per family, and since there were on average about 2 servants
2 per household we should have expected an average size of pomeshchik household
of about 24 and not the 23 cited by Vainshtein. Vainshtein T s figures may 
however be including a larger proportion of smaller pomeshchik households 
that were not included in Anfimov's data.
Another problem with these data is trying to assess how typical the 
situation indicated for 1916 was of the pre-war period. In another book 
Anfimov informs us that over 27% of the workers and employees listed in 
his 1916 data, were not normal peasants but were prisoners of war and 
refugees, who had been pressed into service because of the manpower short­ 
ages. The distribution of prisoner of war and refugee labour is indicated 
in the following table:
1. Anfimov is quite clear that the above mentioned figures exclude 
private servants.
2. According to the 1897 census.
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Type of 
household 
according 
to area sown
No sowings
0-10 des.
10-50 des.
50-100 des.
ino-250 des.
250-500 des. 
500-1000 des.
1000-5000 des.
5000+ des. 
All
Number of 
households 
in 
thousands
7.97
16.46
28.28
14.07
10.79
4.41 
2.02
0.68
0.01
84.18
No. of hired 
labourers and 
employees 
in thousands
59.1
60.8
173.9
167.4
313.4
263.7 
210.0
177.1
11.3
1456.7
of whom 
prisoners
of war
6.2
4.7
23.7
29.0
55.8
60.2 
55.9
55.1
3.0
293.6
refugees
3.5
4.3
15.1
14.9
26.0
15.4 
11.6
7.6
0.3
98.7
as % of a. 
labourers 
prisoners 
of '^ar
17.3
12.3
18.7
17.4
17.8
30.8 
33.2
36.5
27.4 
1
20.2
LI 
& employees
refugees
5.9
7.1
8.7
8.9
8.3
5.9 
5.5
3.9
2.9
6.8
Source: A.M.Anfimov, Rossiiskaya derevnya v godyi pervoi mirovoi 
voiny , H.1962, p.98.
Note: no explanation is given for the slight discrepancy between 
these figures and those given above. The difference is in 
any case very small
Clearly this must cast some doubt on how representative of the pre-war 
period these figures would be. I would suggest that the best approach 
to these figures is to assume that the indications of the numbers of x^orkers 
employed per 100 desyatin^/-of sown area is probably fairly representative 
of pre-war levels, and that the effect of the labour shortage was nainly 
to reduce the area sown rather than to change the methods of organising 
labour. The total number of labourers employed by the pomeshchiki before 
the war would consequently have been larger in direct proportion to the 
extent that porneshchik sowings had been larger before the war. This 
question will be further discussed below when I consider the available data
on the size of pomeshchik grain production.
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A rough indication of the regional location of landowner and peasant 
households is available from the landownership census of 1905. The 
results of this census have been conveniently tabulated by Kondratiev and 
Oeanovsky and it is their work which is cited below. The regional dis­ 
tribution of the different types of households involved in land ownership 
are listed below for the 42 ubernii of Euroean Russia:
Peasant
households
farming on Households on nrivately
allotment land owned land
all peasant non-peasant
2.97
3.12
4.11
0.35
0.24
0.16
0.27
0.15
0.12
0.08
0.09
0.04
spi
All 42 gubernii of
European Russia 11.2o 0.76 0.54 0.22
Source: See K.D.Kondratiev (ed.) Selskoe khozyaistvo Rossii v 
XX veke. M.1923, PP.66-73~
Xot all of the non-peasant private landowner households would be 
pomeshchik farmers. According to another table of landownership statistics 
given by Kondratiev , in 1905 the pomeshchiki owned 68% of the non-neasant 
privately owned land, and in 1911 this proportion had dropped to 64%. 
Assuming that these figures were roughly correlated with the numbers of 
households, then the number of nomeshchik household? would have been about 
150 thousand in 1905 for the 42 gu^ernia of European Russia. If we assume 
a gentle fall in numbers from 1905 to 1914 and then a sharn fall during the 
war, then these figures are quite comparable with the 1916 census result of 
110 thousand landovmer household? in the 47 gu^ernia of European Russia.
1. See N.D.Kondratiev, ibid., M.1923, np.64-5.
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b) Data on grain used as food
^-i) Grain consumption norms
For the very early work on estimating possible grain surpluses,
surplus to the needs of the agricultural sector, the consumption norm
usually accepted was not based on any statistical material, but on the
level of soldiers' rations that had been accepted by the army from the
middle of the eighteenth century.
In 1840 Academician Keppen gave the following justi ication of a
norm of 0.356 tons per person for the consumption of grain:-
In agreement with Reguly dlya provianskogo pravleniya 
published on 9 January 1758 each soldier receives monthly 
721 Ibs of flour or 52^ of crisp bread (Reguly'. dlya 
proviantskogo pravleniya chapter vii p.l). At first 
he received 1 garnet (5 Ibs) of groats per month but 
after the manifesto of the 17 March 1775 he was given 1| 
garnets a month. Consequently every year each soldier 
received 21 pds 30 Ibs of flour and 2 tohetverts 2 
garntsii (i.e. 2 pds 10 Ibs) of groats ... But I am 
not counting here the consumption of groats .,. and I am 
not including the quantity of grain required for feeding 
cattle, therefore the calculation here can only be 
approximate. Therefore taking round figures it is 
possible to calculate about 3 chetverts for each person . 
However this was normally considered to be a maximum norm, possibly 
covering elements other than personal consumtion. In 1842 D.Protopopov 
in the journal of the Ministry of State Property also quoted these army
1. Keppen, '0 potreblenie khleba v Rossii', Zhurnal MVD , lNO.6, 
Vol.36, 1840, p.405.
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rations but added:
PeoDle acquainted with this business believe that this 
quantity (3 chetverts per person SGW) is more than 
sufficient for the most cot>ious feeding of soldiers. 
He noted that with the increase in consumption of other foodstuffs 
the consumption of grain must fall. Later he continued:
There is no doubt whatsoever; a grain portion of 3 
chetverts cannot be considered as an average for all 
and for each. It must be lowered significantly to a 
level of 2 chetverts or, if taken as a whole for the 
whole mass of the population of both sexes and all ages, 
it will have to indicate the quantity of grain consumed 
not only for the satisfaction of the needs of the pop­ 
ulation but also for feeding livestock. This is 
particularly important due to the fact that the sep­ 
arate calculation of the consunrotion of grain feed for 
cattle is impossible due to the scarcity of data .
Protopopov therefore implied a deflator of 1/3 as being necessary to 
adjust for this difference in age and sex structure between adult males 
(soldiers) and the total population.
Converting these figures into metric units we see the following
values: per per
soldier head
Keppen 1758 army ration 0.356 tons flour
0.025 tons groats 
0.381
1775 army ration 0.356 tons flour
0.037 tons groats 
0.391
Protopopov 0.237 tons flour
0.025^ tons groats 
0.262
1. O.Protopooov '0 khlebnoi torgovli v Rossii' Zhurnal MGI , 1842, 
vol.3,pp.93, 95-6
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It should be noted that these norms are given in their flour
i 
equivalent and not in grain equivalents. The grain equivalent of
these figures would be 15-20% higher depending on the extraction rate. 
Rural consumption norms
In the 1860s in the construction of his early grain forage balance, 
the Department of Agriculture snecialist I.Vilson accepted the following 
average per capita personal consumption norms:
Winter Spring Winter Spring
grains grains All grains grains All
For adults 2.5 0.2 2.7 - 0.315 0.025 0.340
For young and old 1.25 0.1 1.35 0.158 0.013 0.170
For all 2.0 0.2 2.2 0.252 0.025 0.277
Source: See I.Vilson (compiler) Obyasneniya k khozyaistvenno-
statisticheskomu atlasu Evropyeiskoi P.ossii, izd.A, SPb.1869, 
pp.106-107
These norms were based on the results of a survey carried out by 
Ya.A.Solovyev in Smolensk gubernia. Vilson notes that the level of 
grain consumption undoubtedly differed from region to region and that 
accounts of the level of consumption were often exaggerated, but he rec­ 
ommended the acceptance of these Solovyev norms as being more reliable
than any other study . He also pointed out that these figures were
2 fairly close to those recommended by Kenpen and Tengoborsky . In fact,
as we can see by comparison with the figures given above they represented 
a lower figure for adult consumption but a slightly higher figure for 
the average consumption of all the population.
1. I have not been able to trace Solovyev's original work.
2. I.Vilson, (compiler), ibid. , p.107.
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By the 1890s the official norms accepted for the peasant population 
were all much lower. These norms were received not from budget data 
but apparently by means of dividing uncorrected production data (net 
of seed) for the food grains by the population figures. They conse­ 
quently represent figures in grain equivalents and not flour equivalents 
like the ration based norm described above. In the 1890s there was 
a. difference of opinion between the TsSK on the one hand and the zemstvo 
and academic statisticians on the other hand. In conditions of the 
agricultural depression of the early 1890s it was natural that the 
analysis of the consumption of grain and the determination of the size of 
grain surpluses should become a matter of great interest and controversy.
The radical intelligentsia including several prominent statisticians 
accused the central statisticians of TsSK and MVD of under-estimating 
peasant grain consumption, so as to show that agriculture was in a 
relatively healthy state and that there were great surpluses available 
for export.
The view of the central statisticians was expressed by the published 
work of the special commission of the Ministry of tbe Interior set up 
specifically to review the conditions of food consumption. The 
commission worked under the chairmanship of privy counsellor V.K.Von Pleve 
and its work was published in 1894 entitled 'The average grain and potato 
harvests for ten years 1883-92 in 60 gubernii of European Russia in 
relationship to national consurnpton' .
1. Vreroennik TsSK, 1894, no.34.
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In this account no correction was made to gross production and 
the consumption norm used was 0,213 tons of all grains (including 
potatoes converted to their rye equivalent) in grain equivalent for 
personal consumption for all the population. The authors of this 
work V.D.Alenitsyn and Yu.V.Brunneman, explained that this was the norm 
accepted by TsSK at the time (referring to the 'main results of the 
grain harvest in European Russia in 1892' ) and that it was slightly 
higher than the earlier figure accepted by TsSK in 1884, when the 
figure accepted was only 0.147 tons (1 chetvert of winter grains and 
half a chetvert of spring grains) per head. Consequently they claimed 
that, 'the accepted norm has been set at a level somewhat higher than 
reality so as to present a less dangerous figure, so as to eliminate 
the possibility of presenting the case in a better light than it is in 
reality, which in connection with mass consumption could have undesirable 
consequences' .
The exact source of this norm is not stated, but it appears to 
have been arrived at by estimation or by dividing production of food
grains, less seed, by the size of the population.
3 At virtually the same time D.P.Semyenov calculated the average
personal consumption norm for the population for the period 1883-93, 
which spans the famine, to be 0.218 tons per head per year in grain 
equivalents . This figure was based on the residual left when seed and 
exports were deducted from the uncorrected gross production data for the
1. Vremennik TsSK, 1892, no.25.
2. Vremennik TsSK, 1894, no.34, PP.2-3
3. I am not sure whether or not this is a misprint for P.P.Semyonov
who was director of TsSK at the time. It would appear to be likely.
4. See Selskoye i Lesnoye Khozyaistvo Rossii, SPb.1893, p.138,
This book had been specially produced for an international exhibition 
in Chicago.
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food grains and when the whole sum was divided by the population figure. 
Feed grains alone would indicate a norm of 0.069 tons per head of pop­ 
ulation per year which could all be assigned to livestock feed. Pot­ 
atoes in their rye equivalent would give an additional norm for personal 
consumption of 0.010 tons per person per year. Semyonov states that 
these figures were close to the figures calculated by the statistical 
department of the Ministry of Communications when they had taken into 
account transport data.
This whole question was made even more complex when several promin­ 
ent statisticians headed by Fortunatov maintained that serious upward 
corrections were needed to TsSK production data and that consequently the 
residually calculated consumption norms should be higher than those cal­ 
culated by TsSK. It was at this point that the zemstvo statisticians 
held their first Statistical Congress, and took the first steps towards 
calling for a comprehensive system of consumption studies. I have 
described all this above .
As already mentioned L.N.Maress provided one of the earliest attempts 
to aggregate the results of some of the few consumption studies which 
had been carried out by the mid 1890s. His study covered investigations 
which had been carried out in 12 provinces, and on the basis of these 
results he calculated an average consumption norm of 19.21 pds of grain 
per head per year i.e. 0.315 tons per head per year in grain equivalent. 
This average was composed of a norm of 0.276 tons of rye and wheat and 
0.040 tons of other grains. Apart from the pure grains Maress noted 
that an average of 0.129 tons per head per year of potatoes were consumed. 
Assuming that potatoes had a grain equivalent of 5:1, this would be 
1. see T>f>3'^-$
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equivalent to another 0.026 tons per head per year in grain equivalents 
i.e. 0.341 tons per head per year for grain and potatoes combined.
However little faith should be placed in the exact significance 
of this average figure, because the sample of cases studied in each 
of these twelve investigations was very small. Two investigations 
were based on only one household's budget, five were based on only two 
budgets and only six of the investigations were based on more than ten 
budgets. These investigated households^no doubt believed by the invest­ 
igators to be more or less typical of all peasant households in the 
given area, but nevertheless the statistical significance of such a 
small sample must remain somewhat dubious.
In their introduction to the book in which Maress's study was 
contained,Chuprov andTbsnikov stated that they believed a lower figure 
of 18 pds per head i.e. 0.295 tons per head to be the correct norm for 
the consumption of grain and potatoes converted into their rye grain 
equivalent . Although they did admit rather confusingly that a further 
pud (i.e. 0.016 tons per head per year)should be added for losses in 
milling. This would give them a total average norm of 0.311 tons per 
head per year. This was much higher than the Protopopov norm.
Chuprov and Posnikov also went on to give an explanation for the 
difference between the low TsSK norm of 0.213 tons per head pe: year and 
their own figure of 0.295-0.311 tons per head per year:
Such a difference is fully explained by the difference 
in aims of the calculations of the consumption norms. 
The 18 pd (0.295 tons) norm represents average actual 
consumption as it is in years of average yield in normal 
1. A.I.Chuprov and A.S.Posnikov, (eds.) ibid., SPb.1897, p.2.
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conditions; the norm of the Central Committee - 13 pds 
(0.213 tons) per head represents the minimum consumption, 
which could support the whole population in years of 
harvest failure. It is according to this norm that the 
government assistance is distributed in years of harvest 
failure and which as is shown by the following peasant 
budgets, is forced to satisfy the poorest peasant 
families. 
As explained above, the TsSK statisticians did not entirely share
this opinion, and this interpretation of their own figures. They had
claimed that they were giving generous norms.
Later in the article which N.A.Svavitsky wrote for the Efron and
2Brokhaus Encyclopaedia , the results of several much larger scale in­ 
vestigations were aggregated. These covered nine separate provinces 
and provided a much lower average norm than did Maress's data. The 
Svavitsky average norm was 17.3 pds per head per year of grain, i.e. 
0.283 tons per head per year. This appears much lower than the Maress 
norm and even somewhat lower than the Chuprov/Posnikov figure.
Later in 1915, Chayanov organised his major study of peasant food 
consumption norms. The Chayanov compilation was based on the nine 
regional studies made by Svavitsky plus another nine. These 18 separate
studies covered well over 7,140 separate budgets, with an average of 476
3 budgets per study . Most of these investigations covered the period
after 1898, although Shcherbin's classic study of Voronezh peasant budgets 
1885-1897 was also included. Most of the more recent studies; by Popov
1. From footnote to introduction p.11 'Vliyaniye urozhaev i khlebnikh
tsen na nekotoriye storonyi russkogo narodnogo khozyaistva',SPb.1897.
2. Krestyanskiye Budzhety ? in Entsikloped.Slovar Brokgauz i Efron,
3. See A.V.Chayanov (ed.) ibid., SPb, 1915, p.11.
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in Tula G., 1910-12, by Groman in Penza G., 1912/13, by Vikhlyaev in 
Moscow G. , 1912 and by Chayanov himself in Moscow G., 1910, had not 
yet been published and were sent to Chayanov in manuscript form. The 
different studies used different methods of investigation; Income 
and Expenditure accounts books had been used in Moscow (Chayanov) and
in Poltava, most had used expeditionary methods, but some had used
1 
questionnaires .
The results of all these investigations as regards grain consumption
as given in 17 separate provinces are listed below:
Vyatskaya
Vologodskaya
Olenetskaya
Novgorodskaya
Kostromskaya
Yaroslavskaya
Moskovskaya*
Smolenskaya
Kaluzhskaya*
Tulskaya
Penzenskaya
Simbirskaya
Voronezhskaya
Kharkovskaya
Poltavskaya
Khersonskava
Consumption of
grain 
per hd. 
avg.in 
tons
0.292 
0.235 
0.361 
0.264 
0.218 
0.226 
0.227 
0.228 
0.277 
0.209 
0.232 
0.319 
0.295 
0.275 
0.237 
(0.450)
Consumption of 
grain
min
%
66
81
55
74
77
76
83
60
62
68
.3
.5
.3
.6
.1
.3
.2
.3
.9
.5
max
*F
/o
164
157
157
125
104
115
112
118
134
135
%
Rye
.4
.4
.7
.7
.5
.0
.8
.2
.4
.0
72
59
92
70
74
86
41
85
83
87
74
64
67
19
49
36
.7
.2
.1
.8
.5
.3
.6
.2
.3
.3
.9
.6
.6
.6
.6
.1
% %
Wheat
10.
9.
3.
10.
18.
2.
3.
4.
10.
15.
74.
33.
54.
29
52
I
1
7
7
4
5
5
5
6
3
5
2
2
7
4
9
11
6
17
13
7
4
6
8
%
Others
.47
.49
.9
.6
.4
.7
.9
.9
.3
.3
.7
.0
.7
24
28
26
11
13
30
12
1
5
2
11
9
1
14
-
.6
.76
.1
.0
.7
.3
.1
.63
.9
.6
.7
.6
.1
.1
(0.195) 
Kazachnoe Voisko 
Average 0.266
Average (for all 
cases less 
Olenetskaya &
82.0 124.0
Consumption of
	grain &
potat- potat-
toes toes
0.009 0.301
0.015 0.249
0.016 0.376
0.024 0.286
0.013 0.231
0.024 0.250
0.043 0.271
0.052 0.280
0.042 0.319
0.052 0.261
0.032 0.264
0.031 0.350
0.024 0.320
0.016 0.290
0.032 0.269
0.030 0.480
0.008 0.203
0.027 0.293
Kherson. G,) °- 262/0.245
1. For further details see A.V.Chayanov (ed.), ibid. , SPb.1915,p.10.
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from A.V.Chayanov Materialy..., vyp.1 M.1916,pp,36, 39, 47,
* Figures only given for reliable uezd in gubernia, other figures for 
other uezds given, but no gubernial average given.
The average is given as the simple arithmetic average, with no 
attempt to weight the regions for the importance of the different regions. 
In the text an average consumption norm of 0.262 tons per head per year 
was given, which it was claimed was the average norm, after the extremely 
high (and somewhat unbelievable) figures for Olonetskaya G. and 
Khersonskaya G. had been subtracted. But in fact the average norm ex­ 
cluding these two regions would have been 0.245 tons per head per year.
N.I.Sazykhin was delegated to look after grain consumption and to 
write the section of the report pertaining to the consumption of grain. 
He appears to have made an important and rather fundamental mistake. In 
comparing the results of this study with those of Maress and Svavitsky, 
Sazykhin was struck by the apparent drop in average annual per capita 
consumption of as much as 3 pds i.e. 0.049 tons. And was misled into 
concluding that T a drop of 3 pds per head is more than could be explained 
by sampling errors and is more likely to reflect a change in grain con­ 
sumption' . But as one of Sazykhin f s colleagues later pointed out the
reason for this difference was not a substantial change in consumption
2 patterns, but just a different concept . The earlier Maress and
Svavitsky norms had been calculated in grain equivalents, while the more 
recent norms were apparently based on flour equivalents. If a correction 
for an 82% extraction rate (in milling) is made then the Maress norm 
would fall to a flour equivalent of 0.257 tons per head per year and the 
Svavitsky norm would fall to 0.231 tons per head per year. Maress's norm
1. A.V.Chayanov, (ed.) ibid., M.1916, p.33.
2. S.A.Klepikov, ibid., M.1920, p.26. Earlier Klepikov had been in
charge of the analyses of the consumption of milk, eggs, tea and
sugar, in the 1916 study.
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is therefore totally comparable with the Chayanov norm of 0.262 tons. 
And although the Svavitsky norm is much lower this must be explained 
by the regional coverage as all of Svavitsky's cases are included in 
the Chayanov compilation.
SazyLkhin was more successful in drawing attention to the great 
fluctuations in norms for different regions (See table). If the 
extreme cases Khersan uezd in Kherson G. with a norm of 0.450 tons 
(171.7% of average)and Volokolmskii uezd in Moscow G. with a norm of 
0.180 tons (68,8% of average) were excluded from the count the norm 
would be even lower at 0.256 tons per head and the new extreme cases 
would both be within 25% of the average (i.e. Simbirsk G. at 0.319 tons, 
124% of average and Tula at 0.209 tons, 82% of average).
From the table it can be seen that the provinces in the NCR 
(Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Moscow, Smolensk, Kaluzha,Tula) have an average 
norm of 0.224 tons per head; whereas the norm for the producer regions 
(excluding Astrakhan) was much higher at 0.296 per head.
Apart from deviations between areas there were also considerable 
deviations within the same region and between different households in 
the same region. Soz^'khin drew attention to this and demonstrated it 
with examples from uezds in Kharkov and Vologda Gubernit , where the 
consumption of the population in different households was given acc­ 
ording to divisions into groups according to size of sown area.
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Starobelsky uezd 
Kharkov Gubernia 
Group in Sown 
Area
0 des
0.1-3.0 des 
3.1-7.5 des 
7.6-15.0 des 
15.1-*- des
Average
Consumption
0.223 tons/head 
0.228 tons/head 
0.293 tons/head 
0.288 tons/head 
0.331 tons/head
0.275 tons/head
Velsky uezd
Vologodskaya
Gubernia
Group ace.to S.A.
0-2 des 
2.1-3 des 
3.1-4 des 
A.1-6 des 
6.1+ des
Average
Consumption
0.200 tons/head 
0.213 tons/head 
0.211 tons/head 
0.246 tons/head 
0.282 tons/head
0.224 tons/head
Source: A.V.Chayanov 'Materialy. . . ,'Vyp 1 M.1916, p . 34 .
As can be seen from the above table the norm of consumption 
increases with the increase in sown area of the household. We see no 
signs of a negative grain consumption elasticity to sown area.
Apart from a change in the volume of grain consumption norm with 
change in sowing group, there was also evident a change in the internal 
content of the norm, i.e. a substitution effect between different grains 
and grain products within the norm as is shown below: 
Starobelsky uezd, Kharkov Gubernia Consumption of grain products per
Groups of 
households 
ace. to S.A.
0.0 des 
0.1-3 des 
3.1-7.5 des 
7.6-15 des 
15.1+ des
Average
head (edoki) -
wheat
consumed per
Wheat Rye Black Bulki Groats All grain 1 pd of rye 
flour flour bread rolls pasta products bread
9.61
13.15
19.00
18.44
21.89
4.33 4.47
5.68 0.10
5.07
4.67
5.03
0.01
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.00
0.64
0.5
0.93
1.5
1.35
19.06
19.47
25.05
24.64
28.32
1.9
2.27
3.75
3.95
4.36
18.75 4.95 0.25 0.04 1.19 25.18 3.79
Source: A.V.Chayanov 'Materialy...,' vyp.1, M.1916, p.43.
With a change in sowing group and move to a group with a larger
sown area there was a shift to the consumption of wheat and groats.
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Chayanov's work was undoubtedly a great advance on the earlier 
state of knowledge, but it was still based on a very small regional 
coverage, and could quite readily be drastically affected by the addition 
of cases from regions with a markedly different level of consumption. 
Even before Chayanov's book went to press, data from other regions were 
appearing.
R.M.Orzhenskii forwarded data from a large study in Yaroslavl G. 
in 1915 covering 1,023 households, "Ehese data indicated a low consumption 
norm of 12.32 pds 0.202 tons per head per year in 1915. A.N.Chelintsev 
also reported on a study of 85 households in Tambovskaya G, in 1915 
which also indicated a consumption norm lower than the average, 14.25
pds i.e. 0.233 tons per head per year . The inclusion of these two
2 
regions would have brought the Chayanov norm down lower .
A final revision of all the available data for pre-war peasant 
consumption appeared in 1920, written by S.A.Klepikov, but still under
Chayanov's general editorship . This study included a further 1,791
4 budget studies in 11 provinces more than in the earlier study , with the
result that the average consumption norm was reduced slightly from the
1. See A.V.Chayanov, (ed.) ibid., M.1916, pp.5, 86-87
2. If the average for all regions less Olonetskaya G. and Khersonskaya 
G. had really been 0.262 tons per head per year, the inclusion 
of these two regions would have brought the average down to 0.252 
tons per head per year. This was the figure that Lositsky sub­ 
sequently stated in his report. But it should also be noted that 
according to my calculations of the data given the average for all 
regions was initially 0.266. The average with the inclusion of 
Yaroslavl and Tambov G. was 0.262. The average for all regions 
less Olonetskaya, Khersonskaya, the new Yaroslavlskaya survey and 
Tambovskaya G. was 0.245.
3. S.A.Klepikov, ibid., M.1920
4. S.A.Klepikov, ibid., M.1920, p.7. These additions do not include 
the 1,023 budgets from Yaroslavl G. mentioned above.
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ac(s\s-e.p> level
A summary of Klepikov's norms are given below:
Flour Norms 
per per 
head adult
All Russia 0.267 0.393
European Russia 0.255 0.379
Consumer regions 0.241
Producer regions 0.278
Grain Norms 
per per 
head adult
0.321 0.459
0.305 0.455
0.288
0.334
Extrac­ 
tion 
rate
83.2
83.6
83.7
83.2
The ratio of con­ 
sumption per head/ 
consumption 
per adult
0.70
0.67
Source: S.A.Klepikov, ibid., M.1920, pp. 8,26.
These figures indicate a 15% difference between consumption norms 
in the producer and consumer regions, with the former being the higher. 
Other differences in the figures of up to 17 and 33% are a consequence 
of differences between concepts of the consumption norm, as to whether 
it is referring to grain or flour (a 17% difference) or whether it is 
referring to all the population or only to adults (30-33% difference). 
These differences in concept were not always fully understood, even it 
would appear amongst the experts.
Klepikov's data also allows us to break down the norms according
to grain:
Rye flour
Wheat flour
Other flour
Groats
Beans
All grains in flour
Potatoes
All grains & potatoes 
in flour equivalents
All Russia 
per head per adult
0.131
0.095
0.020
0.018
0.003
0.267
0.035
European Russia 
per head per adult
0.196
0.136
0.030
0.027
0.004
0.267
0.046
0.159
0.049
0.025
0.019
0.003
0.255
0.037
0.239
0.070
0.037
0.029
0.004
0.379
0.055
0.302 0.439 0.292 0.434
Source: S.A.Klepikov, ibid., M.1920, pp.27, 35.
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Klepikov also presented an interesting break-down of consumption 
according to the income of the household. These differentiated norms
are given below:
Income
0-100 rubles 
100-150 " 
150-200 " 
200-1- II
Grain Consumption in tons per adult per year
Groats 
0.008 
0.013 
0.014 
0.022
Rye flour
0.195
0.214
0.251
0.252
Wheat flour
0.013
0.019
0.018
0.038
other 
flour
0.053
0.070
0.086
0.093
Beans
0.002
0.005
0.006
0.007
All
0.270
0.372
0.375
0.412
All 
in % of 
0-100
100
119
139
153
Source: ibid., M.1920, p.32.
Again we see no sign of a negative grain consumption elasticity to income. 
And the Wheat flour consumption elasticity is much greater than the Rye 
flour consumption elasticity.
A further table of Klepikov's does however enable us to compare the 
consumption elasticity of grain consumption in comparison with that for 
the other foodstuffs:
Income
0-100 rubles 
100-150 " 
150-200 " 
200-300 " 
300+
grain
cons . in
tons
0.270
0.322
0.375
0.399
0.457
Rye
flour
* Ofin %
100
119
139
148
164
Meat &
Fish
cons . in
•7
SO
100
176
201
312
560
Milk
cons .in
«7
/o
100
151
173
183
237
Sugar
cons . in
%
100
163
237
287
375
Consumpton of 
main foodstuffs 
in tons per adult 
per year,and in %% 
of low incomes 
group consumption.
Source: ibid., M.1920, pp.30,31.
This indicates that although there is a positive grain consumption
Or*
elasticity income it is much smaller than the elasticity for all the other
main foodstuffs.
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Urban consumption norms
The coverage of urban food consumption budgets was much less dev­ 
eloped than those for the peasantry, But a few studies had been made 
following the early work of F.F.Erisman on Moscow workers. V.S. 
Ovsyannikov gathered data from 3589 pre-war budgets from oil refinery 
workers in Baku. Other studies of workers were carried out by I.M. 
Shaposhnikov, V.I.Goritsky, and V.A, Andreyev of factory workers in 
Kostroma Gubernia and M.A.Davidovich of Petrograd textile workers .
In connection with the wartime work on food supply planning 
Y.Shub appears to have been placed in charge of analysing urban consump­ 
tion. In 1918, under Shub's editorship Kabo produced a work surveying 
recent food consumption patterns in four towns; Moscow, Tula, Saratov 
and Orenburg where reliable data were available. Data had already 
been published on Moscow, Saratov and Orenburg, <zt\fL Popov again obliged 
by forwarding to Kabo an unpublished manuscript on urban consumption in 
Tula.
The data from these four urban areas allowed urban consumption 
norms to be calculated which were differentiated by economic group:
Consumption in flour equivalent 
per head per year
Rye flour Wheat flour Rye & Wheat
Low economic group
Average "
High
Grand average
Source: R.Kabo, ibid., M.1918, p.41.
Kabo informs us that if the data from other available studies of 
urban areas were included the norms of consumption would rise to 0.072
1. See A.E.Lositsky, introduction to Trudy TsSU, Tom XXX, vyp.2, p.15. 
Note;the famous budget studies of workers by S.N.Prokopovich in 
Petrograd, and G.Naumov in Kiev, could not be used because they 
did not provide data on food consumption in physical quantities
0.076
0.051
0.054
0.066
0.127
0.128
0.133
0.128
0.203
0.179
0.187
0.194
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ton, s per head per year of rye flour, 0.125 tons per head of wheat 
flour, i.e, 0.197 tons together. And apart from these two grains a 
further 0.044 tons of groats, macaroni, and peas should be added to 
give an average urban consumption of 0.241 tons per head per year. 
Potatoes were also consumed at a rate of 0.120 tons per head per year, 
which had a grain equivalent of 0.024 tons per head per year.
Urban Urban
flour norm grain norm
per head per head
Rye flour 0.072 0.087
Wheat 0.125 0.150
Groats and other grains 0.044 0.053
All grain 0.241 0.290
Potatoes in grain = 0.020 0.024
All grain & potato
in grain = 0.261 0.314
The reliability of the consumption norms data
Concerning the reliability of all these data, we must be extremely 
careful. The regional spread was very small and haphazard, and may 
well present results untypical for Russia as a whole. Within each 
region, the households surveyed may be untypical of the mass of -r.~^r-.,._ 
households in their consumption patterns. Little attention has been 
paid in these surveys to correct for the different age structures present 
in the different households. And finally the data that these surveys 
supply may not be correctly or honestly reported,
A.N.Kokshaiskii, who directed the Saratov investigations pointed out 
that in his region the opinion was widely held amongst the peasants that 
agreement to oarticipate- in a food survey would automatically result in 
the receipt of rations. Consequently he believed that several households
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exaggerated their real level of consumption in the hope of thereby 
receiving higher rations ,
Kabo also pointed out the. problems due to subjective factors. 
Because of the expense of carrying out full detailed investigations of 
the separate households, in most cases these food investigation data were 
collected simply by asking the householders to make a subjective eval­ 
uation of how much food they consumed. A more objective method of 
measurement had only been attempted in a few studies. In the Moscow 
survey of 1916 a strict daily account of food consumption was kept for 
a week, with investigators measuring food purchased, consumed and re­ 
maining unused every day. When the results of this more objective 
investigation were compared with the normal subjective investigations the 
results were seen to be significantly lower:
Consumption of grain in Moscow in 1916 
in Ibs per head per day
Worker Employee Property Owner
Objective invest. 0.99 0.90 0.88
Subjective invest. 1.28 1.16 1.04
% Difference 30% 29% 18%
Source: See R.Kabo, ibid., M.1918, p.2.
Note: A similar experiment was apparently also carried out in 
Tula, under Popov's leadership, but the results from it 
were not available when Kabo completed her work.
This must cast considerable doubt on the overall absolute validity 
of most of the food consumption studies, which employed subjective methods.
When statisticians later came to compile their operational grain 
forage balances, they were, as we shall see below, most reluctant to accept 
these calculated consumption norms as they stood without substantial corr­ 
ections. A.E.Lositsky in compiling the 1917/18 grain forage balance 
1. See R.Kabo, ibid., M.1918, p.3.
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in the autumn of 1917 used per capita consumption norms of 0.218 tons 
of grain per head per year for the rural population and 0.145 tons 
per head per year for the urban population , instead of Klepikov's 
norm of 0.321 tons of grain per head per year or Kabo's norm of 0.241 
tons of flour per head per year (roughly equivalent to 0.290 tons of 
grain per head per year).
In 1921, P.I.Popov used per capita grain consumption norms for 
pre-vjar grain consumption considerably higher than Lositsky's 1917 
norms but still much lower than the Klepikov and Kabo norms, i.e. 0.295 
tons per head per year of grain for the rural population instead of 0.321 
and 0.246 instead of 0.290 for urban grain consumption.
But most strikingly of all we should note that S.A.Klepikov, himself 
when he later (1922) came to drax-7 up a series of grain forage balances 
which included the pre-war period, also accepted a level of pre^war per 
capita consumption significantly lower than those which he presented in 
his survey of the food investigations data. In the balance which he 
constructed for grain utilisation in the European part of the RSFSR before
the war Klepikov used a rural grain consumption norm of 0.211 tons per
2 head per year and an urban norm of 0.189 tons per head per year . Finally,
it should be noted that V7henever Klepikov's data were cited by the TsSU
1. See below.
2. See S.A.Klepikov,'Neurozhai 1921 goda (Tsifry? i fakty )*, Sel. i 
Les.Khpz. ,1921, No.1/3 pp.195-211. (see later chapter pp.UC-r) 
It is difficult comparing the results from this study with the 
earlier one because the 1921 European part of the RSFSR excludes 
the area of the Ukraine, while the data for the pre-war European 
part of Russia includes the Ukraine. Per capita grain consumption 
rates were undoubtedly higher in the Ukraine than in the rest of 
European Russia before the war, but not by a sufficient margin to 
explain the differences between Klepikov's data.
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department of consumption statistics in the 1920s, they compared 
Klepikov's data in flour equivalents with their own later data in 
grain equivalents . This effectively deflated the Klepikov data
by 15-20%
1. See Trudy TsSU, torn XXX, vyp,2, M.1928, p.67; Statisticheskii
Spravochnik SSSR, M.1927, p.313; Statisticheskii Spravochnik SSSR, 
M.1929, p.
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Grain rations for the civilian population
Military rations have been dealt vrith above, here I am only concerned 
with civilian rations. There were two kinds of civilian ration a) the 
ration allowed to the producer and b) the ration given to the consumer. 
First the producer's ration.
The grain levy (razverstka) was first introduced by the Tsarist 
Minister of Agriculture in November 1916. The system was the followingtthe 
anticipated requirements of the army and other preferential groups for 
1916/17 wefit calculated. The chairman of the Special Council on food 
supply was instructed to divide the required amount of grain to the diff­ 
erent gubernia giving each one a quota to be fulfilled. The quota was to 
be determined on the basis of the harvest the stocks and the consumption in 
each area. Within each gubernia the levy was to be apportioned successively 
among the several uezds, volosts, villages and individual households. The 
gubernia zemstvo offices together with the local commissioners of the special 
council and the Ministry of Agriculture were to divide the quota between 
the different uezds. At the uezd level the levy was apportioned by the uezd 
zemstvo offices and within the volost the quota was further apportioned by 
volost and village meetings . At this time no centrally determined scale 
of consumption norms or rations w£re specified to assist the local auth­ 
orities to ascertain what the normal consumption level was. It was 
assumed that the local authorities themselves would know better than the 
central authorities what the local consumption patterns were.
In the following year the Provisional (-rovernment took a tougher line 
and in the law of March 25, 1917 they specified the ration or norm that
1. See K.I.Zaitsev and N.V.Dolinsky in P.B.Struve (ed.) Food supply 
in Russia during the world war, Yale 1930, pp.89-91
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the grain producer was allowed to keep for himself and his fanily. This 
ration was set at one-and-a-quarter nuds of grain per head per month and 
10 zolotnik of groats per head per day . This is equivalent to 15 puds 
or 0.246 tons of grain per head per year plus 0.016 tons of groats per head 
per year. This was about 18% lower than the Klepikov norm of 0.321 tons 
of grain per head per year, but over 12% higher than the norm that Lositsky 
used in the calculation of his grain forage balance. In comparison with 
later norms for producers this one was quite generous. Tt was not applied 
very strictly and the law of March 25 even allowed for an additional 10% of
all the estimated needs of the grain producing households to be left to them
2 'to meet all eventualities' .
The position as regards rations for consumers was much less certain. 
Rationing was introduced in a piecemeal fashion in the major cities from 
the autumn of 1916, but at first it covered only sugar, salt and then meat. 
The system was formally regularised by an order from the Ministry of food 
supply in June 1917 which laid down the general principles for the rationing 
of grain to consumers. This order introduced a maximum for the size of 
rations. Different maximum scales of rations were introduced for different 
groups. In general the inhabitants of rural districts were set a maximum 
ration the same size as the ration alloxvred grain producers. In urban areas
a much lower maximum norm of 0.123 tons of flour per head per year (probably
3 A between 0.15 and 0.16 tons of rrain) plus 0.015 tons of groats . For those
employed in heavy physical labour an addition to these maxima by 50% was 
allowed.
It should be emphasised that these were all maximum-levels for rations 
and were in no vray meant to form an obligation. In most urban areas the 
level of rations that were actually distributed were much lower than these
maxima.______________________________________________________________
U See K.I.Zaitsev and N.V.Dolinshy, ibld~ pp.99-1^0.
2. See K.I.Zaitsev and N.V.Dolinsky, ibid., p.100.
3. This of course depends on the extraction rate of flour at the time, which
could have been between 75 and 80%. '
4. See K.I.Zaitsev and N.V.Dolinsky, ibid., p.109.
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c) Data on grain used as livestock feed
The estimation of the quantity of grain used as a supplement to 
livestock feed is an extremely complex problem. It depends upon the 
quantity, type, age, size and quality of livestock. It depends upon 
what the livestock are doing, where they are kept. In severe climates, 
like those of much of Russia much of the animals' food intake will be 
generated into heat energy to keep it warm through winter, hence the 
importance of the severity of the climate and the quality of the shelter. 
But most of all it depends upon what other forms of livestock feed are 
being used and what the nature of the fodder balance is. Grain is a 
far less major element in the animal feed balance than it is in the 
human food balance. Whereas in human feeding patterns at this time 
grain accounted for over 65% of all carbohydrate intake and over 70% of 
all protein intake , for livestock feed, grain accounted for less than 
25% of all carbohydrate and starch intake. The task is therefore, not 
of estimating the basic element in the diet, but rather of estimating 
just a supplement. And whereas there was a considerable degree of 
stability in the basic item in the human diet, there can be expected to 
be a far smaller degree of stability in the amount of grain supplement 
added to the basic livestock feed. But on the other hand we must not 
forget that the Russian peasant would not struggle to keep alive 
emaciated animals, and if he failed to have sufficient feed concentrates 
available to keep his livestock alive over winter, instead of cutting 
down their feed rations, he might well decide simply to slaughter "_ 
some of the animals.
In the following sections I will discuss i) the available data 
on the quantity and type of livestock, its regional location and very 
1. See S.G.Wheatcroft, SIPS No.2, Birmingham 1976, pp.94-95.
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very briefly who owned it, ii) the available data on livestock feed
norms and patterns of fodder getting.
i) The available data on livestock numbers
Livestock statistics with the exception of data on horses were 
the worst branch of pre-revolutionary agricultural statistics. Their 
reliability is worse than that of any other branch. Data on the number 
of livestock were included in the annual gubernorial accounts. These 
data, like the equivalent grain production data were based on the 
assessments of the local uezd police and then aggregated in GSK. Some 
of these early series of data, covering rural livestock held in the A9 
provinces of European Russia were published by I.Vilson in the early 
editions of the Department of Agriculture Compendium to the Economico- 
Statistical Atlas . Later the veterinary department of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs was to annually aggregate these gubernia totals and theSt*.
2 were also published in the Ministry of Finance annual .
Apart from data on horses, which I will return to no special system 
of collecting these livestock statistics was introduced in the 1880s. 
Here the position differs from that for grain statistics. Only from
1900 did TsSK begin to include questions on livestock on the sown area
3questionnaires that it sent out . And the results from this investig­ 
ation were published in the TsSK statistical annuals. For horses the 
sources of statistical data were much better.
The military reforms of 1874, which had set about modernising the 
army and the conscription system, also required an accurate and regular
1. See Obyasneniya k khozyaistvenno-statisticheskomu qtlasu 
Evropyeiskoi Rossii, various editions from 1851-69.
2. Yezhegodnik Ministerstva Finansov.
3. See Svod statisticheskikh svedenii po $el.^hoz.Rossii k kontsu 
XIX veka, vyp.il, SPb.1903, p.iii. For an account of the TsSK 
questionnaires which had been regularly sent out since 1883 see 
above .^
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registration of horses which could be of use to the army in the 
eventuality of war. The authorities were interested in assessing
draft animals as well as cavalry horses. In line with this re­ 
quirement a series of regular military horse censuses were introduced. 
The first experimental census, covering only three gubernit was carried 
out in 1875. An attempt to expand this to 33 guberni*. in the following 
year proved unsuccessful, but only in 1882 was a successful census carried 
out covering most of the gubernit) in European Russia. The census was 
then repeated every four or five years until 1912, the last military 
horse census before the War .
These censuses were very elaborate as they involved a military 
veterinary examination as well as just a head count. Only the barest 
details of numbers and age by region were published in the civilian press. 
The zemstvo statisticians also collected some data on livestock numbers, 
but as already explained above there was little uniformity in the coverage 
and methods of collecting data in the different gubernii before the War.
During the War, there was organised the first All Russian Agricul-
2 
tural Census in 1916 which included all livestock for the first time .
The results of this census were most unexpected, and caused the reliabil­ 
ity of the livestock statistics to be even more greatly questioned.
Although it had been generally believed that the military 
requisitioning of horses and meat animals, and the decline in rural 
population would have led to a sharp decline in the numbers of livestock
1. See A.I.Goluzov, Ocherki istorii otechestvennoi statistiki,
M.1972, pp.128-29, and V.E.Den, Kurs Ekonomicheskoi Geografii, 
L.1925, p.359. Censuses were carried out in 1882 in 59 gubernii, 
in 1888 and 1891 in 58 gubernii, in 1893/4 and 1896 in 53 gubernii 
and the Caucasus, in 1899/1901 and 1903/4 in 47 gubernii in the 
Kalmitskaya Steppe and the Caucasus, in 1905/08 in 37 gubernit, 
in 4 Siberian gubernii, and 2 oblasts of Central Asia, and in 1912 
in 78 gubernii of the entire Empire.
2. For an account of this census see above.
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the results of the 1916 census appeared to indicate that there had in 
fact been a sharp increase in the numbers of livestock during the War. 
A.E.Lositsky, who had been directly involved in the central organisation 
of the census, before the beginning of his career as director of 
statistics of the Ministry of Food, and head of the TsSU department of 
food consumption statistics, had been one of the first to write explain­ 
ing that a revision was necessary. While admitting that it was doubtful 
whether there had actually been an increase in the number of livestock 
during the war, Lositsky did accept that the census showed that there 
certainly had been no decline . From this time onwards the 1916 
livestock figure has normally been accepted as the best available indic­ 
ator of pre-war livestock levels and is still officially accepted as 
such.
This view however has been sharply undermined by A.L.Vainsh? :ein's
2
analysis of all the available series of data. Vainsh ,ein has compared
the different pre-war and 1914-16 sources of livestock data for comparable 
areas and concluded that although the data of the veterinary department 
is by far the most complete, that it still grossly under-estimates the 
real level of livestock, especially the number of younger animals.
1. Lositsky T s article initially appeared in Russkaya Vedomost, in 
1916. I have not yet seen this article so can only refer to 
it indirectly as referred to in A.E.Lositsky,'Sovremennoye 
sastoyaniye skotovodstva v Rossii, M.192A, p.5, and in A.L. 
Vainshtzein, v lz istorii predrevolyutsionnoi statistiki 
zhivotnovodstva* in Ocherki po istorii statistiki SSSR, No.3, 
M.1960, pp.86-115. And although Vainsb-trein's account seems 
to demolish the arguments advanced by Lositsky, an examination 
of Lositsky's 1916 article is needed.
2. See A.L.Vainstrfcein, in Ocherki po istorii statistiki SSSR, No.3, 
M.1960, pp.86-115.
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Vainshtein's comparisons are given below:
Animal Census data ___TsSK data Correction required
Horse
0-4 year old
4+ year old
All horses
Cattle
Pigs
9.39
22.05
31.64
50.47
19.28
6.48
19.76
26.24
35.67
10.19
+44.85%
+11.61%
+19.32%
+41.51
+89.2%
Source: A.L.Vainshtein, ibid. , M.1960, pp.102, 104.
Unfortunately Yainshtein failed to give a regional breakdo^-m of the 
correction coefficients, and he also failed to publish the TsSK 1916 
figures with a regional breakdown . Consequently we have no way of cal­ 
culating our ox-m regional correction coefficients. In his article
Vainshtein himself recommended accepting the TsSK series as providing the
2 best indication of the intertemporal dynamic . In the series that I have
calculated I have accepted the uncorrected TsSK data for the pre-war 
period. But during the war tine, since no regional TsSK figures have been 
published I have been forced to make a comparison between the TsSK data 
and the agricultural census data. A. comparison with no correction at all 
would provide a most misleading picture, consequently I have had to resort 
to applying the total disaggregated correction to all the regional figures 
without discrimination. This is bound to be a rather imprecise operation, 
but in the absence of any regionally differentiated correction norms there 
anpeared to be no alternative.
1. These figures had never been published and so Vainshtein must have 
got hold of them through some archive, presumably the TsSU archive. 
But he failed to pive any reference to his sources. This is verv 
untynical behaviour for Vainshtein who is normally most meticulous 
in these matters.
2. See A.L.Vainshtein, ibid. , p.113.
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Before giving an account of the change in the numbers of livestock 
over this period and their distribution by region I will just describe 
in a few words the relative importance of the different kinds of livestock. 
A detailed account of the feed norms per animal will be given in the next 
section, but a rough indication of the relative importance of the different 
animals will be of some use now as we look at their changing numbers.
The only livestock that we are concerned with are horses, cattle and 
pips. In as much as sheep consumed hardly any grain at all they will 
not be included in this analysis. Horses were by far the most important 
grain consuming animal. Although feeding levels varied quite significantly 
throughout the country, taking the country as a whole the average horse 
consumed between three and four times as much grain as the average cattle 
or pig, and slightly more than the average human. Horses accounted for 
about 70% of all livestock grain feed, cattle for about 23% and pigs for 
only 7%. The number of horses, cattle and pigs in the different regions 
are indicated in the following tables for all readily available years .
See appendix for the sources of data and for its regroupings. 
F.A.Cherevanin wrote a section on the effect of harvest fluctuations 
on agriculture 1883-1923 including the effect on livestock numbers in 
V.G.Croman (ed.), Vlyaniye neurozhaev na narodnove khozyaistvo "lossii, 
chast 1, M.1927, pp.160-301. But this was far less thorough in its 
presentation of data than were the earlier cited sections written 
by Obukhov (grain yields and production) and by Zaitsev (population). 
Only a few scattered figures for livestock "numbers in 1888,1891,1892 
and 1896-98 covering mainly the CPR were given. It would no doubt 
be possible to compile a more complete regional series from the 
different editions of the Yezhegodnik Ministerstva Finansov and other 
sources, but that task lies beyond the scope of the present thesis. 
Here I have restricted myself to the early average regional figures 
given by I.Vilson, the figures for 1883 and 1900 given in Svod.stat. 
svedenii....,vyp.II, SPb., 1903, the 1901-14 data given in the separate 
TsSK annuals, (Statisticheskii Yezhenodnik Rossii.. ..,) from 1903-15 
and the scattered figures for the CP3 in the 1880s and the 1890s given 
by F.A.Cherevanin. Figures for 1916 and 1917 come from N.D.Kondratiev 
(ed.) Selskoye Khozyaistvo Rossii v XX veka, M.1923, and from various 
volumes of Trudy TsSU
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The numbers of horses held by the rural pooulation in mlns
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Numbers of cattle held by the rural population in mlns.
Year NCR SCR SPR CPR EPR USSR
Annual average growth
1846-83 
1883-1900 
1901-14 
1909-14
-0.3% 
+2.7%
-t-0.4%
+0.2%
+2.4%
-0.4%
-0.6%
-0.2%
+2.8%
+1.0% +3.2% +0.9%
50 gub
1847/50 
1851/60 
1859/64 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1887 
1888 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1894
1895 
1896
1897 
1898 
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1916
1917
7.07 
6,36
5.96
8.49
7.87
7.96
7.65
8.02
8.71
8.72
8.57
8.43
8.40
8.60
8.60
8.65
9.06
8.88
9.74
(9.86)
(4.2)
(4.2)
(4.2)
(4.2)
(4.2)
(4.2)
(4.2)
(4.2)
4.19
4.37
4.26
4.49
4.27
4.07
(4.0)
(4.0)
(9.42) 
(8.38)
(10.30)
(14.30)
12.74
12.76
12.69
11.32
12.77
12.54
13.04
12.61
11.38
11.51
11.64
11.67
12.01
12.16
13.66
(13.67)
6.16 
5.36
5.61 
6.48
6.22 
5.28
8.15
7.45
7.60
7.86
7.89
9.75
8.90
7.50
7.73
7.87
8.26
8.65
7.99
8.02
8.44
11.59
10.69
8.78
9.47
9.60
8.04
9.79
9.94
10.09
10.21
10.44
11.59
12.29
10.74
11.65
12.39
17.36
(12.95)
41.04
41.97
42.0
39.47
44.72
40.10
43.40
43.18
42.28
44.33
45.44
43.54
45.01
45.94
56.35
(51.17)
20.97 
22.12 
21.73 
23.19 
23.07 
24.91 
25.53 
25.32 
23.97 
24.07 
24.52 
29.55
30.71 
30.15 
30.94
31.66
31.90
32.18
31.84
31.87
31.19
30.51
29.68
29.69
30.49
31.31
31.02
30.92
32.03
Sources: See appendices.
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Numbers of pigs held by the rural population in mlns.
Year NCR SCR SPR CPR EPR USSR 50 gub.
1842/50 
1851/60 
1859/64 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1887 
1888 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1916
1917
2.39 
2.04
1.68
2.74
2.43
2.44
2.34
2.53
2.41
2.41
2.30
2.29
2.28
2.28
2.21
2.50
2.56
2.63
3.95
4.40
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.3)
0.30
0.41
0.42
0.36
0.43
0.49
(0.5)
(0.5)
(3.30) 
(3.53)
(3.85)
(4.31)
5.05
4.62
4.65
4.64
4.40
4.20
4.41
4.24
4.12
4.31
4.58
4.74
5.00
5.13
6.97
(8.60)
3.10 
2.89
2.32 
2,32
1.57 
1.14
2.34
2.12
2.03
2.05
2.22
2.43
2.21
1.72
1.96
1.77
2.01
2.52
1.94
2.05
2.26
3,99
4.96
1.04
0.94
1.13
1.14
1.26
1.48
1.53
1-48
1.64
1.61
1.88
1.43
1.57
1.91
4.81
3.46
10.94
10.33
10.47
10.83
10.80
10.60
10.26
10.27
10.11
10.62
11,61
10.97
11.61
12.42
20.22
(21.92)
9.26 
8.95 
9.10 
9.72 
9.24 
9.55 
9.55 
8.83 
8.83 
9.19 
13.26 
12.92 
11.98 
11.57
11.76
12.12
11.65
11.44
11.99
11.47
11.86
11.57
11.39
11.33
12.05
12.65
10.63
11.1
Annual average growth
1846-83
1883-1900
1901-14
-0.6%
-(•3.9% 
+0.6% +12.7%
+0.4% 
+0.7% 
+0.1%
-0.5% 
+0.1% 
+0.5% +6.4% + 1.0%
Sources: See appendices
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In order to get a better appreciation of the relative importance of 
livestock in the different regions over time, I have calculated the 
numbers of livestock per head of population. These indicators are 
presented in the table below:
Numbers of livestock per head of all population
Year 
Horses
NCR SCR SPR CPR EPR USSR
1850s
1883
1891
1892
1900
1905
1910
1914
Cattle
1850s
1883
1891
1892
1900
1905
1910
1914
Pigs
1850s
1883
1891
1892
1900
1905
1910
1914
0.271
0.194
0.170
0.172
0.160
0.155
0.367
0.268
0.312
0.299
0.279
0.272
0.118
0.076
0.101
0.083
0.074
0.081
0.141
0.197
0,207
0.197
0.182 0.193
0.155 0,200
0.553
0.452
0.457
0,368
0.480 0.306
0.417 0.300
0.233
0.169
0.138
0.127
0.046 0.115
0.050 0.127
0.378
0.286
0.306
0.215
0.233
0.245
0.213
0.206
0.326
0.257
0.254
0.214
0.298
0.307
0.256
0.242
0.176
0.106
0.064
0.046
0.085
0.084
0.062
0.065
0.504
0.415
0.433
0.428
0.540
0.531
0.544
0.529
0.064
0.068
0.076
0.082
0.247
0.237
0.228
0.226
0.373
0.371
0.338
0.326
0.099
0.090
0.081
0.088
Sources: See appendices
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It can be seen from these figures that with the exception of pigs 
in the EPR and horses in the SPR between the 1850s and 1900 , there was 
quite a distinct decline in the per capita number of livestock in all 
regions over this period. Of course if the figures had been calculated
per capita of the rural oopulation the decline would not have appeared
2 quite so bad, but it would not have made very much difference . Overall
the fact that the livestock level was growing more slowly than the population 
was indisputable. From the middle of the century until the 1880s there 
was even an absolute decline for horses, cattle and pigs in the NCR and 
for cattle and pigs in the CPR. Although the growth rate for horses 
remained fairly high at the beginning of the twentieth century in the 
SPR, there was an absolute decline in the number of cattle. This was 
probably more an indication of the declining quality of pastureland as the 
grain sown area was expanded, than of a shortage of grain for forage.
1. This was the period when the Ukraine was being opened up for 
grain exports. We see during this period a sharp decline in 
the per capita number of cattle and nigs. The increase in 
horses was an indication of a move from food animals to draft 
animals associated with grain production.
2. The statistical problems involved in making corrections to 
the urban and rural population figures make it advisable to 
calculate per capita indices on the basis of all the population 
wherever possible.
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The wartime data on livestock numbers
As explained above, the comparison between the uncorrected TsSK 
data and the agricultural census data for 1916 gives a highly misleading 
picture of livestock growth over this period, but we have no adequate 
regionally differentiated correction coefficients to apply to these data. 
The following figures have consequently been corrected with Vainshtein's 
regionally undifferentiated correction coefficients. The results should 
be accepted with caution.
Horses
1914 TsSK uncorrected
1916 census uncorrected
apparent change
1°14 corrected (+10.8%)
revised apparent change
Cattle
1914 TsSK uncorrected
1916 census uncorrected
apparent change
1914 corrected (+41.5%)
revised apparent change
Pigs
1914 TsSK uncorrected
1916 census corrected
apparent change
1914 corrected (+89.2%)
revised apparent change
NCR
5.04
4.96
-1.6"
<•
-17.9%
8.88
9.74
+9.7%
12.57
-22.5%
2.63
3.95
+50.2%
4.98
-20.7%
S?^
8.12
8.40
+ °.4~
O 7 -3
-13. 6 7
12.16
13.66
+12,3%
17.21
-20.6%
5.13
6.97
+35.9%
9.71
-28.2%
C?'0
7.17
7.79
+ 8.6"
8.5°
-9.3%
8.44
11.59
+37.3%
11.94
-3 . 0%
2.26
3.99
+76,5"
4.28
-6.8%
EP*
10.07
12.37
+27.6%
12.0'-
+2.5%
12.39
17.36
40.1%
17.53
-1.0%
1.91
4.81
+ 15L8%
3.61
+33.2%
USSR -SCR
30.40
33.52
+11.5%
36.42
-8.0%
41.87
52.35
22.7%
59.25
-11.6%
11.93
19.72
+62.8%
22.57
-12.4%
Sources: Calculated from the regional data presented in the
appendices and from ^ T ainshtein's regionally undifferentiated 
correction coefficients.
We consequently see a sharp decrease in the livestock levels instead 
of the apparent increase. The decrease is far more significant in the 
XCR and SPR than in the CP? or EP8. In the latter there was even an 
increase in the number of horses and nigs, even after the corrections had 
been applied.
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There should be less problems involved in assessing the changes in 
livestock levels between the 1916 and 1917 censuses. The data for these
years are nresented in the following table:
NCR SPR EPR USSR
Horses
ni7
1916 
7 change
Cattle 
1917
I q 16
7 ch an ge
Pi.^s
1917
7 change
4 
4 
-0
(9
q
-1
4
+ 11
.92 (8.02) 
.96 8.40 
.87 -4.57
.86) (13.67)
.74 13.66
.27 0
.40 (8.60)
.4% +23.47
7 
7 
-2
10
11
i
~ /
4
+ 24
.58 
.79
.77
.69
.59
O ^
  (. J C
.96
.3%
9 
12 
-29
(12
17
-25
o
-28
.00 
.77
.57
.95)
.3*
.47
.46
.1%
31.12 
35.52
-12.47
(51.17)
56.35
-9
(21
+ 8
.27
.92)
.4%
Sources: see appendix
the data in brackets refer to figures where absent 
data have been estimated by extrapolation.
These figures indicate a quite distinct change in the earlier 
pattern. The EPR, which had earlier suffered relatively less than the 
other regions now experiences a far more sharp decline, which brings it 
more in line with the other regions. The NCR which had formerly suffered 
the most now suffers the lowest regional decline in horse numbers. But 
most curious of all there is an annarent increase in the number of t>igs
in all regions apart from the EPR. ^h ether this is just a statistical 
phenomenon caused by some change in registration or whether it was a 
true reflection of reality I am not at all sure.
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Livestock data according to the different types of producer
Neither Nifontov nor Kovalchenko provided any data on the levels 
of livestock held by the different types of producer across the whole 
country. Figures are available from various statistical handbooks for 
1900, for the military horse census data for 1912 and again from the 
1916 agricultural census, and they indicate the following changes in the 
relative share of peasant ownership of all rural livestock:
Horses 
1900
1912
1916
Cattle
1900
1916
Pigs
1900
1916
NCR 
86.2%
90.1%
95.7%
-
83.0%
96.0%
84.4%
97.2%
Sources: 1900, 
1912,
1916,
European 
SCR SPH CPR EPR USSR USSR
77.7% 88.6% 96,9% 85.5%
75.1% 9^.7% 86.8%
98.0% 90.2% 95.9% Q9.6% 9^.0%
76.7? 85.7% 97.6" 82.8%
98.6% 91.0% 95.7% 9^.4% 96.2%
81.5% 86.2% 97.9% 84.3%
98.0% 93.7% 95.4% 99.6% 96.3%
Svod statisticheskilfysvedenii po sel .khoz .Rossii
k kontsu XIX veka, vyp.II, SPb . , 1903, pp. 2-5
A.M.Anfimov, Krupnoye pomeshchichye khozvaistvo
Evropyeiskoi Fossii, M.1969, p. 65 and N .D.Kondratiev
(ed.) Sel. Khoz. Rossii v XX veke , "..1923, pp. 207-13,
A.Gayster (ed.), Osnovnive elenentvi sel.K^oz.
proizvodstva -C SSR, 1916 i 1923-27 gg. , '1.1930,
pp.90-9. 
See appendix
Notes: The 1912 data for horses refer to horses aged 4 and above 
only. The horse data fron all other sources refer to 
all horses.
These data indicate the verv sham ca-nge in ownership of livestocl; 
that had come about from 19 r><~>, and narticularly, it would anpear from the 
horse data, during the war. This is just another indication thnt the 1916 
indications of the relative inoortance of the pomeshchik is by no means 
tvnical of the ore-v7 ar period.
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The regional aspect of the above data indicates aqain the greater 
significance of the pomeshchik in the SP" and his relative insignificance 
in the EPR.
The Anfimov data for 1916 again enables us to get a more detailed 
picture of the distribution of livestock between the different groups of 
pomeshchik grouped according to their sown area. See the following table
dumber of livestock
1 Work horses in
Sowing 
Groups
0
OrlO des.
10-50
50-100
100-250
250-500
500-1000
1000-5000
5000+ 
All
All ! 
households
7,970
16,463
28,275
14,n65
10,286
4,411
2,020
681
11
84,183
thousanc 
1915
32.9
42.9
214.3
220.6
362.2
312.3
220.6
134.7
6.9
1,547.4
Is 
1916
30.4
41.2
187.5
194.0
316.7
275.7
200.6
126.5
7.0
1,379.6
Cows i 
1915
29.9
59.9
206.6
167.4
214.6
127.2
6^.2
34.2
1.4
901.4
.n ths. 
1916
27.2
52.0
166.6
137.6
178.6
109.1
55.7
33.6
1.3
761.5
per household
Horses Cows 
1915 1916 1916
4.1 3.8 3.4
2.6 2.5 3.2
7.6 6.6 5.9
15.7 13.8 9.8
35.2 30.8 17.4
70.8 62.5 24.7
109.2 99.3 27.6
197.8 185.8 49.3
627.3 636.4 118.2
18.4 16.4 9.0
Sources: A.M.Anfimov, Rossiiskaya derevnya v gody pervoi 
mirovoi voinyi M.1962,pp.98, 119,151
A.M.Anfimov, Krupnoe pomeshchichye khozyaistvo 
Evropyeiskoi Rossii, M.1969, pp.234-5.
Again we see the large number of livestock per household and the highly 
skewed nature of its distribution. Ry comparison we should ooint out 
that the average peasant household in 1916 was recorded as having 1.6 
horses, more than ten times less than the average no^eshchik household, 
and 1.2 cows seven and a half ti mes less than the average no^eshchik
1. These averages are calculated fro^ A.Gayster (ed.) iM d. , ".1930, 
pp.2, 90.
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But if we relate the number of horses to the sown area of each grouu 
we get a very different picture. We see that the peasants used a much 
larger number of horses per unit area sown than did the average pomeshchik 
household. The peasants had 41.9 horses for every 10^ ctesyatinu, sown, 
whilst the noneshchiki had only 19.5 horses for the same area sown . If 
we look at the Anfimov data for different types of landowner household we 
can see that the larger the area sown the smaller the number of horses per 
unit of sown, area:
0
o-in
10-50
50-100
100-250
250-500
500-1000
1000-5000
5000+
All
Sown 
area in 
th . des .
108.3
367.4
1065.9
1877.9
1636.5
1376.6
1079.0
75.1
3197.0
:iO . of
horses 
in th.
32.9
42.9
214.3
220.6
362.2
312.3
220.6
134.7
6.9
hor­
ses
per 
lOOdes 
s own 
area
39.6
24.7
20.7
19.3
19.1
16.0
12.5
9.2
18.9
Sown 
area in 
th.des .
65.9
713.8
925.2
1496.9
1543.2
1324.2
1054.0
70.4
7194.4
f \<N O . O I
horses
in th .
30.4
41.2
187.5
194.0
316.7
275.7
200.6
126.5
7.0
1379.6
Horses 
per lOOdes. 
so'-.7!! area
62.5
26.3
21.0
21.2
17.9
15.1
12.0
9.9
19.2
Sources: A.M.Anfimov, ibid., M .1962, pp.119,138.
This is another reason why the unit costs of production on these 
large estates wer< less than on the small and why there were more srain 
surpluses produced on them. However, I must make two qualifying remarks 
concerning this indication of the numbers of horses on oo^eshchik estates
First, there is no indication given of the extent of hiring labour 
with horses. This may affect the position. Secondly, no account has
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been made for quality aspects. The landowner horses were quite noticeably 
larger than the peasant horses , and the dairy herds contained some very 
fine animals, all of which would have consumed more than the average 
peasant animal. Nevertheless these factors are only likely to have a 
marginal effect on the overall differences described above.
1. The military horse census measured the horses and in 1912 it 
was reported that 67.8% of Umefpu/a-r* horses were more than two 
arshin tall (1.42 metres) while only 43.7% of peasant horses 
were that tall. (Voenno konskii nerepis 1912g., Pp, .1914, 
pp.16-35, cited by .^.^.Anfimov ibid. , M.1962, p.114)
-137-
c)
ii) The available data on livestock feed norms and patterns of fodder 
getting
The earliest livestock feed norms x^ere often given not in terms of 
the quantity of grain per head of livestock but in terms of the quantity 
per head of the rural population. In the earlier section of this 
chapter concerned with food consumption norms it was described how 
Protopopov argued that a personal consumption norm of 3 chetverts per head 
of all the pODulation was too large, and that it would be reduced to 2 
chetverts or should be considered to include livestock feed .
From this it can be inferred that Protopopov considered that 1 
chetvert per head of all the population would provide sufficient grain to 
cover livestock feed.
Since the level of livestock per head of the population changed 
quite significantly over this period and differed from region to region, 
this kind of procedure can clearly only be very rough.
In the 1850s Tengoborskii estimated that livestock would consume 
on average 1 chetvert of grain per head of livestock per year. Since 
the grain was likely to be oats 1 chetvert would weight 0.092 tons. 
The different kinds of livestock were presumably converted into their 
horse equivalents .
Several years later, in 1869 when I.Vilson came to draw up his
early grain forage balance he accepted a livestock feed norm for horses
3 only, x^hich he gave as 2{ chetverts per year . (Assuming again that the
1. See above p.9 ^
2. See Tengoborskii,0 proizvoditelnylkh sjlakh Rossii, SPb 1854
pp. 198-202, cited here from P.I.Por>oV, in Selskoye Khczyaistvo na 
putyakh vosstanovleniya, M .1925, p.3.
3. See I.Vilson (ed.) Obyasneniya k Khoz.stat.atlasu Evropyg-skoi Rossii, 
SPb, 1869, p.106.
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grain was oats, this would mean 0,23 tons per year per horse), Vilson 
justified the use of such a norm from the investigations of Ya.A. 
Solovyev in Smolensk Gubernia and he also added that this was the order 
of magnitude officially accepted by the Ministry of State Property.
I have not been able to trace Solovyev's work, and the earliest 
serious investigation of livestock feed that I have come across was 
that of L.N.Maress in the late 1890s. The following account of livestock 
feed patterns and feed norms appeared in Maress's already cited work on 
the production and consumption of grain in a peasant household, which he 
wrote for the Chuprov and Posnikov edition of articles on the effect of 
harvest levels .
Maress $t».t-ed 7/ that ha}' vas the main item of livestock feed but 
it was always to some extent supplemented by more nourishing grain 
(mainly oats and barley but in certain cases also wheat and rve as well 
as mill-feed). A grain supplement was given especially to horses doing 
demanding work particularly in the worst weather and in winter; to all 
animals giving birth and suckling their young; to young animals and to 
pigs, poultry and other animals for fattening. The quantity of grain 
used to supplement feed was far less than in western Europe and northern 
America at this time, but this appears to be mainly due to the smaller 
and weaker nature of the animals rather than to their getting sufficient 
alternative feedstuffs. Maress noted that the actual amount of grain 
used to supplement feed was very difficult to estimate with any degree 
of accuracy, and warned that the norms that he was applying were very 
tentative. His norms were based on the data of a few budget studies 
of fodder norms in volosts around St.Petersburg, and around Voronezh.
1, See L.N.Maress, in A.I.Chuprov and A.S.Posnikov (eds.) Vliyaniye 
urozhaev i khlebnikh tsent. . . SPb 1897.
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Maress calculated the average annual grain supplement to feed to be 
18.3 pds (0.300 tons) of oats per horse and 10 pds (0.164 tons) per cow 
or ox, and one tenth of this per head of smaller livestock (e.g. sheep 
and pigs). On average assuming there were per household 1.48 work­ 
horses which consequently required 27.1 pds (0.444 tons) of oats, 1.52 
cows and oxen, and 7.14 smaller livestock (equivalent to 0.71 cows or 
oxen) requiring 0.365 tons of grain supplement to hay . Finally Maress 
allowed 7.4 pds (0.121 tons) of grain for poultry feed. This gave a 
total productive consumption per agricultural household per year of 
grain supplement to livestock feed of O.930 tons of grain. Allowing an 
average of 6 persons per household, this gives an average annual con­ 
sumption of grain supplement to fodder of 0.123 tons per head of 
agricultural population.
Chayanov's study also gave an analysis of the feeding norms for 
livestock. He also emphasises that this is a topic that had been little 
studied in the past and was of fundamental importance for the food supply 
plan. But as already explained the construction of livestock feed norms 
was far more complicated than the construction of personal consumption 
norms for the population and the norms were far less stable. Different 
types of livestock required different quantities of fodder. These 
differed by area, by type of households and according to the method of 
organising the livestock sector and fodder-getting. Apart from this 
the substitution of different types of fodder was far more significant 
and grain plaved a far less fundamental role in the consumption of
1. Maress received figures of number of animals per household from 
the work of Blagoveshchensky Svodnyi statisticheskii sbornik 
khozyaistvennoi svedenii po zemskim podvornim perepisyam Vol.1 
The data was a collection of zemstvo surveys from a sample 
covering 123 uezds in 22 gubernii.
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livestock than grain did in human consumption. Grain was used as a 
supplement to livestock feed predominantly in the winter months when 
the livestock was in stalls and could not graze for itself. The length 
of the stall period differed greatly for different regions. Generally 
it could be said that maintaining the livestock over the winter months 
was a much harder task in the typical Russian conditions of severe and 
long winters than it was in other more moderate climates so to this extent 
grain was more important for livestock in Russia than in other countries. 
The fact that at this time less grain was fed to the livestock in Russia 
than in other countries, explains the pitiful state of much of the country's 
livestock. It was impossible for larger animals to be bred while insuff­ 
icient fodder was available for the livestock. Insufficient fodder was 
available a) because the pressure to increase the sown area led to a 
decrease of pastureland , and b) because much of the grain was exported, 
instead of being fed to the animals. In particular the major export crops 
barley and wheat were replacing oats as spring grown crops in the crop 
rotations which were used at this time.
Chayanov laid the basis for the study of livestock feed-getting by 
classifying feed-getting into three types. These types were arrived 
at by an analysis of the organisation of livestock feeding as revealed by 
budget studies in 5 guberniu. A brief review of Chayanov's analysis 
is given below:
1. There was little movement towards intensive rotation and the 
production of specialised forage crops at this time.
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Organisation of feed-getting (quantities per household; numbers
unless otherwise stated)
People
Arable (des.)
Feed area (des.)
Horses
Oxen and bulls
Cows
Small livestock
All livestock
converted
to cattle
Poultry
VologcMx
uezd
Vologda
5.3
3.7
6.1
0.9
0
2.1
0.6
3.6
3.2
Voronezh
gubernia
8.4
10.1
1.2
1.6
1.0
1.2
16.0
7.8
24.0
Expenditure on feed and litter in pds .
Hay (Meadows)
Hay (Clover)
Straw winter
Straw spring
Chaff
Sprinklings 
(Prisipka)
Grain
Oilcakes
Other
Total
Grain for
Poultry
499.0
—
93.0
26.2
6.1
24.0
-
-
643.3
9
108.8
-
594.0
143.0
34.0
40.0
-
-
921.1
10.9
Starobel
uezd
Kharkov
7.6
14.1
2.3
1.0
2.2
1.1
8.1
6.8
41.4
173.4
-
417.7
196.5
52.8
31.8
-
11.8
884.1
16.6
Volokolamsk
uezd
Moscow
7.7
7.1
2.2
2.5
-
2.4
3.5
6.1
9
———————————————
298.4
429.0
271.0
92.1
-
*
56.6
6.2
-
1153.3
9
*
Yaroslav
gubernia
5.3
—
-
-
-
-
-
-
9•
397.2
9
-
0.9
32.5
-
11.4
9
9
from: A.V.Chayanov Materialy.... vyp 1, M.1916, p.80.
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Chayanov's three basic types of fodder-getting were:
1) The harmonic threefield type, typified by the above example from 
Vologda uezd. In this type the feed area is sufficiently large 
in comparison with the area of arable and 5/6 of all feed stocks 
are comnosed of hay collected from meadows.
2) The purely p,rain economy type, typified by Voronezh gubernia 
(and more or less common for all Chernozem regions) . In this 
type the arable has spread to such a degree that the area for 
natural feed has been greatly diminished (in the case of 
Voronezh it accounts for only 10% of all the land). Feed- 
getting in these cases is dependent primarily on grain products: 
grain and straw. Hay in the case of Voronezh only accounts for 
1/9 of all feed stocks.
3) The grass-lands system, typified by Volokolamsk uezd. The 
livestock are again fed mainly from the arable production. 
But in this case the arable supplies the livestock not only with 
the waste products left after human consumption, such as straw, 
but also with fine artificial hay from specially sown grasses. 
In the case of Volokolqmsk the total hay collected accounts for 
6/10 of the overall feed stocks and of this over 60% comes 
from sown grasses.
If we compare the quantity of grain fed to one unit of livestock 
(converted into long-horned cattle) for these different cases we see 
that in the Vologda extensive livestock system 6.7 pds of grain are fed 
to one head of cattle, in the Voronezh extensive grain economy case 
5.1 pds per head of cattle, while in the more progressive intensive 
grasslands type economy of Volokolamsk 9.3 pds of grain were consumed 
per head. However if we include expenditure on sprinklings (nrisipka)
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the picture is reversed 8.3 pds for Vologda, 9,5 pds for Voronezh and 
9.3 pds for Volokolamsk, In order to understand the situation more 
fully and be able to make conclusions it is necessary to analyse in 
more detail the content of the element of sprinklings. (How much of 
it is grain and how much other stuffs?). It stands to reason that 
with a decrease in the consumption of hay it requires an increase in 
consumption of grain and other foodstuffs to achieve the same effect. 
But it is very unlikely that the same effect (the same quality of 
livestock) was achieved in all these cases. Livestock bred on the 
intensive grasslands system and with large grain supplements was likely 
to be far more healthy and larger than that bred on more extensive 
systems with lower grain supplements, but to analyse this we would re­ 
quire statistics of the average x^eight of the respective livestock; such 
statistics were not recorded at this time or recorded very infrequently.
The above analysis would allox-7 us to classify livestock breeding 
in all households into these three classifications and use the equivalent 
norms of grain supplement (with or without all of the norm for 'prisipka' 
expended) per household for the regions where these organisational patt­ 
erns predominated, in order to calculate the overall expenditure of 
grain on feed. Limitations further to those mentioned above are that 
the above budget studies are not necessarily typical of the consumption 
for the whole of these areas. The most important variable was the 
number and type of livestock per household in different households. As 
a consequence of this Chayanov attempted also to analyse norms of con­ 
sumption for different types of livestock.
Most statistical data on livestock feeding up till that time were 
collected in a most rough manner; one figure x^as given for the estimated
-144-
use of fodder by the whole household without sub-divisions for 
different animals. This is true for the five most detailed cases 
given above, Chayanov recorded in 1916 that only in literally four or 
five of the most recent investigations had sub-totals per type of animal 
been obtained. As an example of such an analysis Chayanov supplied the 
following table for Vologda
Horse 
Cow
Sheep
Foal
Bullock
Calf-lyr.
Stall time 
(monthly)
8.2 
7.1
7.0
8.0
7.2
5.2
Hay 
pds
220.3 
90.3
26.4
158.8
71.5
18.9
Spring 
Straw
44.7
0.1
0.8
7.9
Chaff & 
Bran
5.6 
12.5
0.3
4.0
4.0
0.9
Oats
13.8
3.0
Flour
1
I
Milk 
Returns
18.6
5.1
18.9
30.2
From: A..V.Chayanov 'Materialy. . . ' vyp 1, M.1916, p.81.
In addition to calculations by type of livestock and organisation of 
fodder-getting Chayanov also recommended the calculation of livestock 
norms according to length of stall period. He classified European 
gubernii into the following four regions as is shown below:
1) Region with stall period of less than 160 days included the
following gubernii: Bessarabskaya, Khersonskaya, Tavricheskaya, 
Ekaterinoslavskaya, the southern oblasts of the Don Military region 
and Astrakhanskaya.
2) Regions with stall period of 160-80 days: Vilenskaya, Grodenskaya 
Minskaya, Mogilevskaya, Volinskaya, Podolskaya, Kievskaya, 
Chernogovskaya, Poltavskaya, Kharkovskaya, Kurskaya, Orlovskaya 
Kaluzhskaya, Tulskaya, Ryazanskaya, Voronezhskaya, Tambovskaya, 
Penzenskaya, Simbirskaya, Saratovskaya, Samarskaya, Orenburgskaya and
the northern oblasts of the Don Military Region.
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3) Regions with stall period of 180-200 days: Pribaltiiskaya,
Kovenskaya, Vitebskaya, Sraolenskaya, Mos^ovskaya, Yaroslavskaya, 
Vladimirskaya, Kostromskaya, Nizhegorodskaya, Kazanskaya, 
Ufimskaya.
4) Regions with stall period of over 200 days: Pskovskaya, 
Petrogradskaya, Novgorodskaya, Olonetskaya, Vologodskaya, 
Vyatskaya, Permskaya, Arkhangelskaya (250+).
However, in spite of all these recommendations on how the norms 
of livestock feed should be calculated and their future statistics 
organised, there was no attempt to reach detailed conclusions on the 
scant evidence that was so far available. Any pre-war norm would 
clearly have to be guesstimated on a very unsure basis; it would 
probably be best to estimate a norm per head of agricultural population, 
not per animal per stall period and classified according to the type 
of fodder-getting.
Lositsky obtained his operational livestock feed norms by using 
the earlier analyses of Chayanov and Popov. He simply combined the 
analysis by Chayanov in 1916, and obtained overall consumption figures 
for one head of livestock differentiated between the non-Cherno-zem 
and Cherno-zem gubemii. A detailed survey by Popov in Tula gubernia 
provided an indication of the proportions of livestock feed required 
by the different types of livestock. Lositsky admitted that the 
quantity and type of feed used was dependent on the system of fodder- 
getting as analysed by Chayanov; but Lositsky had been forced to assume 
that the average of the studies of Vologda, Volokolamsk uezds and 
Yaroslavl gubernia could be taken as being typical for all non-Cherno-zem 
regions, and that the average for Chayanov 1 s studies of Voronezh and 
Kharkov gubernia was typical for the Cherno-zem regions. These were
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simplifications and assumptions of heroic proportions.
No. of livestock
per household
average in 
cattle.
Poultry
Use of fodder per 
head of livestock
in pds
Hay (meadow and 
clover)
Straw and chaff
Grain
Prisipka
Cattle cake etc.
Grain per fowl
Vologodsky 
uezd
3.6
3.2
140
33
6.7
1.7
-
9
•
Volokolarnsky 
U<tzJ
6.1
7
120
60
9,3
1.
7
Yaroslav / 
gubernia
3.0
?
132
?
10.8
0.3
3.8
7
From: Lositsky.^ Urozhai khlebov v Rossii v 1917g; , M.
Voronezh-. .•/ 
gubernia
7.8
24.0
14
95
5.1
4.4
—
0.45
Kharkov 
gubernia
6.8
41.4
25
90
4.7
7.8
7.8
0.4
1918, p. 23
(recalculated from A.V.Chayanov Materially ... *' vyp 1, M.1916,
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The norms of consumotion of feed for different animals were then 
calculated, 'on the basis of norms of giving grain and sprinklings (of 
grain stuffs) (prisipka) for one head of full grown livestock according 
to the two regions and in relation to the giving of it to large and small 
livestock and bullocks in Tula gubernia... and after the addition of well- 
known quantities for feed for horses during the summer'.
Category of livestock Non-Cherno-zem Cherno-zem
Horses ( T\Tork)
Other large livestock 
(non-work horses, cows, 
bullocks)
Small £• average livestock 
(Foals,bullocks,pigs etc.)
Bullocks younger than 1 yr.
0.246 tons
tons
0.088 tons 
0.049 tons
0.262 tons
0,180 tons
0.082 tons 
0.049 tons
From: Lositsky Urozhai khlebov v ?ossii v 1917g., M .1918, D.26.
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^ations for livestock feed
In assessing the grain levy in 1916 an allowance was also to be made 
for the amount of grain used as livestock feed in the grain producer 
households, but no centrally determined norm or ration was given for this. 
The law of March 25, 1917 set the following rations for the livestock 
belonging to grain producing households :
for a draft horse 3.28 kilograms of ^ats or Barley, or 4.10
kilograms of wheat r>er day for a maximum of 75
days i.e. a maximum of 0.246 tons of oats or barley,
or 0.307 tons of wheat per horse t>er year.
for full grox-m cattle or pigs 1.64 kilograms of grain for a maximum
of 60 days, i.e. 0.098 tons per year
calves more than a year old were allowed half the ration of a full
grown COT' i.e. 0.049 tons per year.
By September 1917, Lositsky reports that the Ministry of Food were 
using a much higher series of fodder norms'":
Full grown horse 0.410 tons per year, 
Full grown cattle 0.197 tons per year, 
Foal younger than 1 year 0.131 tons 
Bullocks over 1 year 0.098 tons 
Pigs 0.082 tons
The norms set for town horses by the Ministry of Food at this time
3 (October 1917) were the following:
Dray horses weighing more than 0.57 tons, 8.6 kilograms per day
with no time limit, therefore up to 3.14 tons per year
Dray horses weighing between 0.29 tons and 0.57 tons, 7.4 kilograms
per day, up to 2.69 tons per year
Dray horses weighing less than 0.29 tons, 4.1 kilograms per day, giving
a maximum of 1.49 tons per year.
1. See K.I.Zaitsev and X.V.Dolinsky, ibid. , p.9°.
2. See A.E.Lositsky, ibid. , p.26.
3. See A.E.Lositsky, ibid., o.27.
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These appear to be very generous norms. The varch 1917 fodder 
rations were about the same size as the average norm given by Lositsky 
in his grain forage balance for 1917. But by September Ministry of 
Food norms were far higher.
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d) Industrial use
Virtually all the grain used in human consumption was processed into 
flour. But very little of this was measured as part of the milling 
industry. Good statistics were kept for the large establishments which 
fell within the census definition of industry, but these only covered 2,705 
mills in 1916, at the time of the 1916 census of the milling industry and 
they had an annual production of less than 12 million tons . Since at 
least 35 million tons of flour were consumed by the population, the figures 
from the milling industry are likely to provide a very poor indication of 
the amount of grain milled. It will therefore be best to resort to the 
normed consumption data in order to assess the real size of the milling 
industry.
If we exclude the milling industry, other industrial uses of grain 
were relatively minor. '.'" The main grains, potatoes and sugar beet 
were all used in the distillation industry and barley was used in the malt- 
making and brewing industry. But less than 1 million tons were used in 
the factories of the distillation industry. About one half was malt coming
from barley, about a fifth was rye, and a growing proportion, over a quarter
. 2was maize ,
Less than a quarter of a million tons of barley was listed as being
3 used in the brewing industry . But these figures and all the available
figures refer to large scale industry only. There were no ways of register­ 
ing the production of illegal homemade spirit (Samogon), and it was probably
produced on a very large scale in the countryside. It required roughly
4 1 ton of grain to produce 2,000 litres of 40% alcohol . If the average
peasant household consumed 1 litre of alcohol a week that would account for
the utilisation of another half-million tons of grain.__________________ 
T. See Ezhegodnik khlebnoi torgovly,, No. 1, M.1928, pp.6, 42.
2. See Sbornik statistiko-ekonomicheskikh svedenii po sel.khoz.Rossii.., 
SPb.1916, p.194.
3. See Sbornik stat.ekon.svedenii...,SPb.1916, p.204.
4. See Sbornik stat.ekon.svedenii...,SPb.1916,p.178.
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e) Grain consumed by the army
Throughout the nineteenth century the army had been one of the 
largest single consumers of grain. For the first half of the nine­ 
teenth century the size of military consumption was in all probability 
greater than exports. In the late nineteenth century and until the eve 
of the Great War the share of military consumption undoubtedly declined 
in comparison with total utilisation and especially with the growth in 
exports. But during the war military consumption rose rapidly to 
enormous and ultimately crippling proportions.
In this section I will consider i) the changes in the size of 
the army over this period, ii) the size of a soldier's ration, and 
iii) the direct data on procurements for the military. 
i) The size of the army
Sir Bernard Pares has pointed out that the Russians have always 
had a large army: 'All through Russian history from the very beginning 
there have been testimonies to the great numbers of the Slavs and the 
almost irresistible power which they might have if ever they were 
united....We are surprised at the numbers of Russian troops mentioned 
by the early Western travellers to Moscow; they altogether exceed the 
proportions of Western armies' .
At Borodino, in 1812 Napoleon was faced by 120,000 Russian troops 
and under the reign of Nicholas I (1825-55) the size of the army was 
expanded to about 1 million which was well in excess of any two other 
European armies. At this time the army was based on a fairly random 
conscript system in which 1-2% of peasant males of eligible age served 
for 25 years. The serf owners and the village elders were responsible 
for selecting conscripts and they often used their power to punish 
1, Bernard Pares, A History of Russia', Methuen, London 1965, p.114
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trouble makers or unpopular elements.
By the mid century the Russian population had grown at such a rate 
that the traditional 1-2% was leading to the recruitment of far more 
males than was needed for an army which was stabilising its size at 
about 1 million. The standard length of service was therefore allowed 
to drop to 15 years which was followed by 10 years leave during which 
the soldiers formed effectively a reserve army.
After the failure of the Russian army in the Crimean War (1854-56), 
and after the emancipation of the peasantry (1861) there were a whole 
series of military reforms, which ultimately led to a less arbitrary 
conscription system in which, on reaching the age of 21, a quarter of 
each male cohort was drafted into the army to serve on active service for 
seven years to be followed by eight years in the reserve. This again 
provided just over a million men on active service. In later years as 
the growth in population size continued to increase it was decided to cut 
the length of active service in order to gradually increase, and in
August 1914 on the eve of the Great War the Russian Army stood at 1.423
.,. . 1 million men .
The Great War resulted in a very sharp rise in the size of the army. 
Between August 1914 and January 1, 1915 5.115 million reservists were 
mobilised. Between January 1, 1915 and January 1, 1916 a further 5.01 
million men were drafted. The following year we see the addition of a
further 2.745 million men. And in the last year of the war in 1917
2another 0.830 million men joined the army .
1. For the above account on changes in the size and organisation of 
the Tsarist Army see: J,N.Westwood,Endurance and endeavour:Russian 
History,1812-1971, OUP, 1973, pp.64-67,95-97,186;J.S.Curtiss, The 
Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1956, V.I.Kovalevskii (ed.) 
Rossiya v kontse XIX veki, SPb.1900, pt>.952-59, and Trudy TsSU, 
vol.18, M.1924, pp.86-89.
2. See Nar.Khoz.S5SR v tsifrakh, M.1925, p.109
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In order to calculate the size of the army at any one point during 
the war years, we have to deduct the losses; either killed or taken 
prisoner. The available data on deaths and other losses of prisoners 
#/*•€ very inadequate. The Soviet demographer B.Ts.Urlanis has described 
how the poor state of the organisation of military statistics in the 
early months of the T-?ar has led to a large under-reporting of losses in
1914 . Altogether Urlanis suggests that there were 1.8 million deaths
2 amongst the military in the 1914/18 war , and that there were several
million taken prisoner.
Given the poor quality of the data on losses only very rough 
estimates of the size of the army at any given time can be made. Such 
rough estimates are given below:
Numbers of Soldiers in Tsarist Army in millions
Date
August 1914 
January 1915 
January 1916 
January 1917 
November 1917
*
5
5
2
0
tions
.1
.0
,7
.8
losses 
killed
0.
0.
0.
0.
4
4
4
4
, POW
1
0
o
0
.0
.5
.5
.5
Total 
in army
1
5
9
11
10
.4
.1
o• *—
.0
.9
From these figures the average annual number of soldiers who 
required feeding every year rose in the following manner:
1. B.Ts.Urlanis, Wars and Population, M.1971, (English edition), 
pp .46-55.
2. B.Ts.Urlanis, ibid., p.198. Of these 1.8 million deaths 0.2 mln 
are estimated to have died in captivity.
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Calendar Year
1800-1830
1830-1905 
1905-1914
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
about
about
about
about
about
about
about
300,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
2,000,000
7,000,000
10,000,000
9,000,000
1913/14
1914/15
1915/16
1916/17
1917/18
Agricultural Year
300,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
6,000,000
9,000,000
11,000,000
Unfortunately very few data are available on the number of horses and 
other livestock held by the array at this time. According to the 
detailed procurement data and the feeding norms, which will be discussed 
later , it would appear that in peace time there were on average about 
3.3 soldiers per horse, while in war time the ratio rose to about 5.6. 
This includes both cavalry horses and general draft horses.
ii) The size of military rations
Data on the size of military rations current from the late eighteenth
2 century to the mid nineteenth century have alread been described above .
They give a figure of 0.391 tons of flour and groats per soldier. The
following table, taken from Kondratiev's major work, supplements these
early data with an indication of the rations in 1869 and at certain times
during the war,cn
1. See p , /S"d
2. See above
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Total 
flour grain
Date grain
1758
1775
1869 0,373
16/1/1916 0.373
7/4/1916 0.448
28/12/1916 0.373
20/3/1917 0.299
flour
0,356
0.356
0.281
0.281
0.337
0.281
0.224
bread
0.258
0.258
0.261
0.261
0.299
0.261
0.261
:n, Zhurnal MVD,
Condratieiv , Rynok
groats
0.025
0.038
0.037
0.037
0.037
0,037
0.037
Vol.36, no 
khlebov. .
other
 
-
0.006
0.018
0.037
0.037
0.037
.6, 1840, 
. ., M.1922
equivalents
0.381
0,394
0.324
0.336
0.411
0.354
0.298
p. 405. 
, p. 183.
0.416
0.428
0.522
0.447
0.373
It can be seen that there was a remarkable degree of stability in 
the standard army ration until 1917. The standard amount of bread 
consumed in the ration hardly changed at all, although there were some 
significant changes in its flour and grain content. In the eighteenth 
century a larger amount of flour was used in the production of the stan­ 
dard army ration bread loaf. I am uncertain as to whether this was a 
consequence of a change in the method of baking the bread (e.g. the 
introduction of a more leavened bread which would require a larger share 
of water) or whether it was a consequence of some other change (probably 
in the standard of flour mixed from a unit amount of grain). From the 
middle of the nineteenth century the soldier appears to have been re­ 
ceiving a slightly larger loaf which was baked from slightly less flour, 
fcrhe bread to flour ratio having been raised from 0.725 to 0.929. The 
flour extraction rate from grain was reported to be 0.753 at this time. 
A certain amount of groats had always been given as a supplement (served 
as gruel or dropped into the soup) . To this \-7ere added a small amount 
of oeas, beans and other secondary grains, especially during the War. 
There appears to have been an attempt to increase the size of the ration 
in April 1916, probably as an attempt to boost morale. But as the
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supply situation deteriorated after the 1916 harvest this increase had 
to be cancelled. But even the traditional level of rations could not 
be maintained under the Provisional Government. And in March 1917 the 
amount of grain and flour in the standard ration loaf was reduced. This 
appears to have been achieved without a reduction in the weight of the 
loaf. And consequently the loaf must have contained more water or other 
fillers. In the strained supply conditions of these times it is uncertain 
to what extent even this reduced ration was maintained.
Kondratiev also informs us that the standard military supply norm 
for feed for a horse during this period was 13.. Ibs of oats per day 
for a normal horse and 12 Ibs a day for a small horse , i.e. 2.053 tons 
per year for a normal horse and 1.79 tons per year for a small horse, 
iii) Data on grain procurements and utilisation by the military
The system of prewar grain procurements for the army is a subject
2 which has unfortunately been neglected by historians . It is undoubtedly
an extremely complex topic and I will only present the system in its 
most simple outlines.
In grain surplus areas grain could fairly easily be procured by 
the local quarter-masters with little disturbance to the local market. 
In other areas the military had to arrange its own provisioning; the 
purchasing of grain in other regions and their transportation into the
1. See N.D.Kondratiev, ibid. , M.1922, p.184.
2. N.D.Kondratiev's work on the grain market during the War and
Revolution fails to provide an account of pre-war military pro­ 
curements and thereby gives a rather misleading account of the 
rapidity with which the war-time procurement agencies were formed. 
The sole account of the pre-war procurement agencies that I have 
come across is a rather incomplete account given by the modern 
Soviet historian T.M.Khitanina, in T.M.Khitanina, Khlebnaya torgovlya 
Rossii v 1875-1914 gg.,1.1978, pp.95-103, 201-21, 255-65. ~~~~
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garrison area. Since the middle of the eighteenth century, these 
more complex inter-regional provisioning arrangements had been based 
on a system of contract supplies which had been overseen by an agency 
in the War Ministry called the 'Intendanstvo'. The 'Intendanstvo 1 set 
fixed prices for grain, which were considerably above the market price. 
But they did require their suppliers to provide high quality grain and 
on a regular basis. The contractors acted as middlemen between the 
producers and the army.
According to a figure prepared by P.I.Popov and V.I.Yefryemov from 
contemporary sources on the number of the military and their consumption
rations , the army in the period from 1840s to the 1860s consumed annually
2 about 0.7 mln.tons of grain .
Khitanina, citing Ministry of War data for total military procure­ 
ments of grain products and forage in the 1870s and 1880s averaged about 
3.5 mln,chetverts i.e. approximately 0.5 million tons a year . Later in 
her work Khitanina cited from the Central State Military Historical 
Archives annual data for procurements by the 'Intendanstvo' for the 1890s
1. See P.I.Popov, in Sel.khoz.na putyakh vosstanovleniya, M.1925, pp. 
8,11,37. Popov states that these figures had been worked out by 
V.I.Yefryemov (head of the TsSU Department of Military Statistics), 
and were based on data from Voenno-'statisticheskii spravochnik, vol. 
IV, SPb. 1871, and Entsiklopediya voyennikh i morskikh nauk, (ed. 
Lyeyer).
2. I.D.Kovalchenko in Russkoye krepostnoye krestyanstvo... M.1967, 
p.97 gives a much lower estimate of 1.95 mln.chetverts i.e. about 
0.25 mln.tons. This is due to his failure to include any account 
of the military requirement for fodder.
3. See T.M.Khitanina, ibid., L.1978, p.95. No source or reference
is given to this Ministry of War data. And Khitanina rather
misleadingly implies that this figure is higher than Ponov's.
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which vary from 0.37 to 0,21 million tons . Unfortunately Khitanina
is very imprecise in stating what precisely these figures refer to.
They certainly cov«r Aioch food and fodder grains. The detailed figures
for the 1890s certainly exclude local purchases by the local quarter-
2 master , and may only include procurements in the European part of
Russia. Given these reservations the figures do nevertheless provide 
an interesting indication of some fundamental changes in the procurement 
system. But first I will make a rough attempt to assess total military 
consumption requirements based on the size of the army and the size of 
the standard ration.
We have seen above that from the 1830s until 1905 the army numbered 
about 1 million, whereafter it gradually rose in numbers to about 1.4 
million on the eve of the Great War, Given that the standard soldier's 
ration had a grain equivalent of 0.416 tons per year per soldier, we 
would expect about 0.42 million tons of grain to be required by the army 
annually, just for personal consumption from the 183Os until 1905, and 
then for the amount required to rise to 0.58 million tons. The Khitanina 
1870s figure of 0.5 million tons total military procurements would allow 
just 0.08 million tons for livestock feed, which could only provide feed 
for 0.039 million horses. This would imply a ratio of 26 soldiers per 
horse. The Popov figure of 0.7 million tons would allow 0.28 million 
tons for livestock feed which would allow enough feed for 0.136 million 
horses. This would imply a ratio of 7.3 per horse, which I would suggest
1. See T.M.Khitanina, ibid., L.1978, pp. 208-209
2. This however does not ston Khitanina from referring to them as 
covering all military consumption (See T.M.Khitanina, ibid. , L. 
1978, footnote 58, p. 95), which is clearly incorrect. She does 
not even bother to sum the individual series of figures which 
she reproduces from the archives, and so appears to be totally 
oblivious °f t^ie ^ act tnat they could not possibly cover all of 
military consumption.
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is a much more likely number, and which is much more comparable with the 
kind of ratios implied by the more complete 1914-18 military procure­ 
ments data.
The figures given by Khitanina are therefore far from complete, 
and represent at most only 50-70% of total military consumption. I 
have suggested therefore that they exclude purchases made by local 
quartermasters in local grain surplus areas. There appear to be no 
data on these local military purchases.
We will now consider in more detail the figures for the grain 
purchased by the 'Intendtfnstvo' during this period. As mentioned above, 
the traditional contracts system, using private middlemen operated with 
prices fixed and considerably higher than the market price. In condit­ 
ions when the market price was rising the authorities were more or less 
satisfied x^ith this system. But with the onset of the depression in 
agricultural prices the gap between the prices paid by the 'Intendanstvo' 
and the market price widened and the authorities became less satisfied 
with the expense of the system. In such circumstances an attempt was 
made to deal direct with large scale producers (mainly the gentry) and to 
cut out the expensive middlemen. However the Ministry of TJar appeared 
to lack the necessary flexibility for such operations and succeeded in 
collecting only a very small quantity of grain direct from the producers.
The situation appears to have become quite serious in the early 
1890s at the time of the famine. In conditions of general shortage 
the 'Intendanstvo 1 was unable to collect as much grain as it required. 
The level of collected grain fell from 0.32 mln.tons in 1889 to 0.21
1. For an indication of the fall in market prices of grain and the
prices oaid by the 'Intendanstvo', see N.A.Egiazarova, Agrarnyi
krizis kontsa XIX veka v Rossii, M.1959, pp.175-77.
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millions tons in 1891 , Whether this actually led to shortages in 
military rations is uncertain, but there must certainly have been a 
major drain on the size of military stocks. For three years in a 
row 1890-92 significantly less than 0.3 mln.tons of grain was collected.
Following this experience Witte proposed that the Ministry of 
Finance be allowed to undertake direct grain purchases for the army in
order to build up stocks , and to help the producers overcome the harm-
? 
ful effect of the famine . Witte proposed that the Ministry of Finance
should organise these collections through the agencies of the Gubernia 
or Uezd Zemstvo Authorities, the agricultural societies and associations 
and also through the commercial agents of the railways. And despite 
the hindrance from the War Ministry such locally organised direct 
collections did succeed in collecting more than 0.14 mln tons of grain 
in their first year of operation and thereby helped bring the total level 
of grain collected up to 0.35 mln.tons.
Although the Ministry of Finance continued to organise some of 
these military supplies in later years it did not maintain its importance. 
Having been shown how to organise local collections through the local 
zemstvo agencies, the War Ministry soon adopted this system itself and 
began collecting a larger share of its grain in this manner.
Following the disaster of the "Russo-Japanese War, and the decision 
to increase the size of the army, a further review of state procurements
policy was required. Great attention was again paid to the expense of
3 the contracts system , but V,N.Kokovtsov the Finance Minister was reluctant
1. See table following.
2. See T.M.Kfc t anina,ibid. , L.1978, pp.201-207
3. See T.M.Kitanina, ibid., L.1978, p.260.
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Grain collected for the army in mln.tons
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
Ministry c 
Contracts
0.315
0.255
0.211
0.281
0.338
0.205
0.254
0.288
0.301
>f War 
direct
0.006
0.006
0.001
0.002
0.005
0.002
_
-
0.013
0.013
0.074
0.154
0.116
0.189
0.165
all
0.321
0.261
0.212
0.283
0.343
0.207
0.254
0.288
0.314
Min.Fin. 
direct
-
_
—
-
-
0.146
0.105
0.059
0,062
0.039
0.038
0.034
0.035
0.034
0.042
All
0.321
0.261
0.212
0.283
0.343
0.353
0.359
0.347
0.376
All 
contracts
0.315
0.255
n.211
0.281
0.338
0.205
0.254
0.288
0,301
All 
direct
0.006
0.006
0.001
0.002
0.005
0.148
0.105
0.059
0.075
0.052
0.112
0.188
0.151
0.223
0.207
Source: T.M.Kittanina, Khlebnaya Torgovlya Rossii v 1875-1914gg 
pp.708-709,
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to expand the involvement of his Ministry, A special interdepartmental 
commission under the chairmanship of the principle 'intendant' consid­ 
ered this question in June 1908 and having decided that the solution 
must lie in greater zemstvo involvement in organising local collections, 
it referred the question to the next zemstvo gathering which took place 
in December 1909.
It was ultimately agreed that the separate gubernia zemstva "ould 
take on the job of breaking down the orders for grain and distributing 
them between the different uezd zemstvo authorities and that the latter 
would distribute the orders between the different producers. This 
system was carried out on a trial basis initially in 1909/10 in 
Simbirskaya, Penzenskaya and Kazanskaya Gubernii, where it appears to 
have worked with great success . In the following years a few other 
zemstvo authorities agreed to be involved in distributing procurement 
orders. But right up until the outbreak of war the contracts system 
appears to have remained the source of most of the procured grain.
Our knowledge of war-time military procurements is much more complete
than that for the pre-war period. Kondratiev has analysed this question
o 
in great detail and TsSU has also reworked these materials^.
For a detailed account of the organisation of state procurements
during the War the reader is referred to Kondratiev's work and the work
3 of Zaitsev and Dolinsky, which is mainly based upon Kondratiev's work
1. See T.M.Kitanina, ibid., L.1978, p,263.
2. See N.D.Kondratiev, Rynok khlebov i ego regulirovaniye vo vremya 
voiny' i revolutsii, M.1922, TsSU devoted a whole volume of its 
Trudy Tom XIII to the army during the War. Many authorities in­ 
cluding P.I.Popov cite from it, but the official TsSU bibliography
states that volume XIII of the Trudy was never published. (See 
E.A.Mashikhin and V.M.Simchera , Statisticheskiye publikatsii v SSSR
M.1975, p.66).
3. N.D.Kondratiev, ibid., M.1922, K.I.Zaitsev and N.V.Dolinsky,
'Organisation and Policy, in P.V.Struve (ed.) Food supply in Russia 
during the World War, Yale 1930.
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Here I will just give a very brief outline of the organisation and how 
it changed.
Popov provides us with the following data on the foodstuffs consumed 
by the army during the 191A/18 War:
Year
1914
1915
1916
1917
flour
0.39
1.94
3.47
3.65
groats
0,06
0.25
0.57
0.49
Oats 
Barley
0.86
2.52
4.83
2.87
All in 
equiva
1.34
4.87
9.23
7.37
Source: P.I.Popov, in Sel.Khoz. na putyakh vosstanovleniya, M.1925
p.28. Popov is citing'Rossiya v oiirovoi veiny* 1914-1918g., 
Trudy TsSU, Tom.XIII, p.60. (This is the volume which 
Mashikhin & Simchera tell us was never published, see 
above p. /pi ) .
It will be readily seen that fodder crops account for 64% of all 
military consumption in 1914, 52% in 1915, 52% in 1916, but only 39% 
in 1917.
If we were to apply the standard January 1916 rations to these 
data we would see that they were sufficient to feed the following numbers
of soldiers and horses, l
No,of soldiers 
from
flour groats 
Year data data
No.of horses
from
Oats &
Barley
data
Proportion
of soldiers to
horses according to
flour groats
data data
1914
1915
1916
1917
1.39
6.90
13.35
12.99
1.62
6.76
15.41
13.2
0.42
1.23
2.35
1.40
3.3
5.6
5.7
9.3
3.9
5.5
6.6
9.4
If we compare these data '-?ith the above estimates of number of 
soldiers in the army at given times we see that 1914 must have been the
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year of greatest food supply strain.
Given my earlier estimates of the size of the army at different 
periods, these present estimates would indicate that for most years 
v:ith the exception of 1914 the amount of food grains available were 
ample for the number of soldiers requiring to be fed:
Number of soldiers estimated 
from
Year
1914
1915
1916
1917
recruitment 
and loss 
data
2.00
7.00
10.00
9.00
from 
flour 
data
1.39
6.90
13.35
12.99
from 
groats 
data
1.62
6.76
15.41
13.20
However this assumption might be somewhat rash. It seems to me 
to have been quite likely that there was some substitution amongst the 
grains. It is quite likely that large quantities of barley were coll­ 
ected in 1914 primarily because of the unanticipated decline in barley 
exports. It would consequently have been relatively easy to collect barley 
in 1914, and the quantity of barley collected may well have been more than 
was required by the livestock, and so may well have been given to the 
soldiers. In later years when it became harder to collect fodder grains, 
it is quite likely that substantial quantities of rye and groats were 
fed to the horses.
One of the main problems with the above data is that t.k<y a/*'grouped 
according to calendar year and not according to agricultural year. No 
data are available for total military utilisation divided by crop year, 
but Kondratiev does provide us with a detailed account of monthly figures 
of grain transported to the army by the centralised transnoration system. 
These figures clearly do not include all military consumption but they 
do cover a large proportion of it, and enable us to see the seasonal 
incidence of the flow, and make the division between agricultural years.
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f) Changes in quantities of grain held in stocks
Grain was produced once a year but it was generally consumed through­ 
out the year and in some cases in the following years. Stocks were held 
by the producer, by the agencies involved in transferring the grain from 
the producer to the consumer, and by the consumer. There were long 
term reserve stocks which aimed at balancing, out the great annual variabil­ 
ity in production from year to year, and there were seasonal stocks which 
aimed at ensuring adequate supplies of grain until the appearance of the 
next year's harvest.
Little data are available on peasant producer stocks. The size of 
peasant stocks naturally featured in the peasant budget studies which 
were carried out. But there were no attempts to aggregate the results 
from all these various studies and an analysis of stocks was not included 
in Chayanov's survey. In his survey of pre-war grain forage balances 
P.I.Popov states that as a general rule the peasantry would aim at 
setting aside enough grain to satisfy their own utilisation needs for 15 
months after the harvest i.e. that apart from keeping the seasonal stock 
of his full requirements for the year, the peasant would aim at a reserve 
stock of 25% of these basic requirements. This assumption was presumably 
based on Popov's own experience in peasant budgets in Tula G, or on some 
other work.
The level of stocks held by private producers, and traders was
collected by the Department of Taxation (okladnyikh sborov) once a year
2 
on 1 July. P. I.Lyashchenko notes'" that there are several problems
involved in using these data. First, since these data were known to
1. P.I.Popov ibid., M.192A, pp. «T
2. See P.I.Lyashchenko, Ocherki agrarnoi evolutsii Rossii, Vol.1, M.1923 
p.194.
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be collected for taxation purposes and since they were based for the 
most part on unchecked and unchekable questionnaires, they can be 
expected to involve a considerable amount of concealment. Lyashchenko 
does admit that the taxation data for the larger trading establishments 
may be fairly reliable because the taxation officials did carry out 
periodic investigations of these larger traders. But most of the smaller 
traders and the private producers could rest assured that the taxation 
department just could not afford to investigate them. A second and 
even more serious problem, however, lay in the timing of the Department's 
investigation and the fact that it only occurred once a year. 
Lyashchenko points out that the Russian agricultural year was very 
irregular and that sometimes, depending upon agro-meteorological conditions, 
there would be quite considerable delays in the time of harvesting. In 
such delayed years the grain from the nex>7 harvest may not find its way 
into the stores of the traders and private producers until well after 
July 1 and probably after August 1. In anticipation of the delayed 
harvest the traders and producers would maintain their stocks relatively 
high until the new harvest appeared. A high level of stocks on July 1 
may not therefore simply indicate a high level of carry-over from one 
year to another, but might indicate a slow-down in the discharge of stocks 
in anticipation that there vas going to be a further lengthy period before 
stocks could be replenished. The true level of carry-over would then be 
indicated by the low point in stocks held, which would come later.
P. I. Lyashchenko therefore recommended that some official agency,; 
TsSK or the Department of Taxation, should carry out a series of periodic 
sample survey investigations, clearly advertising that they were not for 
taxation purposes, and that these should be used as a supplement to the 
more mass data to get a better picture of the stocks situation. Such 
a survey was in fact carried out on a semi-official basis by the journal
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Vestnik finansov. The journal received monthly reports from the 
managers of elevator and railway warehouses, from local stock exchange 
committees and from a network of other private correspondents. The 
Vestnik finansov data had been collected since 1897, and soon covered 
27 major markets, 5 main railway lines and most of the best equipped 
grain elevators . This was about 5% of the coverage of the Tax 
Department data. Compilations of these figures, given separately for 
each grain with little aggregation, are very bulky and so have not been 
included in this thesis.
The Tax Department data for the four main grains in the 64 gubernii
of European Russia and the North Caucasus are given in the following table
2 for the years from 1897-1910 :
Tax Department data on the stocks of grain held by major producers, traders, 
shops, and held in transit in mln.tons in 64 gubernii of European Russia and
North Caucasus.
All four 
Rye Wheat Barley Oats main grains
15/7/1897
98
99
1900
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
1910
Source:
1. See P.
5.92
3.54
2.97
3.94
4.34
2.75
3.05
2.95
3.70
2.53
1.40
1.46
1.53
2.57
Spravochnik po
I.Lyashchenko,
2.53
1.55
2.53
2.16
2.12
1.59
1.96
2.24
2.54
2.25
1.42
1.28
1.33
2.30
khlebnoi torgovlye
0.31
0.42
0.54
0.44
0.44
0.32
0.46
0.62
0.52
0.42
0.28
0.30
0.33
0.57
, SPb.1911
ibid., M. 1923, p. 195. The 27
0.95
0.57
0.59
0.87
0.79
0.44
0.67
0.55
1.10
0.82
0.38
0.39
0.40
0.83
,p.lOO
major
9.71
6.08
6.64
7.41
7.69
5.09
6.14
6.36
7.85
6.02
3.47
3.43
3.59
6.27
markets were:
Saint Petersburg,Revel,Riga,Libav,Warsaw,Voronezh,Kiev,Ye lyets,Lyivan, 
Moscow,Ryibinsk,N.Novgorod,Kazan,Chistopol,Verkhnyedeprovsk,Saratov, 
Tsaritsyn,Orenburg,Taganrog,Genichek,Novorossiisk,Rostov on Don,Mariupol, 
Berdyansk,Feodosiya,Odessa and Nikolaev. The railway elevators on the 
five main railway lines were on the: Kharkov/Nikolaevsk,Ryazan/Ural, 
South Western, Moscow/Kazan and Syirzan/Yazemskii railway lines.
The data supplied by P.I.Lyashchenko, in P.I.Lyashchenko ibid.,M.1923 
p.204, from unpublished Taxation Department data covered just 63 gubernii 
and the years 1896-1910. These data covering 64 gubernii were some from 
Scravochnik po khlebnoi torgovlye,SPb. 1911, p.100.
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These figures indicate fairly substantial changes in stock levels.
During the War the 1916 agricultural census provided the first 
census of grain stocks. This census was taken in July 1916 and provided 
the following data:
Grain stocks held on July 15, 1916
Social In
Pomeshchiki Peasants Traders §rain Transit Allstores
Non chernozem 
(21 Gub.)
SCR (9 Gub.)
Chernozem & 
N. Caucasus 
(29 Gub.)
Siberia & Steppe 
(6 Gub.)
All (65 Gub.)
Source: A.M.
0.05
-
0.54
0.06
0.65
0
0
1
0
2
Anfimov, Ros
voiny ., M.1962,
.41
.04
.54
.31
.30
siiskaya
0
0
1
0
2
.49
.05
.20
.27
.00
derevnya
0
0
0
0
1
V
p. 309, citing from
.21
.02
.67
.14
.03
gody
0
0
0
0
.17
-
.62
.01
.60
pervoi
the archives
1.
0.
4.
0.
6.
rairovoi
TsGIAL
31
11
38
79
59
F 23, op.9, d 970.
These figures would indicate that the producers had 2.95 million tons of 
grain left' before the 1916 harvest. This was less than 5% of the harvest 
and must have been significantly less than the three months of stocks 
claimed to be normal by Popov. But we should be careful in accepting 
the absolute reliability of these data.
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g) Data on grain exports
Relatively reliable and detailed records were kept by the 
Department of Customs and Excise (Glavnoye upravleniye bamozhennyikh 
sborov) of the quantities of grain exported. These statistics date 
back to long before regular and reliable indicators of grain production 
are available. The following table presents an indication of the size 
of grain exports according to type of grain for over two centuries 
before the First World War: see table over page,
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Pre-revolutionary grain exports from Russian Empire less Finland and Poland
Average Annual Exports in mln.tons
1701-1761
1762-1770
1771-1780
1781-1790
1791-1801
1801-1805
1806-1810
1811-1815
1816-1820
1821-1825
1826-1830
1831-1835
1836-1840
1841-1845
1846-1850
1851-1855
1856-1860
1861-1865
1866-1870
1871-1875
1876-1880
1881-1885
1886-1890
1891-1895
1896-1900
1901-1905
1906-1910
1911-1913
1913
Rye
0.0033
0.0076
0.0227
0.0147
0.0119
0.0763
0.1354
0.012
0.105
0.09
0.08
0.06
0.17
0.15
0.24
0.23
0.34
0.87
1.36
1.00
1.35
0.93
1.22
1.27
0.69
0.66
0.65
Wheat
0.0003
0.004
0.0119
0.0077
0.0271
0.1277
0.2845
0.138
0.222
0.176
0.4248
0.3521
0.5744
0.521
0.6246
0.8212
1.257
1.509
1.81
2.04
2.67
2.93
2.73
3.78
3.74
4.24
3.33
Barley
0.0001
0.0002
0.0006
0.0013
0.0023
0.003
0.028
0.01.2
0.0212
0.017
0.027
0.022
0.03
0.032
0.098
0.082
0.124
0.197
0.338
0.53
1.01
1.52
1.42
2.02
2.97
3.72
3.93
i
Oats
-
0.0005
0.0004
0.001
0.0016
0.0028
0.0381
0.0033
0.037
0.018
0.025
0.015
0.057
0.044
0.128
0.098
0.249
0.392
0.699
0.84
1.00
0.93
0.72
1.26
0.93
1.09
0.6
Total 
of 4 
grains
0.0037
0.0124
0.0356
0.0248
0.0429
0.2098
0.224
0.086
0.486
0.165
0.38
0.303
0.473
0.446
0.835
0.745
1.094
1.227
1.97
2.97
4.21
4.41
6.03
6.18
6.12
8.33
8,33
9.71
8.51
All grains
9.97
10.08
11.92
10.66
Source: 1701-1805, B.N.Mironov in Istoricheskiye ^apiski , no.93,M.1974 
pp.168-69; 1816-1900 P.l.Lyashchenko in Polnoe gntsiklopediya 
Russkogo selskogo fchozyaistva, Tom IX, vyp 1-2 SPb 1904,op.1227-29. 
1806-1815 computed from Den, Kurs gkon.freoprafii , M .1925, p. 184, 
Mironov and Lyashchenko, ibid.
1901-1913 P.I.LyashchenkOj Russkoe 2iernovoye khozyaistvo,M.1927,p.311
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It can be seen that until the beginning of the nineteenth century 
gross exports were less than 50,000 tons per year. In the second half 
of the second decade of the nineteenth century, in response to the last 
great famine to affect Western Europe, Russian grain exports rose to almost 
half a million tons. For the next quarter of a century Russian exports 
fell well below this level. After the repeal of the corn laws and the 
opening up of the British market in 1847 Russian grain exports began to 
grow rapidly. By 1860 they had exceeded a million tons Der year, by the 
1870s they were well over 2 million tons per year and by the 1860s well 
over A million tons per year. The railways and steamships then added a 
further boost to the level of grain exports which rose to well over 6 million 
tons in the 1890s, over 8 million tons in the first decade of the twentieth 
century and over 10 million tons on the eve of the war. This was a very 
large proportion of the total crop. From 1880-1913 the volume of exports 
fluctuated between 10% and 26% of the total harvest . For barley and wheat 
the proportion was much higher. In the eighteenth century rye was the 
major export crop. From the beginning of the nineteenth century rye 
exports were exceeded by wheat exports and on the eve of the First World 
War there had been a great increase in barley exports (barley exports actually 
exceeded wheat exports in 1913).
The shift in importance from rye exports to wheat and barley exports 
was also associated with a shift of agricultural production to the south and 
the opening up of the southern ports. If in the second half of the eight­ 
eenth century 73% of the grain was exported through the northern ports, by
1. Only in 1892, the year of the famine did it drop to below 10% 
and then only to 9%.
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the late 1870s this proportion had fallen to 63%, by the late 1880s to 
40%, by the end of the century to 36% and on the eve of War to as low 
as 30% .
Most of these figures are presented in the form, of calendar years. 
When we are dealing with periods of ten or even five years average length 
the use of calendar year data presents us with only a small margin of 
error, but when we are concerned with annual data we must be far more 
careful. A. series of data covering exports for the agricultural year 
(O.ctote," I - Sepcer«tf&*3&) ^ presented in the table on following 
page.
These data may compared with a more lengthy series of annual data 
in calendar year periods, supplied by Popov:
Pre-revolutionary grain exports from Russian Emnire less Finland
and Poland in mln.tons
1890
91
92
93
94
1895
96
97
98
99
ov '
6.85 .
6.41
3.22
6.62
10.48
9.41
8.3
8.01
7.52
5.66
Khlebofurazh
1900
01
02
03
04
1905
06
07
08
09
balans .
6.88
7.64
11.13
10.68
10.63
11.43
9.68
7.71
6.63
12.48
. . ' in
1910
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
13.9
13.5
9.04
10.66
6.18
0.00064
0.00069
0.00005
Selskoye khozyaistvo
1880 3.29
81 3.41
82 4.94
83 5.63
84 5.26
1885 5.63
86 4.71
87 6.44
88 8.97
89 7.64
na putyakh vosfcanovleniyfl.-, Tom 1, M.1925, p. 35.
The fluctuations in the agricultural year data are much more pronounced 
than in the calendar year data. The latter suffer the dampening effect
1. See Y.N.Mironov, Istor.Zaoiski, no.93, M.1974, p.168
P.I.Lyashchenko, Istoriya razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR, T.II, 
M.195, np.227-8. N.D.Kondratiev 'Rynok khlebov i ego regulirovanie 
vo vremya voini i revolutsii 1 M.1922, p.24.Note this is just 
considering the exports by sea from the Arctic, Baltic and Black Sea. 
In 1910 Kondratiev also draws attention to grain exports overland 
to the west, which at this time accounted for 11.5% of all grain 
exports. (See N.D.Kondratiev, ibid., p.24).
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Grain Exports in mln.tons, by agricultural year (1 OtC. - 3D
1395/96
1896/97
1897/98
1898/99
1899/1900
1900/01
1901/02
1902/03
1903/04
1904/05
1905/06
1906/07
1907/03
1908/09
1909/10
1910/11
1911/12
1912/13
1913/14
1914/15
Wheat
2.16
2.51
3.86
4.19
5.25
4.14
2.65
1.54
3.14
6.47
5.69
2.26
Rye
1.40
1.37
1.65
1.14
0.87
0.98
0.91
0.66
0.41
0.59
1.11
0.38
Oats
1.33
0.91
1.32
0.48
2.05
1.48
0.43
0.41
0.90
1.36
1.57
0.78
Barley
1.09
1.48
2.23
2.48
2.40
2.33
2.17
2.44
3.41
3.77
0.45
2.85
others
1.24
2.10
1.80
1.63
1.48
1.28
1.56
1.62
1.74
1.77
2.64
2.46
All 
grains
8.11
7.99
8.25
5.38
6.50
7.22
8.37
10.86
9.92
12.05
10.20
7.71
6.67
9.61
13.96
15.50
8.73
9.76
4 main 
grains
5.98
6.27
9.06
8.29
10.57
8.92
6.15
5.05
7.87
12.19
12.86
6.27
Sources: 1895/6 - 1911/12 all grains from Sel.khoz.promysel v 
Rossii, P.1914, p.126.
1900/1 - 1911/2 by grain from Sbornik statistiko-ekonom-
icheskikh svedenii po sel.khoz.Rossii i inostrannyikh 
gosudarstvo SPb.1914, p.336
Data from the Department of Customs and Excise 
(Tamozhennyikh sborov)
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of including the effect of two years' harvests.
Lyashchenko provides us with the following indication of the seasonal 
pattern of grain transfers to the ports: see table below
1897-1904 Seasonal transfer of Wheat, 
Rye, and Oats to the ports for export
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
M .1923, p. Z11
in mln.tons
0.19
7 0.17
0.19
0.27
0.29
0.18
0.16
0.38
 0.47
0.46
 0.32
 0.33
3.41
Ocherki agrarnoi evoluts
in %
5.6%
5.0%
5 . 6%
7.9%
8.5%
5.3%
4.7%
11.1%
13.8%
13.5%
9.4%
9.7%
100.0%
ii Rossii,
It can readily be seen that the months from August to December, immediately 
after the harvest were the times of maximum transfers of grain to the ports. 
But this does not mean that the grain was actually exported in these months 
or that the exports of these months were sufficient to ensure that the 
calendar year in which the harvest took place was the one most affected by 
the size of the crop.
I have carried out a few simple correlations between the production 
data for 1900-1911 and the exports for a) immediately follovjing the 
harvest( C^t-*?^^ - 3-c^t-ff^Cf^ the agricultural year, b) the calendar 
year in which the harvest took place and c) of the calendar year following
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th e harvest. The correlation coefficients for each of these cases were:
a) R2 = 0.783
b) R2 = 0.278
c) R2 = 0.442
These results emphasise the importance of dealing with the export 
data in agricultural year periods, and failing this the data for the 
calendar year following the year in which the harvest took place ar^ preferable 
to the calendar year in which the harvest took place.
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h) Losses
The importance of the losses item depends largely upon the definition 
of grain production utilisation used . For a biological yield the losses 
item would clearly include harvesting losses and losses involved in the 
transportation to the barn. Even if we were dealing vith the barn yield, 
unless a specific account of the 'condition' of the grain were made at the 
time of harvest 'losses' could occur simply because of the subsequent 
drying-out or cleaning of the grain. Apart from the above mentioned 
losses, losses could occur during storage and during trans-shipment due 
to spoilage and wastage. Depending upon how it was calculated losses 
could occur in milling, although generally the bran and other residuals 
should have been kept and fed to the animals as millfeed. And finally 
we have to consider losses in utilisation. Not all grain presented as 
food, or feed, was consumed. In a peasant household stale bread might 
be fed to the animals, but in other cases it might just be thrown out.
Generally, in the grain forage balances which are being presented in 
this paper, losses will refer to losses in storage and transportation and 
not to the other possible kinds of loss. In most cases this loss is set 
as an arbitrary percentage. Some reference may be made to a residual, 
but the accuracy of the balance and the nebulous quality of many of the 
elements in it give this little justification.
-177-
i) Transportation data
Pre-revolutionary statistics on grain transportation were collected
by two central organs: the department of railways of the Ministry of
Finance and the statistical department of the Ministry of Communications.
The former agency was mainly concerned with overseeing overall organisation
of transportation.
Both agencies relied upon the basic data supplied in the annual and
monthly reports of the railway operators and of the different port author­ 
ities for waterway and maritime transportation .
Although there is an abundance of pre-revolutionary grain transport­ 
ation statistics I have not attempted to recompute all these basic data 
into my comparable regions. This would be a major task, which cannot 
be undertaken at the moment. I have therefore restricted myself to 
providing a few indications of the overall patterns of grain transportation 
and have only presented more detailed regional figures where they are fairly 
readily available from secondary sources.
Traditionally in Russia, it was the rivers that were the main arteries 
for grain transportation. The major river was the Volga which linked the 
agricultural regions of the Volga, SamaraG., Saratov G., Penza G., Simbirsk 
G., with the northern industrial regions, with transhipments at Nizhegorod 
for Moscow or at Rybinsk for St .Petersburg via the Marie, skii canal. The 
Dnepr and the Don in the south were already supplying some grain to the 
Black Sea ports but their great period lay ahead with the development of 
the railways.
The following table presents an indication of the magnitude of grain 
transported on the river system for several years, spanning the period from
the 1880s to the beginning of the twentieth century:
1. See Istoriya Sovetskoi ffosudarstvennoi &tatistiki, M.1960, p.153
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Grain transported by rivers in Russia in million tons.
1837/38
1844-54
1854
1859-62
1863
1895
1396
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
Sources :
Volga
1.29
0.81
1.46
1.16
0.98
1.89
2.13
2.29
2.31
1.43
2.46
2.87
1.98
2.37
2.93
3.83
2.81
1.85
2.04
1837/38, 1854
krestyanstvo.
1844/54, 1863 
Evropyeiskoi
1895-1908 P.I
Dnepr
0.02
0.17
0.07
0.96
0.71
0.66
0.68
0.57
0.40
0.46
0.74
1.19
1.18
1.07
0.76
0.81
0.66
, 1859-62.
.. M.1967, p
I.Vilson, 
Rossii, SPb
Don
0.05
0.07
0.10
0.33
0.34
0.43
0.43
0.42
0.49
0,37
0.39
0.55
0.64
6.65
0.28
0.27
0.37
Other
0.26
0.41
0.25
0.55
0.49
0.43
0.43
0.27
0.32
0.55
0.54
0.64
0.47
0.45
0.76
0.43
0.42
All
1.62
2.11
1.58
1.85
3.73
3.67
3.81
3.85
2.69
3.67
4.25
3.65
4.75
5.22
6.00
4.61
3.36
3.49
I. D .Kovalchenko, Russkoye krepostnoye.94. ——————————————— 
Obyasneniya
1869, p. 171.
.Lyashchenko, Khlebnaya
k khoz.stat
torgovlya na
.atlasu
vnutrenniykh
rynkakh Evropyeiskoi Rossii, SPb 1912, p.19.
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The amount of grain recorded as transported on the Volga had risen 
from a level of 0.8 - 1,5 million tons a year in the first half of the 
nineteenth century to a figure averaging 2.4 million tons a year, at the 
end of the century. The Dnepr and the Don had risen somewhat in importance 
but still only transported an average of a million tons between them a year. 
This relatively low development was of course because of the emergence 
of an alternative means of transportation - the railways. The first 
railway of any economic significance was the Nikolaevskii railway connecting 
the regions of the Central Chernozem region with Moscow and then on to 
St.Petersburg. The first grain began arriving by rail in Moscow in 1860, 
by the end of that decade both Moscow and St.Petersburg were annually 
receiving 0.3 million tons of grain by rail a year. By the turn of the 
century Moscow was receiving from 0.5 to 0.7 million tons of grain a year 
by rail and the Moscow Industrial region was receiving over 1 million tons . 
Grain transported by rail in mln.tons:
haulage for internal 
export „ haulage all
1876-80
1881-85
1886-90
1891-95
1896-1900
1901-05
1906-10
1911-13
1895
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
2.
3.
3.
3.
5.
6.
7.
6.
6.
6. 
4. 
5. 
4. 
5.
5.
7.
7.
6.
7.
6.
5.
5.
10.
64
20
86
59
21
83
58
76
14
12 
81 
08 
53 
51
54
27
22
00
28
88
68
17
16
1
2
3
4
4
5
7
7
3
3
3 
4 
4 
4
4
5
5
.97
.82
.05
.21
.86
.37
.12
.03
.60
.70 
.50 
.31 
.67 
.86
.90
.16
.90
4
6
6
7
10
12
14
13
9.
9. 
8. 
9. 
9. 
10.
10.
12.
13.
.61
.01
.91
.80
.07
.20
.70
.79
74
82 
31 
39 
20 
37
44
43
12
in % haulage internal 
for export haulage in %
57.3%
53.2%
55.9%
46.0%
51.7%
56.0%
51.6%
49.0%
42.7%
46.8%
44.1%
54.0%
48.3%
44.0%
48.4%
51.0%
Sources: 1876-80/1911-13 
P. I. Lyashchenko in 
Entsiklopediya Russkogo ^ksporta,
Tom 1, Berlin 1924, p. 112.
1895-1909
P.I. Lyashchenko ,
Khlebnaya torgovlya na
vnutrennyikh rynkakh Evropveiskoi
5
7
7
7
7
.52
.00
.47
.23
.03
12.
13.
13.
12.
17.
80
88
15
40
19
Rossii , SPb.I912, p. 11.
1. See P.I.Lyashchenko, Ocherki agrarnoi evolutsii Rossii Vol.1,M.IQ?I pp 231-2
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The following figures indicate the remarkably rapid growth in rail 
transportation of grain. Already in the 1870s more grain was being 
transported by rail than by waterways. And whereas the amount transported 
by rail more than tripled before the war, the amount transported by water­ 
ways remained fairly steady once the railways had been built.
These figures also indicate the very large proportion of transported 
grain that was being transported for export. During this period the whole 
nature of the grain export business was greatly changed and expanded, 
whereas before the 1870s the northern ports had dominated the export market 
by the 1890s the railways had turned the south into the major export region.
Grain transported to ports in mln.tons 
Northern Ports Southern Ports Overland route German Ports All
1876
1878
1880
1895-99
1900-05
1906-10
Source:
1.2
1.8
1.2
1.9
2.1
1.9
0.5
1.4
0.4
2.5
3.3
4.5
cited from T.M.Kiutanina 
L.1978, pp. 55, 56 citing
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.6
0.5
, Khlebnaya torgovlya
0.4
0.5
0.6
Rossii v 1875
5.3
6.5
7.5
-1914gg
A.D.Bilimovich Tovarnoe dvizheniye
na russkikh zheleznyikh dorogakh, Kiev, 1902
Haterialy k
vyp.Il, p. 55
peresmotru
»
torgovogo dogavora s
, p. 71 and 
Germaniyei . SPb .1914,
More detailed regional transportation data have only been reworked 
into regional groups for a few odd years.
Data from the 1896 Tariff Congress provide; us with the following 
picture of the 1895 internal grain rail transport balance £ t* mittie*
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Receipts Despatch Net Despatch
NCR
SPR
CPR
excluded regions 
(Baltic, Poland)
All
Source :
1
0
0
0
2
.69
.15
.31
.29
.44
P.I .Lyashchenko,
0
0
1
0
2
.19
.69
.55
.01
.44
Ocherki . . . ,
-1
+0
+1
0
.50
.54
.24
.28
M.1923, p. 2
Note: This balance excludes exported grain 
Two balances for 1901 and 1913, which were constructed by I.Poplavsky,
the head of the department of transport statistics in TsSU, in the 1920s 
allow 'I us to see the changes in the balance over a longer period. There 
are of course problems involved in accepting these years as being in any 
way typical, 1912 and 1913 were particularly good harvest years while 1900
and 1901 were- rather poor. But nevertheless they do provide an indication 
of developments. The balance item indicates the scale of net despatches 
from the given region (i.e. despatches-receipts):
Grain transport balances net despatches in mln.tons
including 
foreign trade
excluding 
foreign trade foreign trade
NCR
SCR
SPR
CPR
EPR
All USSR
1901
-2.85
+0.18
+4.63
+2.31
+0,20
+4.48
1913
-4.33
+ 1.33
+ 8.25
+1.49
+0.76
+9.30
1901
-2.98
-0.47
+ 2.13
+2.31
+0.20
+1.18
1913
-4.82
+0.35
+ 1.36
+1.49
+0.90
+1.08
1901
+0.13
+0.65
+2.50
0
0
+ 3.30
1913
+0.69
+0.98
+6.89
0
-0.14
+ 8.22
Source: Trudy TsSU, Tom XIX, vyp.II, M.1925, pp.6-11
From these figures we see the increase in scale of net receipts of
r
grain by the NCR, rising from 1.5 million tons in 1896 to 2.9 million tons 
in 1901 and 4.3 million tons in 1913 . Most of this amount came from the
1. I have deducted the 0.1 and 0.5 million tons that were re-exported in 
1901 and 1913.
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CPR, but almost an equal amount came from the SPR in 1901 and 1913, and 
almost 0.9 million tons came from the EPR» Most of the exports came 
from the SPR at this time as was to be expected. Almost 1 million tons 
were exported from the SCR in 1913, but this seems to have been exceptional. 
The SCR exported grain also in 1901 but this left it with a need to import 
grain for its own consumption needs.
Apart from these balances we also have a most detailed grain trans­ 
portation balance for 1909/13 that was constructed for the special food 
council, to assist in the task of planning food supply in 1916.
This balance was calculated for the separate grains in the separate 
regions. Unfortunately, a regional breakdown was not given for all the 
elements of all the grains and it is therefore best to consider only the 
4 main grains. These however do comprise the bulk of the transported grain 
The results of this balance for the 4 main grains are given in the following
table:
Net despatches of grains in 1909/13 in million tons
Export
. . ab r o ad H main . . .:.,»-~ __„i 4 main internal
1. NCR
2. SCR
3. SPR
4. CPR
5. EPR 
All USSR
*» ilt. d L-
gy^in
-0.6
+4.0
+0.9
-0.1
+4.2
w 1 1 c: a <- 
f 1 OUT
+0.7
+2.0
+1.4
+0.8
+4.9
^j*~
"-0.6
+0.6
+0.3
+0.4
+0.6
^vjr t.
f 1 nnr
-0.9
+0.1
+0.7
+0.2
+0.1
Oats
-0.7
+0.2
+1.5
+0.3
+1.3
Barley
-0.1
+3.7
0
0
+3.6
grains
-2.1
+ 10.5
+4.8
+ 1.5
+14.8
*-t nidiii 
grains
+0.6
+7.8
+0.1
-0.3
+8.2
transfi
-2.7
+2.7
+4.7
+ 1.8
+6.6
er
Source: See data cited in V.G.Groman Khlebnaya produktsiya i khlebnyi 
gksport Rossii, in Entsiklopediya Russkogo '^ksporta, Tom 1, 
Berlin 1924, pp.162-73. The data initially came from 
Materialyl k prodovolstvennomu planu. Proizvodstvo perevozki 
i potrebleniye khlebov v Rossii, Petrograd 1917, vyp.I. 
See appendix.
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Again we see the SPR dominating the export market, white the CPR 
commands two-thirds of the internal transported grain. In both regions 
wheat is the largest single grain in the transport balance, over 60% 
of the total for 4 grains in the SPR and 48% in the CPR. In the former 
two-thirds of the wheat is exported in the unprocessed grain from which 
in the CPR over 60% is exported as flour. The CPR was the largest 
supplier of Rye and Oats both of which went to the internal market. The 
SPR as well as being by far the largest supplier of wheat was also the 
only supplier of barley. These were both major export grains.
Further figures characterising the regional rail grain balance are 
available for war years and are given below. These data are in different 
regionalisations not easily comparable with the earlier series of data. 
They lare also very incomplete for 1916 and 1917. Theyindicate a further 
slight increase in grain transhipments into the NCR from 1913 to 1915 but 
a decrease in surpluses transported out of the CPR in these years.
NCR
SPR
CPR
EPR
All
Source: 
Note:
1913
-2.62
+1.75
+2.76
+0.33
+2.21
Trudy TsSU TOTT,
1914
-2.90
+ 1.39
+2.33
+0.48
+ 1.29
VI, vyp.2
figures refer to internal
1915
-2.91
+ 1.72
+ 1.81
+0.16
+0.78
1916
-2.07* 
(-2.3)
+2.21* 
(+0.8)
+1.57
+0.07
+ 1.73
, M.1923, pp. 169-76 
transportation only
* refers to extremely unreliable data and figures 
in brackets are estimates for the balance when 
the missing values have been filled in by inter­ 
polation.
All these series of data indicate the growing specialisation of the 
regions and the increasing dependence of the NCR on grain imports.
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4. Grain nroduction, the available data
This chapter is divided into 6 sections. Sections a) to d) 
introduce the different series of grain production data covering different 
periods, and generally include a regional breakdown.
Section a) is designed to give an indication of the long-term 
nerspective of changes in the level of grain nroduction; Section b) 
reviews the available secondarv series of detailed grain production data 
covering the nineteenth century. Section c) presents an indication 
of the annual dynamic of grain nroduction in the 30 years before the 
First World War. Section d) presents the data on the level of x^artime 
grain production.
The following two sections then consider other significant aspects 
of grain production - e) the production of the different grains and 
f) the different types of producer.
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a) Strumilin's illustrative estimation of the dynamic of grain 
yields since the third century
The most ambitious attempt to provide an indication of the dynamic 
of pre-revolutionary grain production was that given by the Soviet 
economist S.G.Strumilin in 1949 . This survey covered Russian 'grain' 
production from the third to the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Basing his account on the details of a few estates in the feudal and 
pre-feudal period, and upon the work of Mikhailovsky and the data of 
TsSK (both of which I will refer to later in this section) Strumilin 
provided the following 'illustrative estimation' (illustrativnvi raschet)
The Dynamic of Grain Yields in Prussia
Social Stage and 
System of 
Agriculture
Main 
Implements Date
Grain Production in 
tsentners per hectare
Gross Feed
1, Pre-feudal
a) Slash & burn Axe & wooden C3rd-4th
2.
3.
1.
harroxc
Feudal
b) Three fields Sokha,
system Sickle
& flail
Capitalist
c) Multi field Plough &
rotation horse
system machinery
S.G. Strumilin in K istori
Voprosi Ekonomiki , 1949,
Ocherki Ekonomicheskoi Is
until 17th
C12th
1642
1850-60
1885-1889
1Q09-13
i zemledelcheskogo
no. 2, reproduced in
torii Hossii i SSSR
2.8
4.2
4.2
4.5
4.9
5.9
7.4
truda,
c r c
V> . \J . I •
, ^.19
1.4
2.0
2.o
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
in 
trumi lin,
66, p. 186
1.4
2.2
2.2
2.5
3.0
4.0
5.4
.
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Of course it could be argued that there are few grounds for 
generalising the production pattern of the whole of Russia on the 
basis of a few estate reports. But on the other hand this is the 
evidence that medieval historians are normally forced hack into 
relying upon . Strumilin himself called this an illustrative indicator 
and it does indicate an order cf magnitude which is believable. 
b) Data from the Governor's annual accounts 
i) The Fortunatov/Mikhailovskv yield data, 1800-1915
The longest series of pre-revolutionary data, based upon organised 
statistics covering a large national area are those from the provincial 
governors' accounts; these span the whole of the nineteenth century.
A series of rye yields for the fifty provinces of European Russia from
2 1801-1891 had been published by A.F.Fortunatov in the early 1890s and
this series was updated by V.G.Mikhailovsky and published in the TsSU 
bulletin of 1921, as part of the work commissioned by TsSU at the time
in connection with an analysis of the drought of 1921 and of harvest
3 fluctuations in general .
1. See B.H.Slicher Van Bath, The Agrarian History of Western Europe
A.D. 500-1850, Edward Arnold, 1963, pp.170-80, see also R.E.F.Smith, 
Peasant farming in Muscovy, Cambridge 1977, pp.84-95.
2. A.F.Fortunatov, Urozhai rzhi v Evropyeiskoi Rossii, M.1893
3. See Byulletgn TsSU, 1921, no.50. There seems to be some uncertainty 
as to exactly x^hat area and what crops were covered. ^ikhailovsky's 
article was very short and the figures were always referred to 
as representing the yield of 'grain' in 'Russia'. The collegium 
of TsSU had requested Mikhailovskv to publish a longer and more 
detailed account of his work in their journal Vestnik Statistiki, 
but this was never completed. Having checked the sources, it 
seems to me that Mikhailovsky has combined Fortunatov's series for 
rye yields with a later series for all grains, vhich would give an 
upward distortion in the post 1890 period for the growth in rye 
yields. (See later) The figures as given by Mikhailovsky are 
also available in A.Chayanov (ed.) Problemy urozhai, M.1926, P.35.
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The dynamic as presented by Mikhailovsky is given in the appendix 
and in the table below:
Yield of grain in Russia in Sam (units produced per unit of seed)
1
i
'
1 
1i 1 ii ! ! : -*.'.-..-i ,i
i
i
i
i ! . t ;. i • 1 ;
'i > i " i i '1 • i "i- > i ;
tt-fiK- E r.o
These data clearly indicate the great annual variability in grain 
yields and the long run trend. Until the 1850s the average yield 
remained about 3.5 per unit seed used. Thereafter it rose steadily 
to over 5,5 t»er unit seed used on the eve of the War.
-188-
ii) Kovalchenko grain production data 1800-1850
More recently Soviet historians have examined the same source of 
data and have presented a much more detailed series. In 1959 I.D. 
Kovalchenko published the results of his detailed reworking of the 
provincial governors' annual accounts of the state of agriculture at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century . Kovalchenko analysed the 
•production figures in 48 provinces of European Russia for three decades: 
1802-11, 1842-50 and 1851-60. His results were grouped into 13 regions, 
but have been regrouped by me into only 4 major regions. Throughout
this thesis an attempt will be made to cut the regional data down to a
2 manageable size and to deal with roughly comparable major regions .
1. See I.D.Kovalchenko, Dinanika urovnye zemledelcheskogo proizvodsvta 
dossil v pervoi polovinye XIX v., in Istoriya SSSR, 1959, no.l 
pp. Much of these data were subsequently reproduced in I.D. 
Kovalchenko, Russkoye Krepostno-g. Krestyanstvo v pervoi polovinye 
XIX.I veka. M.1967.
2. See the special appendix on regions for a detailed account of 
the major regions used in this thesis and the methods by which 
other regional data hav^been converted into these regions. 
Basically we are dealing with five major regions: two consumer 
regions where grain has to be imnorted from other regions and 
three producer regions where grain was normally in surolus. The 
two consumer regions are: 1) the Northern Consumer Region (NCR) 
consisting of the northern, north westerly, and western gubernii 
as well as the Central Industrial Region and Belorussia; 2) 
the Southern Consumer Region (SCR) consisting of Transcaucasia and 
Turkestan (Central Asia). The three producer regions are: 3) 
The Southern Producer Region (SPR) consisting of the Ukraine and 
North Caucasus, 4) The Central Producer Region (CPR) consisting 
of the central agricultural region (Central Chernozem) and the ^ T olga 
regions, and finally 5) the Eastern Producer Region (EPR) consisting 
of the Urals, Siberia, the Steppe region (Kazakhstan) and the 
maritime region (Far Eastern Region). Of these regions the SCR, 
the North Caucasus and all the EPR at>art from some of the Urals are 
not included in the 50 gubernii of European Russia.
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The dynamic of grain production in the different regions of European 
Russia in the beginning of the nineteenth century, according to 
Kovalchenko's data are given in the table below:
NCR SPR CPR EPR USSR
1802/11
Production
Sowings 
Yield
57.23
19.42 
2.95
29.53
7.90 
3.74
59.16
16.71 
3.54
8,94
3.00 
2.98
154.85
47.04 
3.29
1841/50 
Production 
Sowings 
Yielcf
1851/60 
Production 
Sowings 
Yields
Source 
Notes:
56.19
20.16
2.79
34.22
9.21
3.71
76.48
22.32
3.43
21.12
6.06
3.48
188.01
57.76
3.26
54.81
20.59
2.66
36.13
10.14
3.56
79.12
23.79
3.33
23.81
6.92
3.44
193.87
61.44
3.16
I.D.Kovalchenko, see appendix
Production and sowings are given in mln.chetvert and 
yield in 'sam*.
In order to make these data a little more meaningful I have 
converted the production data into million tons and have also calculated 
the level of per capita production:
Production 
in mln.tons. SPR CPR EPR USSR
1802/11
1841/50
1851/60
7.21
7.08
6.91
3.72
4.31
4.55
7.46
9.64
9.97
1.13
2.66
3.00
19.51
23.69
24.43
Per capita 
production 
in mln.tons
1802/11 
1841/50 
1851/60
0,503 
0.414 
0.408
0.430 
0.370 
0.374
0.668 
0.632 
0.614
0.379 
0.530 
0.525
0.525 
0.483 
0.479
Source: I.D.Kovalchenko, see appendix.
Note: per capita figures refer to r>er capita of the rural 
population.
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These figures indicate the very unfavourable manner in which 
Russian agriculture was developing during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, Kovalchenko's data indicate that there was 
a decline in yields in all regions apart from the relatively minor 
EPR. The 25% rise in production over this period was consequently 
totally a consequence of the increase in sowings, but this was far 
from sufficient to cover the rapid growth in population. There was 
an overall decline in rural t>er capita production by about 9" over 
this period. The sharpest decline vas in the "C?,, where there vas 
almost a 20°! decline. Thanks to its rapid increase in so^inzs as well 
as yields the IIPR experienced almost a trebling of its production over 
this period and an increase in per capita production by over 38^. 
The other tx^o producer regions sax-7 a decline in per capita production, 
although not as much as in the NCR. In the Ukraine (SP r' ) there was 
a 13% decline in rural per capita production, while in the CPR there was 
an 8% decline.
This picture is much more dismal than the one that appears from 
an analysis of the Fortunatov Mikhailovsky yield data. I have calculated 
the comparable yields from the latter data and have compared them with 
the yields from Kovalchenko's data in the table below:
Yield in T sam' from 
Fortunatov/ 
Year Mikhailovsky Kovalchenko
0707
/O / G
1802/11 3.50 100 3.29 100
1841/50 3-60 102.9 3.26 99.1
1851/60 3.65 104.3 3.16 96.0
Source: See appendix and tables above.
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In as much as we know that Kovalchenko's figures refer to 
comparable regions I would recommend the acceptance of Kovalchenko's 
data in preference to the Fortunatov/Mikhailovsky series . 
iii) The Nifontov/Pronin grain production data 1850-1900
In the 1970s tx^o other Soviet historians carried the investigation 
of the data included in the annual accounts of the provincial governors 
further,to the end of the nineteenth century. A.S.Nifontov 
analysed grain production in the 50 gubernii of European Russia from
1850-1900 using the data in the governors' accounts from 1850-1882 and
2 the basic TsSK data from 1883-1900". Apart from his rough regional
3 breakdown (which I have adar>ted) Nifontov provides data for the
different grains that were sown and for the different kinds of producers: 
the peasants working their allotments and the landowners on their estates 
(see following sections e) below). Nifontov also considers the 
available utilisation data and constructs a rough utilisation balance 
(see following chapter) ^
Nifontov's data on the 50 gubernii of European Russia can be supp­ 
lemented by the data which Pronin has more recently published covering 
grain production and utilisation in Siberia . Pronin 1 s data are much 
less detailed than Nifontov's. No annual figures are given and there is 
no breakdown according to type of grain or to type of producer.
1. It seems to me to be doubtful whether the explanation of the 
difference could be simnly in terms of the different trains 
covered. The decline in yields in the NCR where rye vould 
predominate appears to have been the largest regional decline.
2. A.S.Nifontov, Zernovoye proizvodstvo Rossii vo vtoroi polovinye
XIX veka,po materialam ezhegodnoi statistiki urozhavev Evronyeskoi 
Rossii, M.197A
3. See appendix
4. V.I.Pronin, Dinamika urovnya zemledelcheskogo proizvodstva sibiri 
vo vtoroi polovinye XlX-nachalye XX veka, in Istoriya SSSR, 1977, 
no.4, on.58-75.
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Nevertheless in its major outlines it can be easily integrated with 
Nifontov's data, and thereby allows our detailed regional analysis of 
grain production to be carried back to 1850 for European Russia and
Siberia . Let us consider first Nifontov's annual grain production
2 data. Nifontov's implicit yield data for all grains in the 50
gubernii of European Russia are cornoared with Mikhailovsky's yield data
3in the following diagram The close correlation between the two series
is readily visible, especially for the period fror^. the mid 1880s onwards 
For the earlier period Mikhailovsky's data appear, to be consistently 
higher than Nifontov's data, although following the same fluctuations.
1. It is to be hoped that a study of grain production and utilisation 
in the North Caucasus will soon
2. The yield data in 'saV have been calculated from Nifontov's
production and seed data, both of which were given in chetvert.
3. See appendix for actual figures. In the appendix annual data 
also for grain production, sowings and yields with a breakdown 
according to winter and spring crains.
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This would tend to confirm that the pre-1883 data refers to rye yields 
only, while the later data refer to yield for all grains. The yields 
of rye and winter grains in general were higher than those for spring 
grains (and therefore the all grain average) at this time .
The effect of combining an early rye yield series with a later all 
grain yield series , was to slightly deflate the extent of growth of grain 
yields in this period. It is recommended that where available Nifontov's 
data be preferred to that of Mikhailovsky. Nifontov's data d^e in any 
case available in more detail as will be seen belov. .However, in as 
much as Nifontov's coverage only goes back as far as 1850, and for 
individual years for sown area and yield only back to 1861, an attempt 
has been made to deflate the Mikhailovsky yield data for the 1850s and 
to use it in combination with the Nifontov production data in order to 
carry our analysis of annual data back to the decade before the peasant 
emancipation.
The following graphs show the changing levels of grain production, 
grain yields and grain sown area in the 50 gubernii of European Russia
from 1851-1900. The data upon which they are based and their sources
2 
are given in the appendix .
it especially the yield data are readily visible. Tn the graphs I have
The great' fluctuations in the annual series of all these elements
bu-
also indicated the average levels for the different decades. Most of 
the more detailed data is only available for these ten-year groups and so 
it is advisable to see just what these ten-year averages are covering 
before we get involved in more detailed regional or sectoral . data. The 
yield data art highly cyclical with at least two cycles ner decade and
1. See apnendix
2. See
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sometimes more. Some of the cycles were of very great amplitude and 
caused great problems with the severity of their dox^n-swing. The 
trough of 1891, which resulted in the 1391/92 famine is the most obvious 
case. But the effect of this dox-m-swing is completely lost in the 
averages. The doxro-swing associated x^ith the 1891/92 famine could be 
dated from the 1889 harvest to the 1892 harvest, affecting all four 
'years. 1889 and 1890 fall within the 1880s decadal period and are fairly 
x^ell reflected in the decadal level. But the more serious years of 
1891 and 1892 fall x^ithin the 1890s decadal period and are totally 
masked by the good harvests later on in the decade. The decadal aver­ 
ages show a remarkably rapid growth in yield from the 188Os to the 1890s 
and no hint at all of the discontinuity and disturbances caused by the 
1891/92 famine.
The sown area data Qf£ more regular, but the discontinuities, the 
troughs of the late 1860s and the early 1890s stand out all the more for 
that. The early 1890s decline is again totally off-set by the rise in 
the late 1890s and finds no reflection at all in the decadal averages. 
The decline in the late 1860s however does find a slight reflection in the 
1860s average data.
The Nifontov and Pronin data in decade averages will be presented 
and analysed below in this section. And they xcill certainly be very 
useful in providing us with an indication of the long term trends in 
grain production. But because most of the detail in these series is 
given in decade averages only I have had to resort to compiling my ox^n 
detailed annual data when T wish to analyse the nature of the individual 
production and utilisation crises x^ithin this period. This annual data 
on a regional basis from 1883-1914 together with Nifontov's annual data
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for the 50 ^ubernii of Eurooean Prussia will be presented and analysed 
in the next section.
An indication of the regional distribution of grain production and 
the changes in its pattern for decade averages from the 1850s and in 
comparison with Kovalchenko's earlier ficures, is given in the following 
table:
Grain production in mln.tons from Nifontov and Pronin's data for the 
European part of Russia and Siberia 1S50-1900 in mln.tons.
1802/11
1840s
1850s
1850s
1860s
1870s
1880s
1890s
1900s
1905-15
NCR(K)
7.21
7.08
6.91
NCR(N)
6.90
6.89
7.17
8.06
8.92
8.88
10.31
SPR(K)
3.72
4.31
A. 55
SCR SPR(N)
5.15
5.69
7.35
9.85
14.09
20.27
25.41
CPR(K)
7.46
9.64
9,97
CPR(N)
10.86
11.78
12.89
14.11
14.32
16.03
18.62
EPR(K)
1.13
2.66
3.00
EPR(N&P)
3.48
3-46
4.19
4.87
6.49
6.96
9.17
USSR(K)
19.51
23.69
24.43
USSR-SCR
26.39
27.81
31.59
36.89
43.82
52.14
63.51
Sources : See appendix 
The change in share of the different regions can readily be seen from
the following table:
NCR(K)
1802/11 37.0% 
1840s 29.9% 
1850s 28.3%
SPR(K) 
19.1% 
12.2% 
18.6%
CPR(K) 
38.2% 
^0.7% 
40.8%
EPR(KJ
5 .8% 
11.2%
12.3%
USSR 
100% 
100%
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NCR(N) SCR SPR(N7 ) CPR(N) EPR(N&P) USSR-SCR
1850s
1860s
1870s
1880s
1890s
1900s
1905-15
26 . 1%
24.8%
22.7%
21.8%
20.3%
17.0%
16.2%
19.5%
20.5%
23.3%
26.7%
32.2%
38.9%
40.0"
41.2%
42.4%
40.8%
38.2%
32.7%
30.7%
29.3%
13.2%
12.4%
13.3%
13.2%
14.8%
13.3%
14.4%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
We see a sharp decline in the importance of the CPR and NCR and 
a corresponding sharp increase in the significance of SPR after the 
1860s. The EPR after its rapid increases at the beginning of the 
century keeps about the same proportions throughout the second half of 
the century. Within the CPR it is the Central Chernozem region which 
falls the most (from 24.3% of all production in the 1850s to 15.6% 
in 1905-15) while the Volga regions fall less (from 17.2% in the 1850s 
to 13.7% in 1905-15) 1 .
In terms of changes in per capita production we see the following 
dynamic:
NCR(K) SPR(K) CPR(K) EPR(K) USSR(K)
1802/11
1840s
1850s
1850s
1860s
1870s
1880s
1890s
Sources :
Note :
0.503 0.430
0.414 0.370
0.408 0.374
NCR(N) SPR(N)
0.404 0.396
0.390 0.392
0.373 0.459
0.378 0.513
0.362 0.578
see appendices
these figures are
0.668
0.632
0.614
CPR(N)
0.602
0.625
0.626
0.585
0.555
per capita of
0.379 0.525
0.530 0.483
0.525 0.479
EPR(N&P) USSR(N&P)
0.528 0.449
0.478 0.477
0.510 0.493
0.513 0.497
0.591 0.511
rural population
1. See appendices for further detail.
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There was a continuation of the sharD decline in rural per capita 
oroduction in the NCR. By the 1890s it had a level of tier capita 
production 30% lower than the national average and 35% lover than in any 
other region. The earlier decline in per capita production in the SPR 
was sharply reversed, and by the 1890s its level of per capita prod­ 
uction had outstripped that of the CPR which continued to decline after 
the 1870s. After a sharp decline in the EPR in the 1860s there was a 
sharp increase in per capita production by the end of the century, 
resulting in the EPR having a higher level of per capita production 
than any other region. The net effect of all these regional changes 
was for there to be an overall rise in per capita production, although 
its level in the 1890s appears, according to these data, to still have 
been 3% below the 1802/11 level.
To what extent these levels and changes in the level of production 
were due to changes in the level of sown area or of yield can be seen 
from the following data:
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Region
NCR(N)
Production
Sowings
yield in 'sam'
SPR(N)
Production
Sowings
yield in ' sam'
CPR(N)
Production
Sowings
yield in 'sam'
EPR(N&P)
Production
Sowings
yield in 'sail'
USSR(NSP)
Production
Sowings
yield in 'saV
1850s
54781
20653
2.65
40882
11140
3.67
86986
25989
3.35
27584
7859
3.51
210233
65641
3.20
1860s
54660
18928
2.89
45116
12613
3.58
93498
25519
3.66
27430
8733
3.14
220704
65793
3.35
1870s
56895
18206
3.13
58326
15376
3.79
102289
25895
3.95
33225
9561
3.48
250735
69038
3.63
1880s
63970
18721
3.42
78195
15615
5.01
111973
26239
4.27
38629
10870
3.55
292767
71445
4.10
1890s
70808
18537
3.32
111816
18698
5.98
113665
24285
4.68
51497
11888
4.33
347786
73398
4.74
Sources: See appendices
Notes: See appendices, Production and sowings are given in mln.
chetvert, yields are given in 'sara' (production per unit sown
by volume),.
To ease comparison, in the following table all the data 
turned into indices with the values in the 1850s equal to 100.
100 
100 
100
100 
100 
100
100 
100 
100
100 
100 
100
100 
100 
100
99.8 
91.^ 
109.1
110,4 
113.2 
97.5
107.5 
9S.2 
109.3
99.4 
111.1 
89.5
105.0 
100.2 
104.7
103.9 
88.2 
118.1
142.7 
138.0 
103.3
117,6 
99.6 
117.9
120.5 
121.7 
99.1
119.3 
105.2 
113.4
116.8 
90.6 
129.1
191.3 
140.2 
136.5
128.7 
101.0 
127.5
140.0 
138.3 
101.1
139.3 
108.8 
128.1
129.3
89.8
144.2
273.5 
167.8 
162.9
130.7 
93.4 
139.7
186.7 
151.3 
123.4
165.4 
111.8
148.1
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Region 1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s
NCR(N) 
Production 
Sowings 
Yield
SPR(N) 
Production 
Sowings ^
CPR(N)
Production
Sowings
Yield
EPR(N&P) 
Production 
Sowings 
Yields
USSR(N&P) 
Production 
Sowings 
Yields
From these index numbers it can be readily seen that overall the 
increase in production was a consequence of a gradual increase in the 
size of sowings (by 12% in 5O years) and a very rapid increase in the 
average level of yields (four times as great as the increase in sowings 
i.e. an increase by 48% in 50 years). The increase in yields came 
predominantly in the 1880s and 1890s when the rate of increase in sowings 
was somewhat slox^ing down. But this aggregate picture covers quite 
a variety of differences in the different regions.
The NCR(N) had the slowest of all rates of growth of production 
growing by only 29.3% over this period. This growth was exclusively a 
consequence of a growth in yields as there was over a 10% decline in 
grain sown area during this period. In fact most of this decline came
in the first ten years after the emancioation. Thereafter the level of 
sowings remained about the same.
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The SPR(N), the Ukraine, had on the contrary the largest of all 
rates of growth of production, growing by 174%. This growth was almost 
equally a consequence of a rapid growth in sox<rings (67.8% in 50 years) 
and of yields (62.9% in 50 years). The growth of the former was spread
V,
fairly equally over the period, while the growth in yields had come about 
primarily after 1880.
The CPR(N) had an overall growth in nroduction only slightly larger 
than the NCR(N). Like the NCR(N) this growth was totally a consequence 
of a growth in yield since the level of sowings had fallen by 6.6% over 
this period. However unlike the NCR.(N) the fall in sowings had come 
primarily in the 1890s. This x<ras of course the region which suffered 
most from the 1891/2 famine. But there is little indication of its 
presence or significance in these figures.
Finally the EPR(N&P)* this was an area of rapidly growing production 
(86.7% in 50 years) second only to SPR(N). The growth here was primarily 
a consequence of a 51.3% growth in sowings. The 23.4% growth in yields 
was the lowest for all regions, and even this had only appeared in the 
1890s.
Overall we see the most rapid growth in the newer regions of the 
SPR(N) and EPR(N) where a very large share of the growth x^as a consequence 
of increasing sowings. In the traditional areas NCR(N) and CPR(N) 
overall grox^th was less and there was a decline in grain sowings. In all 
areas there was a rapid growth in yields, although this became more 
important in the later years.
Nifontov also provided much useful data on grain production by type 
of grain and by type of producer, these data will be considered later in 
this section under the aopronriatc headings.
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c) Annual data
i) Sources of data
The sources of data avilable for an analysis of the annual dynamic 
of grain production in the pre-revolutionary period are of two kinds. 
There are fairly lengthy runs of annual data that are available in the 
secondary sources like }\7 ifontov, But generally these are only the 
aggregated data i.e. the data covering the whole 50 guberni.w of European 
Russia. In order to analyse an annual series of data with regional 
breakdown, it is necessary to go back to the primary source and construct 
our own series. Unfortunately the only available primary sources 
are the TsSK data covering the years 18P3-1915.
The major TsSK statistical handbooks on grain were the very detailed 
annual publications Urozhaya .... goda, which appeared from 1383 to 1915.
Much data w^fc also published in the general TsSK statistical handbooks 
such as Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik Rossii which appeared annually from 
1903 to 1915. The Ministry of Agriculture had its own very detailed 
publication on grain statistics ' . . .god v selsko-khozyaistvennom otnoshenii 
po otvetam, noluchennyim ot khozyaev 1 which appeared annually from 1881 
to 1917. The Ministry also published the general TsSK grain production 
data in its more general annual statistical handbook, Sbornik Statistiko- 
Ekonomicheskikh svedenii po Sel . Khoz .Rossii i inostrannyikh gosudarstv, 
which appeared between 1903 and 1916. An earlier Ministry of Agriculture 
publication Svod s tatis ticbeskikb svedenii po Sel .Khoz .Kossii k kontsu 
XIX veka, SPb.1902 contains much TsSK and Ministry of Agriculture data 
for the earlier period (1883-1900).
Apart from these contemporary sources, there also exist three verv 
good compilations of these early data all of which were made in the I q 20s.
First, there is the compilation nade bv N ,P .Oganovsky and his
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department in NKZera in 1922. This work came out under the general
2 editorship of N.D.Kondratiev . This handbook was designed to be
a continuation of the former Ministry of Agriculture statistical handbook 
Sbornik Statistiko-EkonoTTiLcheskikh svedenii po Sel .Khoz .Rossii, SPb 
1903-16. It provides an indication of the pre-war grain production data 
for the five year periods 1901-05, 1906-10 and 1911-15 as well as the 
available results of the 1916 and 1917 agricultural censuses and the 
early results of the post-revolutionary TsSU investigations. This is 
one of the very few works which has attempted to regroup the pre-war 
data to make them comparable with the data for the later period. 
Unfortunately, the early TsSU data which were reproduced in this pub­ 
lication are very incomplete and it is much preferable to use the basic 
TsSU Trudy for these data. Similarly the pre-revolutionarv data have 
been little used in my stady as the annual data from 1901 are readily 
available on an annual basis from the original sources.
Secondly, there are the materials which x^ere published by V.M.
3 Obukhov in 1926 . The materials cover the sown area and yield of all
grains in the 50 provinces of European Russia (excluding Poland, and 
the North Caucasus) from 1883-1915. The data are given separately for 
each main grain for all the 50 provinces and for the yields of each 
major grain (covering over 5% of sown area) in each province separately. 
There is, however, no breakdown between peasant allotment and private 
landowner production.
1. The Department of the Accounts of the basic elements of agriculture 
in NKZem.
2. N.D.Kondratiev (ed.) N.P.Oflganovsky (compiler) Se1skoye Khozyaist vo 
Rossii v XX veke t Sbornik statistiko-ekonomicheskikh svedenii za 
1901-1922gg. M.1923. This book has been reprinted in the Russian 
Reprint Series by Europe Printing, The Hague, 196R.
3. V.M.Obukhov, Dvizheniye urozhaev zernovyikh kultur v Eyrop.Rossii
v period 1883~1915gg, in Vliyanie neurozhaev na narodnce khozvaistvo 
Rossii, ed. V.G.Groman, M.1927, pp.1-159.
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Thirdly, there is a much larger work which was directed by 
M.S.Chetverikov and which was published in 1928 . These materials 
cover the sown area, yield, seed, strax<; harvest and the weight of 
volume measurements for all crops in all of 54 provinces of European 
Russia (including North Caucasus). The data are given separately for 
all the crops in each separate province. There are no aggregated data 
in this collection at all. The data ' given in volume measurements 
from 18S3-1894, in weight measurements of vield and production from 
1895, and area measures of sowings from 1S°3. However, seeding rates 
are given throughout and volume to weight conversion rates are ^iven 
from 1888-1915. Therefore it is oossible to accurately convert the 
data into weight and area measurements back to 1888 and roughly all the 
way to 1883.
Unlike the Obukhov data, the Chetverikov data only cover oeasant 
allotments. This data source was designed specifically to assist 
agro-meteorological investigation, as Chetverikov states in the preface 
Because of the lack of aggregation and the weight/volume problems it 
will not be used in this part of the study-.
Obukhov spends very little time discussing the reliability of 
these TsSK data, however he does state in passing that it is far more 
useful to study these data than those of the Ministry of Agriculture 
or the zemstvo because they are far more homogeneous and internally 
comparable as concerns method of collection and regionalisation than
are the other data. However he does admit that the/nav be a little, lower
2 
than the real level of production (by 5-7°I)
1. Svod urozhainykh svedenii za gody 1P83-1915, materialvr tsentralnogo 
statisticheskogo komiteta po urozhavam rva nadelnykh zemlyakh , M .192S p 3-
2. V.M.Obukhov, ibid., p.l.
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The only other series of data which are available are all in 
highly aggregated forms. The best known of such series of aggregated 
figures, in the V?est, are perhaps those cited by the American economist 
R.W.Goldsmith, Goldsmith in his investigation of the growth of pre-war 
Russian agriculture provided two sets of data one covering the 50 
provinces of European Russia from 1870-1915 and the other the 72 
'provinces of European Russia, Poland, North Caucases, Siberia and 
the Steppe . Both series are given in aggregate form with no attempt 
at any regional breakdown.
The first series is an aggregate of a very dubious series for 
1870-1880 and the official TsSK series from 1883-1914. The 1870-1880 
series covers only 4 main grains. It has to be mechanically adjusted to 
include the Polish provinces. It has been converted from weight to 
volume measurements by using standard coefficients and there are no sown 
data to accompany it.
The second series for the 72 provinces covers the period 1885-1915
2 and was taken from the Ministry of Trade and Industry handbook .
In my analysis of the TsSK data I have taken the annual figure for 
each separate gubernia and classified it into my five ma^or regions. 
The data for the 50 gubernii of European Russia were taken directly from 
Obukhov's compendium. The available data for the non-Euronean gubernii 
were taken from Svod statistic.hesk.ikh svedenii...,SPb.1902 and various 
editions of Sbornik Stat.Ekon.Svedenii...,SPb.1903-16. See the appendix.
Comparable population data were compiled in a similar way by gubernit from
3 the population data compilations available in Zaitsev and Volkov . ______
1. See R.W.Goldsmith, The economic growth of Tsarist Russia,1860-1913
af>ftfr\<.l, , U v\J artid* i.* (=;tct\c^<i$ ot-e^'e(Af.4me'*jt-'a#*{(«(£<**•*.< cko^t,^—————————————
2. A. K. Broshn'fcovskii , Us^lovna byta russkikh khlebza granitsu, P.1914
p.112. This source was also reproduced in English by V.P.Timoshenko, 
Russia and the Wheat Problem, Stanford 1932, pp.522,526,528.
3. See V.Zaitsev, Vliyaniye kolebanii urozhaev na estestvennoe dvizheniye 
naseleniya, in Y.G.Groman (ed.), Vlivanie neurozhaev na na_ro_dnoye 
khozyaistvo Rossii, chast 2, M.1927,pp.66-90, and E.Z.Volkov, Dinamika
naseleniya 5SSR za vosetndesyat let, M.1930. See appendix.
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c)
ii) P.esults of my analysis of annual data
The results of my analysis of the annual data are civen in tahular 
form in the appendices. Here the results have been plotted on graphs 
in order to give a fuller impression of the extremely complex dynamic. 
T Therever possible some rough indication of the longer term dynamic has 
.also been presented to give these figures a more complete perspective. 
In graph Acii/1 we see the annual dynamic of grain production and 
its component elements sown area and yield. The level of grain prod­ 
uction fluctuates quite considerably as a consequence of fluctuations 
in the annual level of yield. The irregularity and severity of these 
fluctuations make it extremely complicated to measure the growth rate 
of grain production and the contribution of its component elements. 
The growth rates calculated below are based on fitting a straight line 
of least squares deviation onto the curve over specific periods, on 
measuring the slope of this line and by dividing the annual increment of 
the straight line by its mean. The growth rates are highly dependent 
on the periodisation used. In the calculations made below I have 
measured the growth rate a) over the entire period of Nifontov's data 
i.e. 1851-1900, and over the entire period of the available TsSK data 
i.e. 1883-1914. But apart from these conventional periods I have also 
regrouped the data according to b) the break in the continuity of the 
sown area data which came in 1895, c) the oeriodisation of the yield 
fluctuations, selecting the periods i) according to peaks in the cycle 
and ii) according to troughs.
Taking first the 1851-1900 data for the 50 gubernii of European 
Russia, if we take the period as a whole we see there was an annual 
average growth of production of 1.3" of which about a quarter (26.3?,)
-207-
80
70
60
50
40
30
20;—=
1
io: ^
' Xo
Acii/1
Grain production in mln.tons in 
50 gubernii of European Russia
c
cc
v*^~ \
oc cc
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
9..0
8.0' 
7.0
6roi 
5.0
4.0
3.0-r
I
2.0 .
Grain yield in tsentners 
per hectare
,
-• 4
i •/
Grain so\-m area in mln.hectare
60
50
30
20
10
0
T\
A
\f \
i/
.-*
1920
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-208-
is explained by an annual average growth in sown area (0.34% per year) 
while the remaining three quarters (73.8%) was due to an average annual 
growth in yields (0.95% per year). If we look at shorter periods and 
calculate the growth rates from trough to trough or peak to peak we see 
an acceleration in the growth rate for both the elements with an increased 
although still minority share in the total growth from the growth in
sown area:
Years
1851-1900
1851-70
1855-73
1851-87
1873-91
Average Annual 
Growth rate of 
Production Sown area Yield
1.30%
0.47%
0.71%
1.08%
1.35%
0.34?
0.14%
0.21%
0.30%
0.42%
0.95%
0.32%
0.48%
0.76%
0.97%
Share in growth 
Sown area Yield
26.2 73.1
2^.8 68.1
29.6 67.6
27.8 70.4
31.3 71.9
Source: see appendix.
Turning now to the TsSK data for the pre-1939 area of the USSR from 
1883-1914 /u ««/ taking this period as a whole we see that the annual average 
growth in grain production had risen to 2.11% and that over half of this 
was due to the annual average growth in grain yields by 1.1% and that the 
rest was due to the growth in sown area by 1.0% per year. There appears 
to be a fairly distinct break in the dynamic of the sown area data with a 
sharp increase in sown area beginning after 1895. If we divide the data 
at this point we see that in the earlier period (1883-1895) the growth 
in production is predominantly (92.5%) as a consequence of a growth in 
the average annual yield level, while in the later period (1895-1914) 
the growth in the level of production is predominantly (62.3%) a consequence 
of a growth in the average annual sown area:
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Years
1883-1914 
1883-1895
1895-1914
Average annual growth of 
Production Sown Area
2.36% 1.47/7
Share in growth 
Yield Sown Area Yield
2.11%
2.127o
1.00% 
0.19%
1.10% 
1.96%
47.4 
9.0
52.1 
92.5
0.89% 62.3 37.7
Source: see appendix.
In order to check that the observed shift in relative importance 
of increases in sown area and yield is not merely the consequence of the se­ 
lection of odd years I have calculated the growth rate for these later 
years selecting several cycles of yield fluctuations measuring from neak 
to peak and from trough to trough. Both calculations ?ive the same 
result showing a relative decline in the rate of growth of grain yields 
in the later years and the increasing significance of the growth in sown 
area.
Years 
1883-1914 
1891-1911 
1894-1913
Average annual growth of
Production Sown Area Yield Production Sown Area Yield
2.11%
2.02%
2.19%
1.00%
1.26%
1.44%
1.10%
0.79%
0.71%
100
100
100
47.4
62.4
65.8%
52.1
39.1
32.4%
Source: see appendix.
ranh 4cii/2 presents the dynamic of ^rain production for the area
of the USSR as a whole and for the four regions. The level of
production in the four major regions is shown to comparable scale but the 
level of USSR production as a whole is presented at a quarter of the
comnarable scale.
I have calculated the average annual growth rate and the mean values 
for the different regions over the 1883-1914 period and these have been 
presented in the table below to indicate the relative share of the
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Grain production in mln.tons by region
4cii/2
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different regions in the average level of grain production over this
period and in its growth rate.
Region trie an level
Annual average 
growth rate
Contribution to total 
erovth
NCR 
SCR
SPR 
CPR
EPR
USSR
XCR
SCR
SPR
CPR
EPR
USSR
8 
1 
18 
15 
6
50
17
3
37
30
14
100
.58
.60 
.63 
.09 
.96
.86
.4%
.1%
8 <7 /o
.6%
.1%
.0%
0
3 
1 
2
2
0
0
3
1
2
2
.52%
.33% 
.37% 
.19%
.11%
.52%
•
.33%
17"7 • _)//=
.19%
.14%
0
0
1
0
0
2
.09%
.
.26%
.42%
.37%
.08%
(4.3%)
(o. )
(60.6%)
(20.2%)
(14.9%)
(100%)
Source: see appendix.
This table indicates that over this period the SPR accounted for 
on average 38% of the production level, but was responsible for 60% 
of the growth over this period. It was therefore rapidly increasing 
its share. The next largest region the CPR covered on average 31% of 
USSR production and was responsible for less than 20% of the growth. 
Its share in the level of USSR production would consequently be falling. 
The EPR covered on average 14% of USSR production and was slightly in­ 
creasing its share as it was responsible for over 15% of the growth in 
production. The NCR covered on average 17.4% of total USSR production 
over this period, but must have been ranidly losing its share since it 
only contributed 4.3% to the average growth over this period. No SCR 
data are available for the early years. It contributed about 3% to the 
average level of production and would have inade a very insignificant 
contribution to the growth rate over this neriod.
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Annual fluctuations-from the linear trend ff risinc grain production
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Let us turn now to consider not the overall growth rate but the 
significance of annual fluctuations. The annual fluctuations from 
the linear 1883-1914 trend are calculated in the appendix and are 
presented in graph form in grat>h 4cii/3.
The standard deviation of the fluctuations from the trend is 13°= 
for all the regions taken together, 9.3% for the NCR, 19.4% for the 
SPR, 24% for the CPR and 20% for the EPR.
In graph 4cii/3 I have placed a broken vertical line at the years 
with a major trough in the cycle of fluctuations of the USSR data. 
The most serious troughs occurred in 1891 (25% below norm) and 1906 
(21.6% below norm). These corresponded with the two lowest points in 
the CPR fluctuations: 1891 being 51% below norm and 1906 being 48% 
below norm. But these do not correspond to the lowest points in the 
other regions. For the SPR 1889 was much lower than 1891 (40% below 
norm cf. 19%) and for the NCR 1892 was lower than 1891 (13% cf. 10%). 
While 1906 was also a low point for the NCR (22% below norm), the low 
point in the comparable SPR cycle came two years later in 1908 at a mere 
12% below norm. For the EPR 1906 was a fairly low point (11% below 
norm) but its lowest point came in 1901 (45% below) and 1911 (41% below 
norm).
As the CPR began to lose its predominant place as the major -oroducer 
region, and as other regions began to become more important the overall 
influence of the extreme CPR fluctuations began to be modified by the 
less extreme fluctuations in the other regions and by the slightly different 
synchronisation of the fluctuations in the other regions.
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Granh 4cii/4 relates the production data for the area of the USSR 
and its major regions to the population data for these regions and 
indicates the changes in per capita production levels for these different 
regions over this period, When adjusted for the ver^; rapid growth in 
population much of the grox-rth in production visible in graph 4cii/2a 
disappears. The annual average growth for the USSR from. 1883-1914 is 
reduced from 2.11% to 0.38% per head. In the NCR the growth in prod­ 
uction by 0.52% per year is totallv inadequate to cover the very rat>id 
increase in copulation and results in an actual decline in ner capita 
oroduction bv 0.71% per year. The sane phenomena, only to a lesser 
extent occur in the CPR where the growth in production by 1.37% is 
converted into a decline in per capita production by 0.167C per year. 
Only in the SPR and the EPR do we observe a rapid growth in ner capita 
production. In the SPR the effect of the growth in population was only 
to reduce the growth rate from a very ranid 3.33% to a still substantial 
1.51% annual per capita growth. In the EPR the growth in population 
reduced the annual average growth of nroduction from 2.19% per vear to 
0.76% per capita per year.
This is a clear indication that the NCR was getting even less self 
sufficient and that the level of production in the CPR was not keeping 
up. The position in these two older more established grain producing 
areas was very different to the dynamic position in the SPR and the EPR.
.GRAIN PRODUCTION IN TONS PER CAPITA OF ALL POPULATION 11
o-z
o-r
EPR
o-3 v.,
/•
ft.'i- '/»
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d) War time data on grain production
The TsSK data continued to be collected and published for the first 
two years of the war. The results for soine of the i^ore distant regions of 
Transcaucasia, Central Asia and Siberia were however not available when the 
last TsSK statistical handbook covering 1915 was published. The values 
for these missing regions have consequently had to be estirr-ated. The 
results for these years have already been included in the 1833-1915 series 
given above, but will be quickly summarised here:
NCR
Production
in 1909/13 
mln. 1913
tons 1914
1915
Sown area
in 1909/13
r.ln. 1913
hec- 1914
tare 1915
Yield
in 1909/13
tsent-1913
ners 1914
per 1915
hect­
are
9.4 
10.1
8.7
10.4
17.8
13.0
12.9
12.5
7.4
7.S
6.7
8.3
SCR SPR CP" ! EPR
1
2.0
2.1
2.1
(2.1)
2.9
3.2
(3.0)
(3.^)
6.7
6.5
(6.6)
(6.6)
28.1
33.^
26.5
(27. A)
33.^
34 . A
*\ i f
1 ^  . 0
(33.4)
3.4
9.3
8.0
8.3)
19.6 
22.5
16.4
23.2
27.3
27.6
o- -
_ / . -.'
27.3
7.2
3.2
6.n
3.5
8.S 
11.3
14.1
(ll.o)
13.5
15.5
16.0
(16.6)
6 .5
7.3
8.8
(6.6)
U^SR USS^. -SCR
i 
I
67.F ! 65.9 
7°. 7 ! 77.6
67.8
74.3
65.7
72.2
on.i | 37.1
n 3.7
Q i . ^
(02.8)
7.5
8.5
7.2
(S.o)
9^.5
oi. n
^9.8
7.6
8.6
7.2
8.0
Source: See appendix.
These data indicate only a very slight decline in sown area from 
1913 and a 3.1% increase overall if the 1915 figures are corona red --T ith the 
1909/13 average. The growth was entirely due to the larse increase in 
sowings in the EPR. The 1915 EP D sowings were recorded as beins over 237= 
higher than the 1909/13 level.
The level of yields remained fairlv high in these first two war vears 
especially in 1915. In 1 Q 14 the CP P and \T CR yields were a little lover
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th an normal (9,5% below the 1909/13 average in the NCR and 16.7% below in 
the CPR). But these kind of fluctuations were quite normal, as we have 
seen above. The 1915 yields appear to have been good in all regions but 
especially in the NCR and CPR (respectively 12.6% and 18.1% above the 1909/ 
13 averages).
As explained above the 1916 and 1917 data on grain production came 
from the agricultural censuses (for sown area) and the local correspondents' 
and local statisticians'reports of the yield. The following table Is compiled 
from a 1924 volume of the Trudy TsSIJ supplemented with some figures for the
SCR from Lositsky's report on the 1917 harvest.
Year NCR SCR SPP. CPR EPR USSR USSR -SCR
Production
1909/13
1916
1917
SoT-m Area
1909/13
1916
1917
Yield
1909/13
1916
1917
6
6
5
9
8
8
7
7
6
.9
.3
.5
.5
.2
.3
.2
.7
.6
2.8 27
23
1.8 24
32
29
29
8
8
8
.7
.9
.1
.9
.3
.1
.4
.2
.3
17
15
11
24
22
22
7
6
4
.6
.2
.0
.0
.2
.6
.3
.8
,8
11
11
14
17
20
19
6
5
7
.0 65.9
.7
.4
.4
.1
.9
.3
.8
.3
63
57
54
83
79
79
7
7
6
.1
.0
.9
.7
.7
.8
.5
.2
.9
Source: Trudy TsSU, Tom XVIII, M.1924, pp.122-5, 131-2.
These figures indicate a fall of soT m area in the NCR, SPP, and the EPR of 
about 10% in comparison with 1915. The NCR and SPR would consequently 
have a level of respectively 14 and 12% below their average 1909/13 level, 
but the EPR would still remain some 14% higher than this level. The 
decline in the CPR was less at only 6% bringing this level just 6% below
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the pre-war level. Overall this indicated a decline of 7.8" in comparison 
with the 1915 level but of only 5% in comparison with the 1909/13 level. 
The censuses record hardly any change at all between the 1916 and 1917 
sowings.
I do find these results a little surprising. It is hard to explain 
why there should have been only a verv moderate decline in sowings between 
1913 and 1915, a very sharp decline fro^ 1915 to 1916 and then hardly any 
decline at all from 1916 to 1917. It is very tempting to suggest that 
this apparent decline from 1915 to 1916 could have been the result of the 
change in methodology of calculating grain sown area at that time. Could 
the census have under-estimated the level of grain sowings by 7-10%?
P.Rumyantsev, head of the statistical department of the special food 
council, stated in his report on the 1916 harvest in November 1916 that 
the local zemstva were providing him with indications that the census was 
under-estimating reality in some gubernii by from 5-15% . Rumyantsev's 
successor A.E.Lositsky also appeared to believe that there was much more
grain in the country than was indicated by the production figures that he
2 was using . And later in Gosplan N.M.Vishnevsky was to argue that the
indications of the quantity of arable land received from the 1917 census 
were between 4 and 17% lower than the local zemstvo reports of the size of
arable land in their area and that this therefore indicated the degree of
3under-estimation involved in the census . The data unon which these con­ 
clusions were made cane from 7 zenstvo statistical offices and are listed 
b e1ov:
1. See P.Rumyantsev, Urozhai khlebov v Rossii v 191ftg. t P.1916, p.VII
2. See D. 25?
3. See '' .'•. Vi s'inevs!:y, Statistika i selsko-khozyaistvennavr. r.yeistvitelnos t, 
in Sel.?' Les ."hoz. , 1922, Xo.9-lo } special supplement op.24-n.
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Data on size of arable land in 1917 from different sources
Zei^s 
d a t a 
-.In.
Penzenskaya G.
Tulskaya G.
Bryanskaya G,
Ukateri noslavskaya G.
Novgorodskaya G.
Simbirskaya G
Ryazanskaya G.
Average
2
2
0
o
0
0
2
tvo 
in 
des .
.256
.02
o
R
86
.251
<ro
.0
.0
2
/
"7 
/
3
5
">
1917 
census 
data in 
r.ln. des .
2
1
0
1
o
1
1
.087
. Q 54
.738
. Q 59
.600
.7P3
.901
Indicntor of 
extent of 
under­ 
estimation
8
3
20
14
3
14
•j
10
.1%
.8
.1
.9
.8
.9
.0
n
.'o
cr
en
"*>
t~* 
/•
C7
r»7 
/O
*7 
/ .>
Source: N. v .Vishnevsky, ibid . , p.24.
Note: Penza and Tula of course were the home towns of Groman and 
Popov.
These arguments were not accepted by the statisticians who claimed that the 
zemstvo data that Vishnevsky was using w€«•<•. out of date . But it is probably 
true that the statisticians as a whole found it difficult to accept that 
their census that they had worked so hard to be allowed to carry out 
was defective. Arguments about the reliability of these data were to rage 
for the next decade. They centred mainly around the utilisation balances 
and will be discussed later. Here I just want to remark that there must 
be some doubt as to the comparability of the 1916 data with the 1915 and 
earlier data, and that the apparent sharp decline in sowings T-*hich appears 
between 1915 and 1916 was probably not as severe as it anpears.
Let us now turn to an analysis of the yield data. The yield data 
in the above table indicate that the 1916 level ofyields was overall about 
the same as in 1914 about 4% below the 1909/13 averaee. It was 17, higher
1. See later p ,• '.-•' '',
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than the average pre-war level in the NCR, about 2^% lower in the SPR 
and between 7 and 8% lower in the CPR and EPR.
In 1917 the overall level of yield fell by another 4% to be 8% below 
the 1909/13 average. The yield in the EPR appears to have been very high; 
some 15.9% above the pre-war average. But the yield in the CPR was 
extremely loWjover 34% below the 1909/13 level. Thes<- w-ef-fthe kind of yield 
which occurs regularly (about once every five years) in the CPR and the 
last two had occurred in 1906 and 1911. They were caused by adverse meteor­ 
ological factors, and with the given level of technology little could be 
done about then.
The low level of production in these years was consequently partly 
the consequence of a decline in so^-m area, although this may have been some­ 
what exaggerated, and partly the consequence of fairly normal fluctuations 
in the level of yield with a low point in the yield cycle hitting the CPR 
in 1917.
Although there have been attempts to make corrections to these data 
for their degree of under-estimation, these have all been fairly crude 
and have normally involved simr>ly the addition of the same 9% ^\*ar\tx&v 
correction to the sown area data and yield data for all pre-revolutionary 
years up to and including 1917 without differentiating between the census 
and the TsSK data. Such a series of 'corrected' data as sunnlied by 
Groman is given below:
Grain production in the pre-1939 area of the USSR less Turkestan, 
Transcaucasia and the Far East.
Production Sown area "field in tsentners 
in ^In.tons in mln.hectare per hectare
1909/13
1914
1915
1916
1917
75
74
82
67
65
.1
.8
.8
Q
1 -
.3
91
98
95
86
87
o
« —
.0
.3
Q
•
.2
8
7
8
/
7
f 2
.6
.7
c
• ^'
.5
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Source: V.G.Groman, Khlebnaya produktsiya i khlebnyi eksport 
Rossii, in Entsiklopediya Russkogo Eksnorta, Tom 1 Berlin 192A, pp.174-5.—————————————
I would suggest that Cretan's corrected series of data cannot be 
accepted as having any known decree of reliability. The level of
corrections applied to the pre-war data annears to me to be of unproven
a> *.v
reliability and probably too high. Thenyustification for usine this sane
level of correction to the years ^Then ^rain production v:as calculated 
in an entirely different manner and when it was probably subject to a 
different set of distorting influences. • .. -••"- s:*L- - It does 
seem to me to be likely that a higher level of correction might well be 
required to the 1916 and 1917 sown area data than to the earlier TsSK 
data. The level of correction required might well be between 5 and 10%
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e) Data on grain production by different types of producer
The available data on grain production by the different types of 
producer are not very satisfactory. Before the emancipation of the 
peasantry in 1861 the producers were grouped into three classes the 
pomeshchiki (hereditary landowners) , serfs and •) ,1 free peasants (called 
state peasants). After the abolition of serfdom, landownership was 
classified as being in one of several forms. l:wo forms that are 
of most relevance to us are private ownership (chastnovladelchesk^i) 
and peasant allotment communal ownership (nadeln'ti) . The communal owner­ 
ship of peasant allotments sometimes went as far as to result in periodic 
repartition of land to be worked by the separate households, but generally 
it resulted in communal regulations over its general utilisation and 
regulations restricting its transfer and sale. The legal position as 
regards the sale of allotment land and the separation of individual 
households from the communal society (Selskoye obshchestvo or mir) which 
regulated general allotment land utilisation, had been changed by the 
Stolypin reforms of 1906. Thii allowed allotment land to be more easily 
converted into a form of privately owned_land, but such a form of 
privately owned land was not included in the general statistics of private 
land ovmership which tended to preserve the title chastnovladelcheskii 
only for that land which had never been classified as allotment land 
since the abolition of serfdom.
At first, immediately after the emancipation^the pomeshchiki had 
owned most of the chastnovladelcheskc-i^ private land. But as tine went 
on more land was sold to other £roups; mainly the peasantrv and members 
of other classes, the raznochints'y. By the first decade of the twentieth 
century the effective distinction between peasant allotment land and 
peasant privately owned land vas becoming very slight. But TsSK continued
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to account them separately and to rake no distinction "between peasant 
private land and poreshchik private land. The 1 and owner ship statistics, 
gathered at the time of a census of land utilisation and ownership enable 
us to see the changes that were occurring within the category of private 1; 
land. See table below:
ownership of land by tyne of producer in 39 Guberniu 
of European Russia in rln .hectares
Peasant 
Allotments
Private Ownership 
Peasant ! Other All
:vCP,
SPR
Uk.
CPR
EPR
USSR(39 G)
1877
i
1887
1905
1877
1887
1905
1877
1887
1905
1877
1887
1905
1877
1887
1905
29.24 A. 85
34.17
34.65
21.90
22.28
22.00
41.17
43.98
40.91
13.36
16.50
17.55
105.66
116.94
115.13
6.60
10.79
0.58
3.01
6.23
1.62
3.31
6.84
0.08
0.17
0.24
7.14
13.08
24.12
28.05
28.97
25.72
21.96
20.46
16.30
21.60
21.18
17.27
9.20
9.78
10.34
80.78
80.31
69.60
32.80
35.57
36.51
22.54
23.47
22.53
23.22
24.49
24.11
9.28
9.95
10.58
87.92
93.39
°3.72
Source: See the results of the 1877, 1887 and 1905 censuses as
tabulated by N .D .Kondratiev (ed.) ibid. , X M923, PP.54-8.
These figures refer to total land ownership: pastureland and waste 
as well as arable land, sown land and land sown to erain. Generallv } arable 
land accounted for a much larger share of the peasant allotment land and 
of the neasant private land than it did of other non-peasant private
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land . These figures indicate that overall the proportion of peasant 
ownership of private lands had increased from 8.1% in 1877 to over 25.7% 
in 1905. The relative share of arable land and of land sown to i^rain 
would have been much higher. This must be borne in mind when we are 
dealing with TsSK classifications of landownership. The 1916 census 
allows us to make a better distinction between the different types of 
Private landowner. But for all the other data we must remember that 
after the emancipation a growing proportion of private land was being 
owned by the peasants.
In the following pages I will consider first the data on grain prod­ 
uction by the different groups divided into private landowners and allot­ 
ment owners, as made available in the studies of Nifontov and Kondratiev.
Later I will consider the 1916 census data.
Nifontov offers us three series of figures. One series covers just 
the pre-emancipation decade and only 32 gubernii. A second series provides 
an indication of changes in the level of sowings for the different groups 
of producers in the three decades spanning the emancipation period i.e. 
from the 1850s to the 1870s. But these data only cover 29 gubernii. 
The final series covers grain production from the 1860s to the 1890s and 
sowings from the 1870s for the 5^ gubernii of European Russia. From these 
figures the average yields by different types of producer can also be
calculated.
Let us consider first Nifontov's data for the pre-emancipation period. 
Nifontov provides an indication of the net production (i.e. gross production
9
less seed) for 32 gubernii" of European Russia for 1851-186^ vith a
1. The results of the 1917 census, which covered just 20 gubernii indicated 
that arable accounted for 36.6% of private land and 60.2^ of peasant 
allotment land. (See Trudy TsSU, Tom T ', vyp. I, *-M921, p.73.)
2. Nifontov actually provides data for 3^ gubernii, but I have excluded 
two because later he supplies sowing data for only 32.
-225-
breakdown according to whether the production was on pomeshchik land, 
serf allotments or state peasant lands. These regrouped data are given
below:
Grain production (net of seed) by sector in th.chetverts and 
million tons, for the average period 1851-1860
Pomeshchik 
land serf
1
3
4
5
. NCR (N15)
.SPR (N6)
.CPR (N9)
.EPR (N2)
USSR(N32)
Source :
in th.chetverts 
in mln. tons
in th.chetverts 
in mln. tons
in th.chetverts 
in mln. tons
in th.chetverts 
in mln. tons
in th.chetverts 
in mln. tons
See A.S.Nifontov,
6.00 
(0.76)
7.60 
(0.96)
12.01 
(1.51)
0.08 
(0.01)
25.68 
(3.24)
15.04 
(1.90)
7.51 
(0.95)
14.64 
(1.84)
1.41 
(0.18)
38.60 
(4.86)
Zernovoye proizvodstvo
state 
peasant
5.36 
(0.68)
4.84 
(0.36)
13.70 
(1.73)
9.72 
(1.23)
33.61 
(4.24)
Rossii . . . . ,
all 
lands
26.41 
(3.33
19.94 
(2.27)
14.34 
(5.08)
11.20 
(1.41)
97.89 
(12.33)
M.1974, p.129.
The share of the different sectors in the net grain production in the 
different regions and overall is indicated in the following table:
l.NCR (N15) 
3.SPR (N6)
4.CPR (N9)
5.EPR (N2) 
USSR (N32)
Pomeshchik 
land
22.7%
42.3%
29.8%
0.6%
26.2%
serf
57.0%
41.7%
36.7%
12.6%
39.4%
state 
peasant
20.3%
16.0%
34.0%
86 . 8%
34.3%
All 
lands
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Data on sowings are available only for a few years 1852, 1856 and 
1860 and these only cover the gentry and serf grain sowings. But if we 
assume that the overall regional grain yield rates for the full Nifontov 
regions apply to the 32 provinces given above, then it is possible to
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calculate the sowings for all the land. If we further assume that the 
average of the 1852, 1856 and 1860 sowings data for the gentry and serf 
groups are typical of the decadal average then we can estimate the sowings 
and consequently the yields for the different sectors. These are given 
in the following table:
Grain production sowings and yields in 32 gubernii of 
European Russia in the 1350s
NCR(N15)
Production
Sowings
Yield
SPR (N6)
Production
Sowings
Yield
CPR(N9)
Production
Sowings
Yield
EPR(N2)
Production
Sowings
Yield
USSR(N32)
Production
Sowings
Yield
All 
land
42.41
16.00
2.65
27.41
7.47
3.67
57.51
17.17
3.35
15.67
4.46
3.51
142.99
45.10
3.17
Pomeshchik 
land
9.36
3.36
2.78
10.57
2.97
3.56
17.06
5.05
3.38
0.10
0.003
3.78
37.09
11.4
3.25
serf
23.94
8.90
2.69
10.35
2.84
3.64
20.62
5.99
3.44
1.95
0.54
3.63
56.85
18.26
3.11
!
state 
peasant
9.11
3.74
2. A3
6.49
1.66
3.92
19.83
6.13
3.23
13.63
3.91
3.49
A9.05
15.44
3.18
Relative share in 7X of all
All
land
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Poraeshchik
land
22.1
21.0
10.49
38.6
39.8
97.0
29.7
29.4
100.9
0.7
0.6
108.0
25.9
25.3
102.5
serf
56.5
55.6
10.15
37.7
38.0
99.2
35.9
34.9
102.7
12.4
12.0
103.4
39.8
40.5
98.1
state 
peasant
21.5
23.4
91.7
23.7
22.2
106.8
34.5
35.7
96.4
87.0
87.5
99.4
34.3
34.2
100.3
Source: Calculated from A.S.Nifontov ibid., pn . 103 f 120,129 , 
see appendix.
Notes: Production and sowings nre given in thousands of chetvert 
and yields in sam.
Production figures here refer to gross production, i.e. 
net production plus seed so'-Tn.
-227-
These figures indicate that overall the serfs produced the most 
grain,about 40%,the state peasants produced 34% and the pomeshchiki 
about 26%. Pomeshchik grain yields were about 2|% above the average. 
In the different regions there were considerable variations from this 
pattern. Serf grain production was much more important in the NCR 
accounting for almost 57%. It was least important in the EPR where the 
state peasants had the predominant position producing 877 of the grain. 
The pomeshchiki were most important in the SPR (the Ukraine) where they 
produced almost 39% of the grain, which was more than any other tyoe of 
producer. They had, however, relatively low yields there.
Nifontov's second series of data covering grain sowings different-
f>ri\sc4.tr-e. 
iated according to whether they were on/land or peasant allotment land,
for the three decades spanning the emancipation period they are given 
in the following table: See over page.
These figures indicate the significant decline in the sowings on 
private land in the decade immediately after the emancipation. The 
relative share of private land sowings fell by over 1 million chetvert from 
just under 25% to just under 22% of all sowings. Overall they fell by 
12.5%, the largest fall being 83.3% in the EPR, followed by a 17.3% 
decline in the CPR and a 15.4% decline in the NCR. In the Ukraine (SPR) 
the decline in private lands was only by 1.1%. The latter was the area 
where the pomeshchiki were most intent on organising their own large farms.
By the 1870s we see that the relative share of private landowner 
sowings had increased to 24.1% > almost the pre-emancipation level. But it 
would be a mistake to assume that this indicated an increase in pomeshchik 
sowings. As already explained above a growing proportion of non-pomeshchiki 
representatives of the bourgeoisie and peasants were buying private land, 
and farming it. Most of these peasant increases in private land purchases
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Grain sowings in mln.chetvert in 27 gubernii of 
European Russia 1850s - 1870s.
NCR(N12)
SPR(N6) 
CPR(N7)
EPR(N2
USSR (A 27)
All
13.874
7.878 
15.928
4.954
42.634
1850s
Priv­ 
ate
3.174
2.808 
4.540
0.024
10.546
Allot.
10.700
5.070
11.388
4.930
32.088
All
13.472
8.114
15.146
5.552
42.204
1860s
Priv­ 
ate
2.686
2.778 
3.756
0.004
9.224
Allot.
10.786
5.336 
11.390
5.548
33.060
-
All
12.780
9.212 
15.097
5.800
43.075
1870s
Priv­ 
ate
2.700
3.114 
4.528
0.006
10.393
Allot
10.080
6.098 
10.569
5.794
32.682
NCR(\12)
SPR(N6)
CPROT7)
EFR("7)
USSR(X27)
All
100
100
100
100
100
1850s
Priv­ 
ate
22.9
35.6
23.5
0.5
24.7
Allot.
77.1
64.4
71.5
99.5
75.3
All
100
100
100
IOQ
ion
1860s
Priv­ 
ate
19.9
34.2
24.8
0.1
21.8
Allot
80.1
65.8
75.2
99.9
78.2
All
100
100
ion
100
100
1870s
Priv­ 
ate
21.1
33.8
30.0
0.1
24.1
Allot.
78.9
66.2
70.0
99.9
75.9
Source: A.S. Nifontov,ibid., pp.162,167.
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were in the Southern part of the Ukraine and the lower vo lga and these 
were the areas that began to show a remarkable increase in private land 
ownership.
The final series of producer differentiated data presented by 
Nifontov spans the period from the 1860s to the 1890s and its major out­ 
lines have been reproduced in the following tablet see over nape.
Here we see that although there was no real decline in the sowings 
on allotment lands, the sowings on private land w-•"-.?, increasing far more 
raoidly. The proportion of sowings on private lands to all lands in­ 
creased from 23.4% in the 1870s to over 27% by the 1890s. The yields 
on these private lands were consistently higher than the yields on allot­ 
ment lands and the gap between their yields was rising: from 18% in the 
1870s to 26.7% in the 1890s. Amongst the different regions the share of 
these private lands grain production were the highest in the SPR where they 
accounted for over 43% in the 1890s. Tn the CPR they accounted for about 
a third, but were still less than a quarter in the NCR and less than 5% 
in the EPR.
Unfortunately Nifontov's presentation of the data stops at the end 
of the 1890s. Much more data are available for the immediate pre-war 
years, although &<y favt- been little analysed. And much of £A«ffn would involve 
a considerable amount of work before £A«y &/*f< assembled in a form in which 
t^ey could be readily analysed . A general summary of the changes by type of
1. For instance, Chetverikov has produced a 224 page compendium of the 
TsSK grain statistics for peasant allotment land covering all the 
grains and other major crops in all of the 56 gubernii of European 
Russia and the North Caucasus from 1883-1915. (See Svod urozhainyikh 
svedenii za gody° 1883-1915, M .1928). It would be an extremely in­ 
teresting task to compare these allotment land results with Ohukhov's 
compendium of allotment plus private land results in order to look
at the characteristics of these different groups throughout the whole 
period. Unfortunately, this cannot be done as the Chetverikov data 
are in a totally disaggregated state. The data for each of the 9 
major grains in each of the 56 gubernii are given separately for each 
of these 32 separate years. Before these data are ready for comparison 
at least 16,000 arithmetic calculations would have to be made.
-230-
Grain production according to different types of producer in the 50 
gubernii of European Russia from the 1860s to the 1890s
1860s 1870s 1880s 18°0s
NCR(N) 
Production 
Sown Area 
Yield
S-PR(N) 
Production
Sovrn Area 
Yield
CPR(N) 
Production 
Sovn Area 
Yield
EPR(N) 
Production 
Sovm Area 
Yield
USSR(N) 
Product! on 
Sown Area 
Yield
t)
Production 
NCR 
SPR 
CPR 
EPR
USSR
Yield 
NCR 
SPR
CPR
EPR
Sown Area 
NCR 
SPR 
CPR 
EPR
Ml !
6.42 
6.61 
1L98 
1.92 
26,93
All
100 
100 
100 
100
100
100
•>ri-
^ate
1.29 
2.30 
2.74 
0.03
6.36 
1860s
pri­ 
vate
20.1 
34.3 
22.9 
1.6
23.6
Ml-
Dt~
•nent
5.13 
4.31 
9.24 
1.89
20.57
All­ 
ot­ 
ment
79.9 
65.2 
77.1 
98.4
76.4
i 
All
6.72 
2.11
3.18
8.35 
2.03
4.11
i
12,88 
3.12
4.13
2.25 
0.70
3.21
30.20 
7.96
3.79 
All
100 
100 
100 
100
100
100 
100
100 
100
100 
100 
100 
100
All- 
pri- O t- 
vate ~,ent
1.41 
0.39
3.62
3.07 
0.71
4.30
3.46 
0.75
4.62
0.05 
0.011
4.40
7.99 
1.86
4.30
1
5.31 
1.72
3.08
5.28 
1.32
4.06
9.62 
2.37
3.97
2.20 
0.69
3.20
22.21 
6.10
3.64 
870s
. All-priTot-
a te i ment
21.0 
36.8 
26.9 
2.2
26.5
.13.8 
L04.6
111.9 
137.1
79.0 
63.2 
73.1 
97.8
73.5
96.9 
97.3 
96.1 
99.7
18.5 81.5. 
35.4 65.0 
24.0 76.0 
l.fi 98.4
] 
All -
7.67 
2.15
3.57
10.66 
2.1
5.08
(14.12 
! 3.19
4.43
2.66 
0.81
3.27
35.11 
8.25
4.26
:>ri- ; 
v7 ate
1.77
0.44
4.02
4.15 
0.76
5.50
4.65 
0.92
5.04
0.20 
0.05
3.70
10.77 
2.17
4.96 
1880s
* 11- 
ot-
ment !
5.90 
1.71
3.44
6.51J 
1.34
4.S5
9.47 
2.27
4.18
2.46 
0.76
3.24
24.34 
6.08
4.00
A 1 1rt.1. JL
bri- I ot- 
All Ivate faent
100 
100 
100 
100
100
100 
100
100 
100
100 
100 
100 
100
23.1 
38.9 
32.9 
7.5
30.7
117.6 
108.3 
113.5 
113.1
7.69 
61.1 
57.1 
92.5
59.3
96.4 
95.5 
94.4
QQ 1\ 7 ; . 1
20.5J79.5 
36.^63.8 
28.^71.2 
6.293.8
Ml -
8.60' 
2.18
3.94
'15.02
i 2.50
6.01
14.49 
2.97
4.88
3.51 
0.83
4.23
41.62 
8.48
4.91 
Ml
100 
100 
100
100
100
100 
100 
100
loo
!
100 
100
loo
100
pri­ 
vate.
2.10 
0.47
4.45
6.49 
0.98
6.59
4.81 
n.86
5.63
0.15 
0.033
4.58
13.55 
2.34
5.79 
1890s
pri­ 
vate
24.4 
43.2 
33.2 
4.3
32.6
112.9 
109 . 7
115.4 
103.3
21.6 
39.2 
29.0 
4.0
4,11-
Dt~
"^ent
6.50 
1.71
3.80
8.53 
1.52
5.61
9.68
2.11
4.59
3.36 
0.86
4.19
28.07 
6.14
4.57
All­ 
ot­ 
ment
75.6 
56.8 
66.8 
95.7
67.4
96.4 
93.3 
94.1 
99.1
78.4 
60.8 
71.0 
96.0
USSR 100 23.4 76.6 100 26.373.7 ion 27.6 72.
Source: A.S.Nif ontov, ibid..,
per
192,237-7,278-9.
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producer over this period has been presented by Kondratiev and I will 
have to make use of that, for this period, before completing the period 
with an account of the data in the 1916 agricultural census.
Kondratiev has indicated that the relative share of T,rain production 
from private lands continued to rise throughout this later period:
The level of grain production bv different types of producer 
in 65 gubernii of Russia fror> 1893/7 and 1909/13
in mln.tons.
Peasant Peasant
1893/7
1909/13
allotment
lands
19.80
26.26
Private
lands
9.60
16.12
All
29.40
42.38
allotment
lands
67.3%
62.0%
Private
lands
32.7"
38.0%
All
100%
100%
Source: N.D.Kondratiev, Rs^nok khlebov...,M.1922, p.10
X ~^^"^ ----"I L-
This was a consequence of both proportional increase in private land sowings 
and the continued proportional acceleration of yield increases on the 
private lands. Both of these points have been well illustrated by 
Kondratiev:
The proportion of sowings by different types of producers of 
the 4 main grains in the 65 gubernii of Russia
Peasant allotment Private 
land land
1896/1900 66.8% 33.2% 
1906/10 65.3% 34.7%
Source: N.D.Kondratiev, ibid., p.9.
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The level of grain yields for peasant and landowner lands in 
tsentners per hectare in the 65 gubemii of Russia
Peasant
allotment 
land
1861/70
1871/80
1881/90
1891/1900
1901/10
/,
L
5
5
6
.35
.65
.10
.85
.45
Private 
land
4
5
6
7
8
.95
.55
.30
.05
.09
Private/ 
/ allotment
+ 13
+ 19
+23
+20
+25
.7 7,
.3%
.47,
.4%
.5%
Source: N.D.Kondratiev, ibid., p.6.
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The war time data on grain production by different types of producer.
An analysis of the war time changes in production for the different 
types of producer is trade complicated by the change in concepts involved. 
The 1916 census distinguished between peasant production and poneshchik 
production without making any reference to the concepts of chastnovladel- 
cheskti or nadelnj,i land. A large share of the production that had earlier 
been classified as private was now transferred to the peasant category and 
the non peasant category became the narrow pomeshchik grout*, a mere 120,000 
households as opposed to over 756,r>00 chastnovladelchesk Pi households . 
The 1916 census figures are consequentlv not at all comparable with the 
earlier figures dividing the producers into different groups. This is not 
always realised and even the most eminent historian of the period appears 
in a momentary relapse to have attempted to compare these data. Kondratiev 
provided the following surprising indication of the war time change in level 
of grain sowings for different types of producer:
Peasant lands private landowners
1909/13 100 100
1914 107.1 103.3
1915 121.2 50.3
Source: N.D.Kondratiev, RyLnok khlebov..., M.1922, p . 40
Kondratiev failed to provide the actual figures from which these index 
numbers were calculated, and failed to specify precisely the source of these 
data. But all the circumstantial evidence is that the 1915 private land­ 
owners figure refers not to chastnovladelchesk^i land but only to Pomeshchik 
land, and that it was calculated fro:r the returns of the 1916 census and
1. There were register^ to be 756,376 households in the group of all 
private land owners in just 42 gubernii of European Russia in 1905 
(See N.D.Kondratiev, (ed.), ibid. , M.1923, p.71). So there would 
have been many more in all the area of Russia decade later.
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not from TsSK data .
This 53% drop in size of private landowners sowings in just one year 
is primarily a consequence of usinp. incomparable statistical indicators. 
Anfimov has used the unpublished materials of the 1916 census and other 
data for the war time years and has made a revised estimate of the war time 
changes in the area sown by pomeshchiki and peasants assumine the 1916 
census definitions. This dvnamic is presented below:
All Grains
area in million hectares
Food Grains Feed Grains
1914
1915
1916
Relative
1914
1915
1916
All
93.68
90.06
82.97
share
100
100
100
Peas­ 
ant
84.49
81.21
75.73
90.2
90.2
91.3
Pomesh 
chik
9.20
8.85
7.25
9.8
9.8
8.7
All
64.17
62.63
56.55
100
100
100
Peas­ 
ant
57
56
52
89
89
92
.71
.37
.07
.9
.9
.1
Pomesh- 
chik All
6
6
4
10
10
7
.46
.31
.48
.1
.1
.9
29.51
27.38
26.42
100
100
100
Peas­ 
ant
26
24
23
90
90
89
.78
.84
.65
.7
.7
.5
Pomesh
chik
o
i— •
2.
2.
9.
9.
10.
1L
54
77
3
3
5
Source: Calculated from A.M. Anfimov, ibid., M.1962, p.280
It is clear from my calculations of the relative share of each type 
of producer that Anfimov has just applied the 1915 proportions that he 
received from the 1916 census, to the data for 1914. This seems to 
be a fairly reasonable procedure and there appears to be no alternative. 
Overall the 1914 sown area was no less than the 1913 sown area so the 
1916 level of pomeshchik sowings was probably no lower than 78.8% of its 
pre-war level in 1916 when the level of peasant sown area in 1916 was just
1. The 1916 census had asked the producers to provide an indication of their 
sowings in the previous year, and these results for 1915 will be con­ 
sidered by us later in this section. Kondratiev certainly had access 
to all the returns of the 1916 census, as he was a deputy minister of 
agriculture at the time that the results were bein^ calculated.
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under 90% of its pre-war level.
It should be noted that these figures for the relative share of 
pomeshchik sown area are totally compatible with the pre-war figures for 
pomeshchik production given by Stalin in 1928.
Stalin gave the following breakdown of pre-war grain production acc­ 
ording to different types of producer:
Grain production
in nln.
tons in cj 07/e /c
Pomeshchiki 9.8 12.0% 
Kulaki 31.1 38.0%
S'erednyaki & 
Bednyaki
All 81.9 100%
Source: I.Stalin, Sochineniya, Tom.11, M.1949, p.85.
The figure that the pomeshchiki produced 12% of all the grain is the 
level that we would have expected if we accept a) the 1916 proportions 
of the pomeshchiki sowing 10% of all grain and b) the pre-war proportions 
of landowner households having a level of grain yield about 20% higher than 
peasant allotment households. The justification for the division between 
kulaki and other peasants is harder to justify, but it appears to be a 
very rou^h estimation based on allowing the i«*rednyak\ and bednyaki to 
produce half the grain in the country.
Before leaving Anfimov's table of 1914-16 grain sown area, we should 
also note the distinct differences between the sown areas for food grains 
and feed grains. During this period of gentle overall decline the 
pomeshchiki actually increased their sowings of feed grains. This was 
probably associated with them providing for the fodder needs of the army.
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In the peasant sector the sowings of feed grains fell more sharoly than 
for food grains.
An indication of the regional distribution of nomeshchik and peasant 
sowings from the 1916 census data are provided in the following table:
The regional distribution of grain sowings by type of producer 
in mln.hectare for the pre-1939 area of the USF? in 1916
NCR
0.7
11.4
12.1
SCR
0.1
2.9
3.0
SPR
3.3
23.9
27.7
CPR
1.9
26.4
28.3
EPR
0.1
15.9
16.0
USSR
6.5
80.6
87.1
Pomeshchiki
Peasants
All
% Pomeshchik
to all 5.8% 3.3" 13.7% 6.7% 0.6% 7.5%
Source: A.Gayster (ed.), ibid., M.1930, pp.14-22.
Here we see that the SPR remained the major area of poneshchik farming 
and that they still covered almost 14% of the land soTm to grain. The 
EPR also remained the area with the lowest share of pomeshchik land.
Turning now to the war tine data on grain production and grain yields 
we note the following indication of th^. changes in war time production for 
pomeshchiki and peasants as calculated by Anfinov: (See over page)
Again ignoring the high level of these figures,and just looking 
at their comparative values, we see that the pomeshchik estates maintained 
a level of yield some 20% higher than on the peasant allotments.
Finally in this section I will briefly introduce the more detailed 
data on pomeshchik grain sown area for 1916 that Anfimov has made available 
The history and sources of these data have already been discussed above .
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Grain production by peasant and pomeshchik households 1913-1917 in
rain.tons
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1913
1914
191S
1916
1917
All grain
All
89.25
76.49 
78.62
65.00
59.18
100
100
100
100
100
Peasant
(78.99)
67.68 
69.47
58.25
54.31
(88.5)
88.5
88.4
89.6
91.8
Pomesh- 
chiki
(10.26)
8.81 
9.15
6.75
4.87
(11.5)
11.5
11.6
10.4
9.2
Food grains
All
52.09 
54.87
43.37
37.35
100
100
100
100
Peasant
45.93 
48.32
39.33
34.67
88.2
88.1
90.7
92.3
Pomesh 
-chiki
6.16 
6.55
4.05
2.88
11.8
11.9
9.3
7.7
Feed grains
i 
All
24.41 
23.75
21.62
21.61
100
100
100
100
Peasant
21.75 
21.15
18.92
19.64
89.1
89.1
87.5
90.9
Poraesh- 
chiki
2.65 
2.60
2.70
1.29
10.9
10.9
12.5
9.1
Sources: 1913-16, A.M.Anfimov, ibid., M.1962, pp.293, 296
1917 A.M.Anfimov, ibid., M.1969, p.220
Note: The data for 1913-16 cover the area of 65 gubernii of 
Russian Empire. The data for 1917 cover the pre-1939 
area of the USSR.
For the 1917 data I have grouped millet and buckwheat 
together with the food grains as this appears to be
appropriate for comoarability with the 1913-16 data
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The sown area and specific grain sown area for the 84,183
households included in the 1916 census results are indicated in the 
following table:
Type of pomeshchik household according to area sown.
-"o.of hseholds
households
supplying data
for 1915 ?* 1916
i
All sown area
in mln.ha. (1)
1915
1916
change in
sown area in %
All sown area
in roln.ha. (2)
All grains sown
as % of
all sown area
Sown area by
erain as % of<^
all sown area
Winter Rye
Spring Rye
Winter Wheat
Spring Wheat
All food grains
Oats
Barley
Millet
Buckwheat
Maize
All non-food
grains
Rrain sown area
per household
tofcC1
c
• H
^
C C
^ u
7970
765
0.120
0.001
u: C 
tf> CD C C
0)
T3
Ci— i
1
C
•^
cLI
c
L6463 J28275 '
14191
0.118
0.072
-77%
0.072
0.054
74.4%
29.7
0.5
3.0
3.5
36.7
26.8
6.6
1.5
2.2
0.4
37.7
3.28
cc •
r-+ IT
I _c
lT>.
L4065
m^
CM •
1 IT,
C 0c *c
^
10286
25899 '
0.94^
0.780
-17 J 7.
'
L3027
1.165
1.011
9568
2.653
1.636
-13. Z? -2D.£
j
0.720
0.5^5
82.6%
25.8
0.3
7.8
11.1
47.1
22.1
10.2
1.8
1.2
1.2
38.9
21.04
0.866
0.745
86.0%
20.3
0.3
12.2
14.3
47.1
18.4
16.1
1.8
1.2
1.4
38.8
53.0
1.636
1.374
84 . 0%
20.6
0.9
14.1
9.6
45.2
21.2
13.4
2.0
1.2
1.4
38.8
133.6
c c c
0 C
1 V.
1 — f
u"-, T;
CM
4411
4004
i
1.789
r~~ *
1 o:
C CD
C "w
LT
2020
IT.
1
C 'S.
c a
G. "3r~
682
j
1952
1.505
1.687 1.447
-5.7%
1.686
1.360
80.7%
16.5
0.1
19.3
7.9
43.8
21.4
10.4
2.7
1.1
1.0
36.9
308.3
-3 . 8%
1.447
1.123
77.6%
13.5
0.1
21.4
8.8
43.8
19.6
8.7
3.2
0.9
1.3
33.8
555.9
640
1.179
1.152
-2.3%
1.152
0.855
74.2%
13.4
0.1
17.2
13.2
43.9
16.6
8.9
3.3
0.6
1.4
30.3
4- .
C v.
C oC -C
LT'
11
11
0.082
0.077
-62%
6.077
0.053
70.9%
14.9
0.2
11.7
16.2
43.0
16.5
5.5
5.0
0
0.9
27.9
1253. 6 ]5ooo
(_2
,_?<"
84,184
70,057
8.959
7.863
-12.2%
7.660
6.16
80.4%
17.9
0.2
15.9
10.4
44.4
20.0
11.2
2.5
1.1
1.2
36.0
91.00
Source: 1. A.M.Anfimov, ibid. , -'.1962, n.138.
2. A.M.Anfimov, ibid., M.1969, pu.206-7
:<ote: Xo explanation is given for the slight difference in the 10-50 
and 50-100 des. s;rour> figures for sown area.
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The average pomeshchik household sowed grain on 91 hectares, bv 
comparison with an average grain sown area for the peasantry of 3.33 
hectares . But probahly as many as 25% of the pomeshchik households sowed 
less grain than this (9% are classified as having no sowings, and almost 
20% sowed less than 10 desyatiny and had an average level of grain sowings 
of 3.3 hectares. The distribution of grain sowings amongst the pomeshchik 
households is therefore remarkably skewed with a small number of very large 
estates and a large number of small ones.
It is interesting to note the change in distribution of crons and 
grains in the different sized households. In general the pomeshchik 
households sowed much less rye than the peasants and the proportion of rye 
fell as the size of farm increased. But this might just be a reflection of 
the regional location of the larpe estates. Since most of the large 
estates were in the Ukraine we would expect them to have a larger proportion 
of wheat grown than of rye. The increase in sowings of millet in the 
larger farms is probably a reflection of their production for their own 
hired labourers.
In this section no attemot has been made to make an analysis of 
peasant households according to the size of their sown area or on any 
other socio-economic criteria. "o data are available on a sufficiently 
large scale to make this nossible. Some attempts were made to classify 
the population into senarate groups in separate areas. But these attempts 
are so different and so scattered th^t it is impossible to agsreeate then.
1. See A.Gayster, (ed.), ibid., x '.1^30, pu.5, 14.
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5. Grain utilisation balances before the Revolution
In this final chapter to part one of this thesis I review all the 
available grain utilisation balances that have been constructed for this 
period. In section a) which covers general undifferentiated balances, 
I present the balances in chronological order according to the period they 
cover. But in the sections covering the more detailed balances I present 
•the data in a chronological order according to the period when the balance 
was constructed. The more detailed sections are concerned with b) 
the regional breakdown of the balances, c) the breakdown according to 
different types of producer^
a) The available general undifferentiated balances of grain utilisation
The balances in this section will be discussed very briefly. The 
number of general undifferentiated balances is very large. Generally 
they are of little value other than as a summary of more detailed balances. 
Those balances which are a summary of more detailed balances will be dealt 
with in more detail in the appropriate section. Those balances that are 
not based on more detailed balances need not waste much of our time. 
Some of the undifferentiated balances are useful as a general illustrative 
indication of what the overall situation is believed to have been. These 
balances should be treated as hypotheses. Other balances were proposed 
in order to demonstrate the feasibility or non-feasibility of the production 
data. These have to be treated very carefully to see whether the balance 
is purely cosmetic or whether it is genuine. The cosmetic balances fall 
to pieces when they are analysed in detail, whereas the genuine balance 
reveals itself as consistent in all its details.
This section is primarily, therefore, an introduction to the different 
types of balances, an indication of the hypotheses of what the long-term 
trend has been and an introduction to some of the politically significant
balances.
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Very rough indications of the long terra changes in grain 
utilisation are available in Strumilin's 'illustrative estimation' 
covering the third to the twentieth century, that has already been 
described above, and in the Mikhailovsky/Fortunatov series of returns 
to seed yield for the whole of the nineteenth century. These indicate 
the very large share of grain required as seed given the very low yield 
•to seed ratio that existed in the past .
A more detailed indication of long term changes in grain utilisation
7 
was produced by P.I.Popov in 1925~. Popov's grain forage balances are
presented below:
Production
Rural Consumption
Seed
Food 
Feed
All Rural
Extra Rural Consumption
Urban Population
Food
Feed
All Urban
Army
Industry
Export
All Extra Rural
All Consumption
(Correction coefficient)
1840/50
28.3
7.9
1 18.7
26.6
K
1.4
0.7
0.7
0.4
3.2
29.8
+5.5%
iyso/60
27.8
7.9
719.8
27.7
/-i
1.5
0.7
1.1
1.1
4.4
32.1
+15.4%
1912/13
72. S
11.7
27.4 
11.1
50.2
5.1
1.1
6.2
0.8
0.4
10.7
18.1
68.2
-6.2%
1. See Strumilin's estimation p./S'-- above
2. See P.I.Popov, 'Khlebo-furazhnyi balans 1840-1924', in Selskoye 
Khozyaistvo na putyakh vosstanovleniya, M.1925, pp.1-50.
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Sources: P.I.Popov, ibid., p.37.
Notes: 1840-50, 1851-60: refer to European part of Russia,
1912/13, 1923/24 and 1924/25 refer to pre-1939 area of USSR.
Data wa/** initially given in puds and havr-^been converted into 
millions of tons.
The correction coefficient would appear to refer to changes 
in stock and losses as well as to corrections for under 
recording. (See P.I.Popov, ibid. , p . 9)
It was not clearly specified whether the 1840/50, 1850/60 
figures included potatoes, but it is assumed that they did.
In his article Popov explains that the 1840/50, 1850/60 figures were 
based on the calculations made by Keppen, Protopopov, Tengoborskii , Vilson 
and Semyonov in the middle of the nineteenth century. Of these early 
balances the only one which will be dealt with in more detail is the Vilson 
one . The consumption norms were based upon military ratios and odd budget 
studies, the revizii were used for population data. Grain production and 
seed data come from the annual Governor's accounts. Export data and 
industrial accounts come from the appropriate government offices. Popov 
argues that the figures used in the mid nineteenth century by many con­ 
temporary writers under-estimated the real size of consumption. The pop­ 
ulation data were too low and much of the other data were selected for 
exceptionally good years when grain was relatively abundant instead of the 
average of all years. Popov's criticisms of these earlier data would 
indicate that there was no over-production of grain in the pre -emancipation 
years as was commonly claimed .
Recent works analysing this question have tended to agree with Popov,
3 although they have somewhat revised his figures .
1. See
2. See P.I.Popov, ibid. , pp. 1-12.
3. See I.D.Kovalchenko, Russkoe krepostnove krestvanstvo v nervoi polovinye 
XIXv . , M.1969, p. 97, A.S.N'ifontov, Zernovoye proizvodstvo Rossii vo 
vtoroi polovinye XIX veka, M.1974, pp. 138-43, and T .M.Kfrtanina, 
Khlebnava torgovlya Rossii v 1875~1914gg. , L.1978, pp. 40-1.
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Kovalchenko has produced an indication of what he believes the 
level of extra-rural grain consumption to have been in European Russia 
in the 1850s . This can be combined with his indications of the level of 
production and sowings in European Russia at the same time in order to 
construct his implicit grain forage balance. The implicit Kovalchenko 
grain forage balance for European Russia in the 1850s is given in the 
table below:
Grain Production
Grain in
mln.
chetvert
198.6
Grain in 
mln.tons 
approx.
25.0
Grain in
100%
Utilisation
Rural 
Seed
Food and Feed 
All Agricultural Consumption
Extra agriculture
Urban population (6.1 mln x 2 chet) 12.2
62.5
98.2
160.7
37.9
.
7.9
12.4
20.2
4.8
1.5
32%
50%
84%
19%
6%
Industrial population of
North, North-West and Industrial
Centre (3.53 mln. x 1.5 chet.)
Army (0.65mln.x 3 chet.)
Distillation
5.3
Industrial population
other regions (1.8 mln. x 1.5 chet.) 2.7
1.95
8.00
0.7
0.3 
0.2 
1.0
3%
1% 
1%
4%
Export 7.7 1.0 4%
All extra agriculture 37.9 4.8 19%
Sources: I.D.Kovalchenko, ibid., pp.97, 386
Notes: The volume measurements have been converted into their
approximate weight value, using the following conversion 
1 chetvert = 0.126 tons.
1. I.D.Kovalchenko, ibid., p.97.
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In his book Kovalchenko also produced a partial breakdown by producer 
and by region for the production data and for the cotrmodity part. I 
will return to these later.
The series given below are the calculations of grain utilisation in 
the middle of the nineteenth century and its changes in the second half 
of the nineteenth century as supplied by the Soviet historian A.S.Nifontov:
The production and utilisation of grain and potatoes in the 
50 gubernii of European Russia 1850-1900 in millions of tons
1850s
Production
Rural consumption
Seed
Food and forage
All Rural
Extra Rural Consumpton
Urban
Army
Industry
Export
All Extra Rural
All Consumption
Residual
Residual as % of
Production)
Rural purchases 1
All Commodity part 5
Sources: A.S.Nifon
oolovinve
26.3
8.2
16.0
24.2
1.6
0.6
1.0
1.0
4.1
28.4
2.1
1860s
27.9
8.1
17.1
25.2
1.8
0.6
1.0
1.5
4.9
30.1
2.2
(+8.0%) (+7.9%)
.2/1.
.3/5.
tov,
XIX
5 1.9/2.5
6 6.8/7.4
Zernovoye P
veka, H.197
1870s
32.0
8.7
18.6
27.3
2.2
0.6
1.1
3.6
7.5
34.8
2,8
(+8.8%)
3.1
10.6
1880s
37.5
9.1
22.2
31.3
2.8
0.6
1.2
5.4
10.0
41.3
3.8
(+10.1%)
3.7
13.7
roizvodstvo R ossii
4, op. 143, 211 ">14, £. j- X , _ -LH,
1890s
45.8
9.6
25.4
35.0
3.4
0.7
1.3
6.3
11,7
46.7
0.9
(+2.0%)
4.4
16.1
^o vtoroi
307,310,
(198,284),
Notes: The data were given in volume equivalents (rains.of chetvert) 
The conversion of volume measures into weight measures is 
sensitive to changes in the kind of grain. But as Nifontov 
has only supplied us with the utilisation balance in 
aggregate terms (although with potatoes converted to their 
rye equivalent) there is no alternative but to use a rough 
general conversion coefficient for all the data. The 
conversion coefficient used was 1 chetvert = 0.125 tons. 
(See Nifontov, ibid.,pp.169-70). 3 chetverts of potatoes 
= 1 chetvert rye (Nifontov, ibid., p.205).
45-
Notes cont'd:
The grain equivalent of the potatoes included in the above 
balances was 0.5 mln.tons in 1850s; 0.7 mln.tons in 1860s; 
1.3 mln.tons in 1870s; 1.7 mln.tons in 1880s and 3.5 mln. 
tons in 1890s.
The population figures which these consumption patterns apply 
to are: 1850s 59.3 mln; 1860s 63.7 mln; 1870s 69.8 mln; 
1880s 81.7 mln; 1890s 94.2 mln.
In this balance the major items in rural consumption have been cal­ 
culated by means of using an average norm of consumption for personal food 
and livestock feed per head of the population and applying it directly to 
the population data. All other items come from fairly firm data. Changes 
in the level of residual should therefore indicate changes either in the 
level of unreliability of the production data or more likely, in this case, 
changes in the average level of consumption norms. During the period from 
the 1850s to the 1880s the residual had a value which fluctuated between 
13% and 17% of the level of rural food and forage consumption. In the 
1890s the level of the residual fell by more than 10 percentage points 
to 3.5% of the average level of rural food and forage consumption. This is 
a very sharn fall, (in absolute terms it was a fall of almost 3 million 
tons, over 8% of gross production), and I would suggest that it is possibly 
indicative of up to a 10% fall in the average food and feed consumption 
norm. The famine of 1892/93 certainly resulted in a decline in livestock 
numbers and a fairly severe demographic shock, so it is quite likely to 
have had some effect on average consumption levels and livestock feed per 
head of population levels. As mentioned above this decline would have 
come in the early 1890s and we would have expected it to have been masked 
by the better years of the 1890s. But this very sharp decline in the 
level of residual does take place and there seems to be nc other explan­ 
ation for it.
1. See below p.
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These Nifontov data are also given in great detail as regards reg­ 
ional breakdown and breakdown according to producer for the 1850s. 
We will consequently return to these data again in the later sections 
of this chapter.
A fairly detailed balance according to types of grain and types of 
producer was produced by P.I.Lyashchenko for 1901-5 in the decade before 
the Revolution and this will be discussed in more detail in the later 
sections.
A considerable number of 1909/13 and 1913 balances have been construc­ 
ted at different times. Most of them are cosmetic balances. The most 
substantial 1909/13 balance was the one constructed by Kondratiev in the 
early 1920s. This unfortunately only covered the main producer regions 
and so can not easily be compared with the general balances described in 
this section. The Kondratiev balance provides a regional breakdown within 
the main producer regions, a breakdown according to grain type for the four 
main grains and a breakdown according to type of producer. It will con­ 
sequently be dealt with in the later sections.
All other balances for 1909/13 and 1913 are summarised in the following 
table: see over page.
Both the Popov and Kifontov series referred to above were based on 
uncorrected production data and consumption data with constant norms. But 
some of the balances included in this table(_all of the balances after 
column 3J contain quite substantial corrections to the grain production data. 
These inflated Gosplan balances olayed a very significant role in providing 
the justification for a series of large corrections x/hich were subsequentlv 
made to pre and post revolutionary grain production data. But these 
Gosnlan balances are all, without exception, cosmetic balances. None are 
given with any regional breakdown or xcath any breakdown for separate grains.
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Sources for pre-var grain forage balances:
1. P.I.Popov, Proizvodstvo khleba v RSFSR i federiruyushchikhsya
s neyu respublikakh, M.1921, pp.19-21
2. N.D.Kondratiev and N.P.Oganovsky (eds.), Perspektivy razvitiya
selskogo khozyaistva SSSR, M.1924,
3. P.I.Popov, fcKhlebo-furazhnyi balans 1840-1924, in Selskoye
khozyaistvo na putyakh vosstanovleniya, H.1925, p.37.
4. N.Adelung,^Dovoennoe selsko-khozyaistvennoe proizvodstvo, in
Plan.Khoz., 1925, No. 11, p.309
5 , Kontrolniye tsifry narodnogo khozyaistva na 1925/26g.
M.1925, pp.74-5.
6. N. v!. Yishnevsky, Balans khlebo-f urazhnyi , in BSE , TOM. iv, M.1926,
pp.478-9.
7. N.P.Oganovsky, M.M.Vishnevsky and A.E.Lositsky (eds.), Perspektivy
razvitiya selskogo khozyaistva, Materials osobogo 
soveshchaniya no vosstanovleniyu osnovnogo kapitala 
pri Prezidiume VSNKh SSS^., series III, vol.11, M.1927, 
p. 86.
8. S.M.Prokopovich, 'The communist policy towards the peasant and the
food crisis in the IJSSP', Birmingham Bureau Memorandum, No.8, 1932 (appendix). ———————————————————
9. N.Jasny, The socialized agriculture of the USSR, Stanford, 1949,
Appendix* Note J.n.751.
10. A.M.Anfimov, Rossiiskaya derevnya v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny,
M.1962, p.303.
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This is because none are based on any detailed data, they were just 
constructed from all union data with the object of justifying a large all 
union level of correction ,
The major wartime balance was the preliminary planning balance for
« 
1917 that was constructed by A.E.Lositsky in the autumn of 1917 i.e. before
the completion of the harvest year that it refers to. This balance was 
therefore more of a planning projection than an account of an accomplished 
task. Nevertheless it was based on a wealth of analysis of the available 
data on consumption patterns and was presented in great detail with a 
breakdown according to different regions and to different grains. This 
was a preliminary balance, but it was no cosmetic balance. It will 
consequently be dealt with in some detail in the later sections. 
Lositsky's 1917/18 balance has served as the basis for the calculation 
of many other balances. Kondratiev used it in the construction of his 
1909/13 balance, it was no doubt much used by Gosplan in their construc­ 
tion of pre-war balances and it has also been used by modern Soviet 
historians.
In his classic account of the Russian countryside during the First 
World War, A.M.Anfimov has used the Lositsky balance in order to construct 
a series of grain balances for the wartime years. These balances are 
reoroduced belov/ in comparison with the original Lositsky balance for 
1917/18:
1. For an account of the circumstances in which these corrections 
were made to the pre-revolutionary data, see S.G.Wheatcroft, 
Soviet Studies, April 1974, nn.153-30.
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Lositsky 
1913/14 1914/15 1915/16 1916/17 1917/18
Production 89.3 76.3 78.6 65.0 59.2 
Rural consumption
Seed
Feed
Food and
All Rural
Extra Rural
stocks
Consumption
Urban population
Army
Industry
Export
All Extra
Source :
Rural
A.M. Anfimov
12
20
37
69
6
1
1
10
19
, Ross
voinyr. , M.1962, p
v Rossii v 1917g.
.1
.0
.8
.9
.4
.4
.0
.5
.3
ii
.2
11.
16.
35.
64.
5.
5.
0.
0.
12.
9
9
7
5
9
2
4
5
0
skaya derevnya
94, and A.E.Los 
M.1917, PP.29,
11.
16.
34.
62.
5.
9.
0.
0.
16.
2
6
9
7
4
8
2
7
0
v gody.'. pervoi
itsky 
46-7.
Urozhai
10.
16.
25.
51.
4.
8.
0.
13.
mi
4
2
3
9
8
0
2
0
rovoi
11.2
16.4
24.1
51.8
4.3
—
-
-
7.4
khlebov
Anfimov has made two alterations to the Lositsky balance, he has 
inflated the overall production figures by at least 9% (about 6 million 
tons) and he has included a large allocation for the army 8 million tons 
in 1916/17. These are unjustifiable corrections.
First, as explained above the army are included in Lositsky 's 
balance and are located amongst the rural population data. This is apparent 
from an analysis of the population data that Lositsky was using and apart 
from which it is inconceivable that such a major item as the supplies re­ 
quired for the army would be left out of the balance. As explained above, 
the whole rationale for the zemstvo statistiticans being allowed to get
together was to plan supplies for the army and urban population and Lositsky
2 just could not have forgotten to supply the army . The inclusion of the
1. See p. ' ~
2. There are also good reasons in connection with national security why
Lositsky should not have been too explicit about explaining the location 
and number of troops, in a published document while the country was
at war.
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army as a separate item consequently amounts to counting it twice, this 
would lead to the consumption side of the balance being 8 million tons 
too high. The removal of this 8 million tons would also necessitate 
the removal of the correction to the gross production figure, I reseat 
that none of these balances appear to offer any substantial justification 
for the application of a large correction to the production data, and all 
the detailed non-cosmetic balances exclude major corrections. T Je will 
now turn to the more detailed analysis of the more detailed balances.
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b) Available regional grain utilisation balances
In this section I will consider four regional grain forage balances 
in chronological order according to the year in which the balance was con­ 
structed. The first i) covers the years 1857/63 and was constructed in 
1869 by I.Vilson , the senior statistician in the Department of Agriculture
of the Ministry of State Property. The second ii) covers the years 1917/18
2 and was constructed in the autumn of 1917 by A.E.Lositsky t the director of
the statistical economics department of the Ministry of Food. It should be 
noted that this balance was drawn up well before the completion of the year 
that it covers and that it was intended to serve operational planning 
purposes. This was the only pre-revolutionary balance that had such an aim, 
all the other pre-revolutionary balances that I will describe served a more
traditional historical orientational role. The third balance iii) covers
3 the period 1909/13 and was constructed in 1918 and 1919 by N.D.Kondratiev .
It was initially written as part of a larger work entitled 'Materials on the
regulation of the economy during the war and revolution' that was to be
or
edited by S.N.Prokopovich. Kondratiev had been a deputy minister Food
4 Supply in the provisional government , and Prokopovich had been president of
the provisional government's Supreme Council of the National Economy 
(VSNKh) 5 .
The final regional balances that I will consider are the series of 
balances covering the period from the 1850s to the 1890s, which were constructed
by the modern Soviet historian A.S.Nifontov . _______________________________
T.See I.Vilson (compiler) Obyasneniya k khozyaistvenno^statisticheskomu
atlasu Evropyeiskoi Rossii, 4th edition, SPb.,1869,po.106-13. The balance 
cited here appeared in the fourth edition which appeared in 1869. The 
first edition appeared in 1851, but I have not been able to consult this or 
any of the earlier editions.
2. A.E.Lositsky, Urozhai khlebov v Rossii v 1917 godu, val<voi i chistii sbor, 
prodovolstvenniye i kormoviye potrebnosti, mestniye izbyitki i nedostatki 
glavnyikh khlebov, M.1918
3. N.D.Kondratiev,Ry.nok khlebov i ego regulirovaniye vo vremva voiny i 
revolyutsii, M.1922, Appendix 2, pp.204-23.
4. See N.Jasny, Soviet Economists of the Twenties,names to be remembered, 
Cambridge,1972,p.158.
5. See N.Jasny, ibid.,Cambridge,1972, p.99.
6*. See A.S.Nifontov, Zernovove proizvodstvo Rossii..., X M°"4.
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i) Vilson's regional grain forace balance 1857/63
This grain forage balance covered 49 provinces of European Russia and 
provided data on the production and utilisation of the winter trains 
(winter wheat and winter rye), the sprint grains (spring wheat, oats,barley, 
millet, buckwheat) and potatoes. The quantities were given in volumes and 
have been converted into weight measurements using a very crude undifferen- 
tiated conversion coefficient (1 chetvert = 0.126 tons). \nd the regions 
have been regrouped into one major consumer region (NCR) and three major 
producer regions (SPR,CPR, and EPR) .
The population data are based on the revizii. The grain Droduction 
data , data on seed rates and livestock numbers are all based on the 
annual reports of the local officials as passed to KNP. The quantity of 
grain used as food was calculated by mutit>lying the regional population 
data with an overall average per capita grain consumption norm of 0.277 
tons per head (0.252 tons of "inter grains, i.e. 2 chetverts, and 0.025 tons
of spring grains i.e. 0.2 chetverts) according to Solovyev's recommended
2norm . The quantity of grain used as livestock feed was also based on
Solovyev's recommended levels of 0.23 tons per year per horse (i.e. 2\
3 chetverts of oats) . The quantity of grain used for industrial purposes
was calculated from the official statistics of the taxation department on 
the quantity of grain, flour, malt and potatoes used in the distillery and 
brewing industries .
1. For further details of the regionalisation and the basic data see 
the appendix. Basically the regionalisation used here has been 
chosen to be comparable with the later Lositsky data for 1917.
2. See above p.\00
3. See above p.(3 o
Vilson's balance is presented in the following table (see table on 
following page). In this table we see that the NCR is the only region 
with an average deficit. It has an average deficit of 0.73 tons per year, 
i.e. 0.043 tons per head per year, about 9.2% of the quantity of grain 
actually produced in this region. All other regions produced surpluses. 
The largest surplus 3.32 tons per year was produced in the CPR, this was 
a surplus of 0.160 tons per head of the population of the CPR and represen­ 
ted 21.6% of all the grain produced in the CPR. The next largest surplus 
producer was the Ukraine (SPR) which produced a surplus of 1.63 million 
tons, 0.104 tons per head of the population 18.4% of all the grain produced 
in the CPR. Finally there was the Urals (EPR) which produced a surplus 
of just 0.11 tons per year, 0.026 tons per head which was 4.5% of the grain 
produced in the EPR.
Overall therefore we see a surplus of 4.38 million tons, 0.074 tons 
per head of the population, 12.3% of all production. Of this sum 1.15 
million tons was exported leaving a balance of 3.23 million tons, i.e. 0.053 
tons per head of all the population or 8.8% of total production. Concerning 
this final surplus, Vilson stated that this quantity of grain 'remained 
as stocks, and it is equal to about one seventh of the peasant's annual 
food and forage consumption of grain: in other words, seven vears of average 
harvests could provide the population with enough grain for food and forage 
to withstand one year of complete harvest failure'.
This balance undoubtedly suffers from the crude manner in which its 
volume measurements have been converted into weight measurements, from the 
crude uniform food consumption and livestock feed norm. The treatment of 
stock adjustments and Vilson 1 s comments on this matter are also somewhat 
1. I.Vilson, (compiler), ibid. , SPb.1869, pp.112-13.
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dubious , but nevertheless on the whole the balance is probably a fairly 
good indication of the overall regional balance of grain production and 
utilisation.
ii) Lositsky's regional grain forage balance 1917/18
This balance was remarkably complete as regards its regional coverage, 
but far less complete as regards its coverage of grains. Regionally it 
covered the 46 gubernii of European Russia, the 4 oblasts and gubernii of 
the North Caucasus, 11 oblasts and gubernii in Siberia, 8 gubernii and 
oblasts of Transcaucasia and 5 gubernii and oblasts of Turkestan,i.e. all 
the regions of the Russian Empire apart from Poland, Finland, Yakutskaya, 
Kamchatskaya and Sakhalinskaya oblasts. Poland and Finland are being 
excluded from all our calculations so we need not be concerned about their 
loss. And the three far eastern regions were excluded from most of the 
series of data that we have been considering.
As regards the coverage of grains, only the six main grains were 
included i.e., rye, wheat, oats, barley, millet, buckwheat,. The most 
obvious omission being maize.
The population data are based on the agricultural censuses of 1916 
and 1917 and the urban registration of these years^ these figures 
covered the 'on hand 1 population rather than the permanently registered 
population that were covered in the TsSK registrations. The population 
data given included the army, but they were listed as part of the rural
1. Instead of assigning the whole of the residual to stock adjustments a 
large element of it should certainly have gone to losses and an 
unreported consumption e.g. private brewing and distillation
(samogon).
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population with no means of distinguishing them from the rest of the
i • l 
rural population .
2 The livestock numbers came, with a few exceptions , from the 1916
agricultural census as the results of the 1917 census were not available 
at the time. The numbers of urban livestock were not included in the 
agricultural census and so were estimated from the results of the 1912 
military horse census. Lositsky rr,ade the rather crude assumption that 
the level of losses of urban horses to the army was as hish as to account 
for half the number registered in 1912. Urban livestock other than 
horses were not included. I assume that the military livestock were also 
included with the rural livestock in the balance, but I have not been 
able to check this.
The personal consumption norms and livestock feed norms that were
3 used by Lositsky have already been described above .
The overall regional grain forage balance given by Lositsky, with 
adjustments to divide it into my five regional groupings is given in the 
table over the page.
1. There was not even much of a reference to the fact that they were 
there. Lositsky (ibid.,p. 20 ) states only that the army were 
not registered in the towns. But it was, after all, wartime, when 
this work was being nrenared, and in xcartime you do not publish 
detailed accounts of the location of vour troops.
2. The numbers of horses in Transcaucasus and Turkestan ^ere not covered 
by the census and so vere estimated from the TsSK 1 Q 15 statistical 
account.
3. See p./»'£ for Lositsky's personal consumotion norms and p-./-^"^ 
for his livestock feed norms.
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Lositsky's data indicate the following four points:
First, the deficiencies in the NCR were very large^accounting for 
2.7 million tons of grain which was 44 07, of the grain produced in that region. 
In the 1850s according to Vilson's balance the NCR deficiency had only 
represented 9.2% of the production in that area. As ^e shall see from 
the Nifontov series of balances the size of the NCR deficiency had been 
rising steadily throughout the nineteenth century. But nevertheless 
the position must have got much worse during the war with the large 
numbers of soldiers stationed in this area and the rapid wartime increase 
in the urban population.
Secondly, we see the large scale of the deficiencies in the other 
consumer region the SCR. The deficiency of 2 million tons here was only 
25% less than the deficiency in the NCR, and as a proportion of SCR prod­ 
uction it was 110%. According to these figures the SCR was very much 
more of a consumer region than was the NCR. This is a rather surprising 
result and probably indicates that the consumption norms were too high 
here or that the production data were rather incomplete.
Thirdly, we see a very significant deficiency of almost 2.2 mln.tons 
of grain in the Volga regions. These were traditionally the main supply 
regions for the NCR and a deficiency of this scale was a most serious 
phenomenon. This deficiency in the Volga completely dwarfed the surplus 
in the Central Agricultural region.
Fourthly, we see that the surpluses which did exist were mainly 
located in the SPR and in Siberia. (Even the Urals was a deficiency region) 
The SPR was traditionally an export region. Grain from the North Caucasus 
could relatively easily flow into the SCR, but supplying the NCR fro-n either 
the SPR or Siberia would have represented major transport problems.
-260-
On the whole the picture presented in this balance with extremely high 
deficiencies in the traditional deficiency areas, but also in the major 
traditional supplier of surpluses to the NCR would appear to me to have 
been very serious. But curiously Lositskv and the wartime planners do not 
appear to have been too distressed by this picture . They repeatedly stated
that there was sufficient grain in the country and that it was not a prod-
2 uction problem but only a transportation problem"", But this is only true
in the abstract. Figures can indeed be easily pushed around on a grain 
forage balance matrix, but in practice the task of making good a deficiency 
in the CPPx was bound to be a very major problem.
There are several problems involved in accepting this balance. First, 
it excludes the industrial use of grain, which might well have been quite 
large. If the 1850s average per capita figure for the utilisation of grain 
for industrial use were applied to the 1917 population, then over 2.53 
million tons of grain would be needed for this purpose, i.e. over 80% of all 
the recorded surpluses.
Secondly, the personal consumption norms used in this balance were very
o
low ;37% below Vilson's norms but also 32% below the Klepikov norms . The 
addition of 5% to Lositsky's norm would wipe out 1.4 million tons of the 
surplus. The addition of just 10% would wipe out most of it.
Thirdly, there is a factor which it is claimed operates in the opposite 
direction to these first two factors. It was subsequently claimed by Groman 
and other wartime planners who had been insisting on the abundant supplies
1. It could be argued that it would have been bad for morale during the 
war to publish an account describing how disastrously serious the 
situation looked. But on the other hand it was clearly verv foolish 
not to treat these problems as being serious.
2. See for instance A.E .Lositskv, ibid. ,n r>. 36 and 38
3. See above p.f'J Klepikov gave an average rural consumption norm of 
0.321 tons of grain per head per year, whereas Lositskv gave a norm 
of 0.218 tons per head per year.
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of grain, that the production data in the census grossly under-estimated the 
real level of production. Groman subsequently wanted to add a correction 
of 19% to the 1917 production data . Lositsky at the time argued that
an under-estimation in the production data would make up for some of
2
the possible under-estimations in consumption . Later in the 1920s as
we shall see below, Lositsky also offered his support to those who wanted 
to at>ply large corrections to the grain production data.
My analvsis would indicate that the level of under-estimation of 
the 1916 level of production x-;as probably far less than the 19% later 
claimed by Groman and his associates.
Overall, I would tend to agree with the view expressed by Lositsky in 
this work. I therefore think that this balance is a fairly reliable 
indication of regional requirements and surpluses in grain. However, 
I sharoly disagree with Lositsky's evaluation of the seriousness of the 
picture which emerges from this balance.
1. See above p."E-"^r
2. See A.E.Lositsky, ibid., p.
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iii) Kondratiev's regional grain forage balance 1909/13
Kondratiev's balance has a fairly restricted coverage as regards 
both area and types of grain used.
It covered only the main producer areas.
And it covered only the four main grains: rye, wheat, oats and barley.
The production data were based on the 1909/13 Ministry of Agriculture 
yield data and for the most part on the sown area data from the 1916 
agricultural census. But in certain regions like Novorossiisk, where 
there had been a large wartime decline in sowings by landowners these 1916 
sown area data were replaced by data from the various zemstva statistical 
office covering the period 1909/13. Kondratiev admits that the Ministry 
of Agriculture yield data are probably a little higher than the real level, 
but he assumed that this will be compensated by sown area data being a little 
lower than reality .
The urban consumption norms were taken from the regional data presented
2 in Kabo's study of urban consumption , and the rural consumption norms came
3 primarily from the regional data presented in Chayanov's study , but
4 supplemented with the results of a fe" additional studies'.
Unfortunately Kondratiev gave no clear indication as to which population
data he was using. He stated that the data he was using to divide the rural
population between landowner households and peasant households came from
£-
the 1916 census". But he implied that the total level of rural population
1. See \.D.Kondratiev, ibid. , p.206.
2. See above p J'3~^ for an account of Kabo's study
3. See above p«/0-T'~'0 for an account of Chayanov's study.
A. See N.D.Kondratiev, i b id . , P.207. The additional studies covered 
Kharkov G.,Novorossii G., Perm G., and Vvatka G. Kondratiev notes 
that he had not been able to use the results of Klepikov's study 
because it only appeared after he had completed the work on these 
balances.
$* 1 Wt n return to this in a later section, see p ."2/7 IP
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came from pre-war data. It would consequently appear to refer to the 
registered population and not the 'on hand' population. As explained 
above this would tend to give a higher level of rural population than 
really existed and so would increase the level of apparent rural consump­ 
tion and lower the apparent level of extra-rural surpluses and the 
commodity share (tovarnost). If the level of rural population did somehow 
refer to the 'on hand 1 population, Kondratiev gives us no indication of 
how it was calculated.
The livestock consumDtion norms were taken partly from Lositsky's
2 work on the 1917 harvest and from other budget studies. The sowing
norms were also taken directly from Lositsky's 1917 balance, but were of 
course applied to Kondratiev's own sown area data (see above).
The quantities of grain used for industrial purposes f i .e . in the 
distilling, brewing and yeast making industrieSj were taken from the govern­ 
ment department in charge of excise and the state monopoly in alcoholic 
drinks (Glavnoye upravleniya neokladnyikh sborov i kazyennoi prodazhi 
pityei) , for the years 1908/9 - 1912/13. Finally, the quantities of grain 
and flour (converted into their grain equivalent) x^hich were transferred
from one region to another were taken from one of the works produced for the
3 'Special Food Council in 1916 which covered the years 1909/13.
1. See p.
2. See above p.
3. Proizvodstvo Derevozki i Dotrebleniye khlebov SPb.1916.- ————————————————————————————— - ————————
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The main results of this balance when grouped into my main regions are
given in 
Region
NCR
SCR
SPR
CPR
EPR
USSR
less
SCR+NCR
i the tolJ
Prod­ 
uction
26.29
!?.«*-
6.19
$o '42*
.owing t 
Rural
14.36
11.34
5.26
30.96
:able, *+ /w.
All extra- 
rural
11,94
6.60
0.92
19.46
lUo* To
Extra 
Urban
1.98
0.76
0.25
2.99
"^> •
Rural 
Industry
0.12
0.14
0.23
o.^f
Transfer
+9.83
+5.70
+0.44
+15.98
As % 
of 
Prodn .
37.4
3/.f
7.1
3 1 . J~
All 
extra- 
rural as % 
of prodn.
45.4
36.^
14.9
3$ .(s
This table indicates that the SPR was the largest producer of surpluses 
in absolute terms and that it also had the highest proportion of commodity 
grain when the scale of commodity grain is calculated in either terms of 
extra-rural transfers or of extra-regional transfers.
•
The CPR was second in importance as regards the absolute size of its 
surpluses and also as regards it5 share of commodity grain. The scale 
of transfers in absolute terms and the share of commod'i'fy grain were much 
lower for the EPR.
This balance should be compared with the balance for the producer 
regions in 1917/18 given in Lositskv above, in order to see what the
norma 1 state of affairs is in the CPR. Here we see an extra-rural surplus
in the CPR of 6.6 mln.tons and a total regional surplus of 5.7 million 
tons, in comparison with the deficits expected in 1917/18 in Lositsky's 
balance. The differences between the normal state of affairs and that 
indicated in Lositsky's balance, will aopear even greater if, as explained 
above, Kondratiev's rural population data really are based .on the registered 
population instead of the 'on hand' population.lt probably under-estimates 
the real size of the extra rural surpluses.
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iv) Nifontov's regional grain forage balances 1850s - 1890s
Nifontov's regional grain forage balance covers just the 50 gubernii
of European Russia and the main grains . These may be supplemented with
2 the data for Siberia from Pronin's study .
The production data and population data used by Nifontov in his study 
have already been discussed at some length above . The consumDtion norms 
used in this study were quite simple. Xifontov began with the basic rural 
consumption norms of 2.25 chetverts per head (approximately 0.284 tons per
head) for the rural population in the Non chernozem regions, and a slightly
4 
higher norm of 2.5 chetverts (0.315) per head in the Chernozem regions .
These figures included both grains and potatoes in grain equivalents. 
Potatoes accounted for under 10% of these quantities. The figures also 
referred to personal consumption and livestock feed combined. These 
norms were consequently considerably lower than the large norms given by 
Protopov and Keppen. They were probably fairly comparable with the norms 
siven by Vilson in the 1860s and were certainly lower than the norms given 
by Maress, Chayanov and Klepikov .
In a second variant which Nifontov also applied to the data for the
roi*
1880s and 1890s the average consumption norm in the Urals from 2.25
chetverts (0.284 tons) per head per year to 2.5 chetverts (0.315 tons), 
and in the Lower Volga and Southern Steppe regions from 2.5 chetverts 
(0.315 tons) per head per year to 3 chetverts (0.378 tons) per head per
year . The urban population was given a norm of 2.25 chetverts (0.284 tons)
1. Data are also available for the inclusion of potatoes if required.
But for the purpose of this study they have been excluded from all but 
the most general of Nifontov's balances.
2. See V.I.Pronin, ibid.
3. See pp. 78, W-1&-
4. See A.S.Nifontov, ibid., pp.199-202, 293-5.
5. See above
6. See A.S.Nifontov, ibid., p.295
-266-
per head throughout . Unfortunately Pronin is not at all specific about
what consumption norms he *s accepting in his calculations of the grain
2 balances for Siberia .
Although these consumption norms are very crude and make no allowance 
for a separate treatment of livestock, they are probably good enough to give 
a rough idea of the changes in the regional balance of grain production 
and utilisation.
An indication of the regional balances once rural consumption of grain 
has been deducted from grain production ,cs x given in the following table
.v»
1. A.S.Nifontov, ibid. , p . 305.
2. See V.I.Pronin, Istoriya SSSR, 1977, no.4, pp.70-1.
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1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890 S
Variant 2 
1830s 1890s
NCR
Production
Seed
Rural cons.
Rural surplus
SPR
Production
Seed
.Rural cons.
Pvural surplus
Production
Seed
Rural cons .
Rural surplus
EPR(N)
Production
Seed
Rural cons.
Rural surplus
USSR(N)
Production
Seed
Rural cons.
Rural surplus
Siberia
Production
Seed
Rural cons.
Rural surplus
6.
2.
4.
+0.
5.
1.
3.
0.
90
60
29
01
15
40
15
60
10.86
3.27
5.53
2.06
2
0
0
0
25
7
13
3
1
0
0
0
.19
.66
.98
.55
.10
.93
.95
.22
.22
.31
.72
.20
6.89
2.38
4.83
-0,32
5.69
1.59
4.42
-0.32
11.78
3.22
5.70
2.36
2.09
0.72
1.21
0.16
26.45
7.91
16.16
2.38
1.29
0.35
0.81
0.12
7.17
2.29
4.95
-0.07
7.35
1.94
4.77
0.64
12.89
3.26
6.10
3.53
2.51
0.79
1.28
0.44
29.92
8.28
17.10
4.56
1.55
0.38
0.91
0.26
Rural surplus
8.
o
5.
0.
o^> •
1.
5 .
oi— •
14.
3.
7 .
3.
0
• — 4
06
36
36
34
85
97
78
10
11
31
10
70
,91
0.90
1.
n ,
34,
8
19
6
1
0
1
0
,47
54
.93
.54
.71
.69
.79
.43
.08
.28
as % of
8.92
2.34
5.71
0.87
14.09
2.35
6.92
4.82
14.32
3.06
7.22
4.04
3.81
0.93
1.29
1.59
41.14
8.68
21.14
11.31
2.40
0.52
1.33
0.55
all P
8.
2.
5.
0.
9.
1.
6.
1.
14.
3.
~r
3.
i— •
o.
1.
0.
06
36
36
34
35
97
18
70
11
31
3*
4,
01
90
64
37
34.93
8.
20.
5.
,54
,54
,85
8.
2.
5.
0.
14.
2 .
7.
4.
14.
3.
7.
3 .
3.
0.
1.
1.
92
34
71
87
09
35
36
38
32
06
52
74
81
93
44
44
41.14
8.68
22.03
10.43
reduction
variant 2
1850s
NCR
SPR
CPR
EPR(X)
IISSR(N)
Siberia
Sources :
0
11
19
25
12
16
.7%
.0%
.1%
.8%
.4%
1860s
-4.6%
-5.6%
24.3%
7.7"
9.0%
9.3%
see appendice
1870s
-1.0%
8.7%
27.4%
17.5%
15.2%
16.3%
s and
1880?
4
21
26
18
19
15
A Q
• 1 # ^ •
.2%
.3%
.2%
.6"
.2"
.6"
1890s
9.8%
34.2%
28.2%
41.7%
27.5%
22 . 9%
Nif ontov,
1880s
4
17
?4
12
16
ibid . ,
.2%
.3"
.4"
.7%
.7%
or
18QO S
9
31
26
37
25
>.13
.8%
. 1%
.2%
.8%
.4%
4-5
296-7, and V.I.Pronin, Istoriya SSSR, 1977, no.4,p.7o.
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This table indicates several interesting points: 
First, it indicates the changing state of affairs in the NCR as 
regards the size of its balance. After a relatively large level of 
deficiency in the 1860s and 1870s there is a fairly rapid improvement in 
the balance in the 1880s and the 1890s.
Secondly, \<re see the extremely large changes taking place in the 
Ukraine (SPR). After what appears to have been a fairly disastrous decade 
in the 1860s there is a very ranid growth in the size of surpluses, so 
that by the 1890s the Ukraine has overtaken the CPR as the major source of 
erain surpluses.
Thirdly, we see the much more stable position in the CPR, which was 
the traditional supplier of grain surpluses. There was only a very moderate^ 
albeit stable , growth in the surpluses from this region, but its share 
in the total volume of surpluses produced in the 50 gubernii of European 
Russia fell steadily as indicated in the follox<ring table:
NCR SPR CPR EPR All Siberia
Variant 1
1850s
1860s
1870s
1880s
1890s
Variant 2
1880s
1890s
0
-13
-1
5
7
5
8
• "3 /'o
.4%
.6%
.2%
.6%
.8%
.3%
18.7%
— 1 "7 0 "7
1 / . .1 /o
11.6%
32.7%
43.3%
29.1%
42.0^
64
123
81
54
34
58
35
.2%
.9%
.5%
17• -L /O
O'?
• 7 /c
8 ^7 /•3
.9%
17
6
9
8
14
6
13
.1/0
.7%
.8%
. 1/0
.0%
.3%
.8%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
6
5
5
4
4
4
5
.2%
.0%
.7%
.5%
.9%
B o? /o
.3%
1. The stability of the supplv of surpluses from this region is of
course somewhat misleading. T '.7 e are talking here about the stability 
of a ten-year average period. On an annual basis
the volume of surpluses coming from the CPR was far from
stable.
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Finally we see a sharp decrease in the volume of surpluses coming 
from the EPR in the 1860s - 1880s in comparison with the 1850s but a 
great improvement in the 1890s.
Unfortunately Nifontov failed to give a regional breakdown of the 
extra rural utilisation of grain and so took his regional balances no 
further. This, I think, is rather misleadingjparticularly for the NCR. 
The NCR may have been increasing its extra rural surpluses at this time 
but if we take into account urban consumotion we see a very different 
picture. I will attempt to carry Nifontov's regional analysis one step 
further by applying the consumption norm of (0.284 tons) to the regional 
urban population that I have calculated from Nifontov's data . This will 
provide us with the following indications of the regional balance for the 
total rural and urban population excluding now only industrial utilisation, 
exports and the army. These last three elements have been included at the 
bottom of the balance for the sake of comprehensibility, even though they 
were given with no regional breakdown.
1850s
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1860s 1880s 1890s
Total balance 
residual
-0.9 -2.5 -2.8 -3.2 -0.2
Variant 2 
1830s 1890s
NCR 
rural surplus 
urban use
balance
SPR
rural surplus 
urban use
balance
CPR 
rural surplus 
urban use
balance
EPR(N) 
rural surplus 
urban use
balance
USSR(N) 
rural surplus 
urban use
balance
Utilisation 
of balance
Export 
a my 
industry
0.01 
0.67
-0.66
0.60 
0.45
0.15
2.06 
0.38
1.68
0.55 
0.03
0.52
3.21 
1.53
1.68
1.0
0.6 
1.0
-0,32 
0.77
-0.45
-0.32 
0.55
-0.87
2.86 
0.45
2.41
0.16 
0.05
0.11
2.38 
1.81
0.57
1.5 
0.6 
1.0
-0.07 
0.85
-0.78
0.64 
0.65
-o.oi
3.53
0^50
3.03
0.44 
0.01
n.43
4.56 
2.02
2.54
3.6 
0.6 
1.1
+0.34 
-1.14
-0.80
2.10 
0.91
1.19
3.70 
0.59
3.11
0.54 
0.07
0.47
6.69 
2.72
3.97
5.4 
0.6 
1.2
+0.87 
1.38
-0.51
4.82 
1.06
3.76
4.04 
0.69
3.35
1.59 
0.07
1.52
11.31 
3.21
8.10
6.3 
0.7 
1.3
+0.34 
1.14
-0.80
1.70 
0.91
0.79
3.46 
0.59
2.85
0.37 
0.07
0.30
5.85 
2.72
3.13
5.4 
0.6 
1.2
+0.87 
1.38
-0.51
4.38 
1.06
3.32
3.74 
0.69
3.05
1.44 
0.07
1.37
10.43 
3.21
7.22
6.3 
0.7
1.3
-4.1 -1.1
Sources:
Note:
For rural surpluses see table above,
For urban consumption see text and population data above
P. 7*
For utilisation of total balance see A. S.Nif ontov, ibid. , 
pp. 143, 211, 214, 307, 310
The total balance residual is the difference between total 
utilisation and total production. Theoretically it should 
indicate the change in stocks and should over a neriod of 
time equal zero or a snail positive number (if stocks are 
increasing). But in practice, since the reliability of 
so many elements in the balance are so suspect it is much 
more likely to indicate the scale of error. It indicates 
that either the utilisation data are too high or that the 
production data are too low,
I*
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Regional surplus(after rural and urban consumption) as % of production
USSR(N)
1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s
6.7% 2.2% 8.5% 11.4% 19.7%
Variant 2 
1880s 1890s
NCR
SPR
CPR
EPR(N)
-9
2
15
23
.6%
.9%
.5%
.7%
—6 .
-15.
20.
5.
5%
3%
5%
3%
-10
-0
23
17
.9%
.1%
.5%
.1%
-9.9%
12.1%
22.0%
16.2%
-5
26
23
39
7 T» /O
.7%
.4%
.9%
-9.9%
8.0%
20.2%
10.3%
-5.7%
23.6%
21.3%
36 . 0%
9.0% 17.5%
The relative contribution of the different regions to the overall level
of regional surplus in %%
1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s
Variant 2 
1880s 1890s
NCR
SPR
CPR
EPR(N)
USSR(N)
-39.0%
8.9%
100%
31.0%
100%
-78.9%
-152.6%
422.8%
19.3%
100%
-30.7%
-0.4%
119.3%
16.9%
100%
-20.2%
30.0%
78.3%
11.8%
100%
-6.3%
46.4%
41.4%
18.8%
100%
25.6%
25.2%
91.1%
9.6%
100%
-7.1%
46.0%
42.2%
19.0%
100%
These tables indicate several important points: First, they indicate 
that despite the rising rural surplus in the NCR the balance after urban 
consumption still remained in deficit by about half a million tons in the 
1890s and had been as high as 0.8 million tons in the 1880s. Secondly, 
it shows that the rural deficit recorded for the SPR in the 1860s appears 
much more serious when the SPR urban population is taken into account. 
The total regional deficit in these years appears to be as high as 0.9 mln. 
tons, over 15% of the production in these years. I would suggest that this 
is not a very realistic picture and that a lower series of consumption norms 
probably ought to be used for the Ukraine in the three decades before the 
1880s.
Thirdly we see that the extra regional surpluses of the CPR and EPR 
are proportionally relatively high in comparison with their extra rural 
surpluses. This is because the CPR and EPR had a much lower level of urban 
population than the NCR or
Finally, overall we should note the verv rapid rate of increase in 
extra regional surpluses, which doubled between the l^^s and the lS G Os.
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c) Grain utilisation balances according to type of producer
This section contains an account of several different types of 
balance. Most of the balances offer a breakdown according to production 
by peasant households on allotment land or production on landowner land. 
But some of the balances attempt to go further than this and offer a 
breakdown according to whether the peasant land was rented, privately 
purchased or part of the allotment land. \nother more famous balance 
attempts a socio-economic breakdown o f the peasantry into kulaks (the 
exploiter croup in the peasantry) and the other peasants (fcednyaki - Door 
neasants and serednyaki - middle peasants). None of these divisions are 
very satisfactory and even the division between landowner and peasant 
allotment land ultimately fails to take into account that it is primarily 
the peasant who is working the estate lands.
These balances are introduced in chronological order according 
to the time when the different balances were constructed.
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i) Maress's grain balance
1
This balance was produced by L.N.Maress in 1897 . It referred 
primarily to the peasantry in the 1880s and attempted to divide their 
production according to whether the grain was produced on allotment land 
or private land and whether the land was owned by the producer or rented
From all allotment land
Rented allotment land 
Own allotment land
From all purchased land 
From rented private land
From all peasant land 
plus autumn sales of 
oats
All including oats
Prod­ 
uction 
net of 
seed in 
mln.tons. in %
Commod— 
ity Sur­ 
pluses
in mln. 
tons
17.60 (84.3) 1.92
1.15
0.77
1.13 (5.4) 1.13
2.16 (10-3) 0.38 
20.88 (100.0) 3.42
0.49 
20.88 3.91
in %
(56.1)
(33.6) 
(22.5)
% of Commod­ 
ity surplus 
to net 
of 
seed
10.9%
(33.0) 100%
(11.1) 
(100.0)
17.4%
16.4%
18.7%
Source: L.N.Maress, ibid., o.54.
Notes: There is some uncertainty as to whether total production net 
of seed includes the production of oats. If it does not 
another 0.98 mln.tons should be added to net production.
It is unclear how the oats should be distributed between the 
different types of peasant producer, so it has therefore 
been excluded from the calculation of the relative share of 
the different types of producer in all commoditv surpluses. 
Oats were apparently sold in autumn to pay for taxes. (See 
A.S.Nifontov ibid., p.301).
This table indicates the large proportion of commodity surpluses that 
comes from a relatively small share of purchased and rented land. There can 
be little firm statistical basis for these figures but they do at least 
give an illustration of the kind of proportions that statisticians at the
time believed existed._______________________________________________ 
~. L.N.Maress, fc Proizvodstvo i potrebleniye khleba v krestvanskom khozyaistve', 
in A.I.Chuprov and A.S.Posnikov (eds.) Vliyanie urozhaev i khlebnykh tsen 
na nekotoriye storony russkogo narodnogo khozyaistva, torn 1, SPb.1897,
PP.34-5.
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ii) P.I.Lyashchenko's balance for 1901/5
This balance was produced by P.I.Lyashchenko in 1908 . At this time 
Lyashchenko was working as an economist for the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry. Lyashchenko produced separate balances for the food grains 
(which he defined as rye, wheat and also barley) and for oats. He gave 
a greater breakdown by producer for the food grains than for oats and so we 
cannot avoid considering these balances separately although this is really 
the subject of another section.
Lyashchenko's balance for food grains alone is given below followed by 
one with a less detailed breakdown by producer but covering the main food 
grains plus oats. Please note*all these balances are given net of seed.
This table indicates that the peasants are producing over 76% of all 
the grain and consuming 67% of all grain. Their commodity share according 
to these figures was only 12.4% and since the production figures refer to 
production net of seed, this is equivalent to a slightly smaller commodity 
share of gross production.
The landowners are producing just under 24% of the grain, but are only 
recorded to be consuming 4.5%>consequently have a very high commodity share 
of 81% or slightly less if we take into consideration seed expenditure. 
The reason for the very high commodity share for the landowners is their low 
level of consumption. All of the grain listed here as consumed by the land­ 
owner household is consumed as livestock feed and no allocation at all is 
rtade for personal food consumption. This is justifiable to the extent that 
the numbers of the landowner's household are considered to be the landowner's 
family only. But since we are concerned with the production of grain on the 
landowner's land, it night be more meaningful to make an allowance for the 
consumption of the labourers working on the landowner's estate. And this 
x^ould clearly decrease the commodity share of the landowner land.
1. P.I.Lyashchenko, Ocherki agrarnoi evolutsii Rossii, Tom 1, M.1923 
pp.269-76. This was a later edition of a book which was first
published in 1908.
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P.I.Lyashchenko's grain forage balance for the 50 gubernii of European 
Russia in mln.tons net of seed 1901-5:
Production
Peasant allotments
own land
rented from landowners
All peasant production
Landowner
All
Consumption
Rural
Food
Peasants
(insufficient group)
(sufficient group)
(surplus group)
All peasants
Landowners
All food
Feed
All peasants
Landowners
All feed
All Rural
Extra Rural
Urban food
Distilling and brewing
Exnort
Rye
Wheat
Barley
21. A3
2.87
2.46
26.76
7.81
34.57
5.72
11.45
6.11
23.28
0
23.28
23.28
11.29
3.18
0.72
7.39
four
main
Oats grains
6.42 33.18
2.54 10.35
8.96 43.53
5.72
11.45
6.11
23.28
0
23.28
5.77 5.77
1.97- 1.97
7.74 7.74
7.74 31.01
1.23 12.52
3.18
0.72
1.23 8.62
four
main
grains
in %%
76.2%
23.8%
100.0%
53.5%
13.3%
4.5%
17.8%
71.02
28.8
7.3
1.7
19.8
Source: P.I.Lyashchenko, ibid., pp.275~7.
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iii) Kondratiev's grain balance for different producers
Kondratiev's general regional grain balance for 1909/13 has already 
been introduced below. In this balance Kondratiev also gave a breakdown of 
the production and consumption for peasant households and for landowner 
households separately. The 1916 census data provided an indication of the 
size of landowner sowings and of the population of landowner households. 
As already explained above, in certain regions like Novorossiiskaya G.,
where there had been a large decline in the level of landowner households
I
Kondratiev had used the zemstva sown area data instead. And it is hoped
that he also adjusted the population data. In commenting upon his use of 
the 1916 census to assess the size of the landowner population, Kondratiev 
did admit that the indicated population would be somewhat lower than normal 
due to the mobilisation of hired labourers for the army. He adds that this 
would to some extent be compensated for by prisoners of war., and refugees 
working on the landowner estates, but all the same the resulting figure would 
be lower than normal and this would tend to under-estimate the level of 
landowner household consumption and therefore over-estimate the apparent 
commodity share of grain produced by the landowner estates . In contrast 
with the Lyashchenko balance Kondratiev is clearly making an allowance 
for the consumption of grain by labourers on landowner estates. The levels 
of personal consumption and livestock feed norms were assumed to be the 
same for landowner households as for peasant households. Kondratiev 
justified this by explaining that the budget studies upon which the personal 
consumption and livestock feed norms were based, tended to reflect the 
position in the wealthier and better-off peasant households and their
conditions were not much different from the average landowner household's
2 
conditions".______
1. See N.D.Kondratiev, ibid., p.207
2. See N.D. Kondratiev, ibid., p.208.
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The results of Kondratiev's balance for peasants and landowners 
separately in the three producer regions are indicated in the following 
table :
Production Consumption Surplus
in mln. in in mln. % commodity
tons in %% mln.tons tons in %% share
SPR
Peasant
Landowner
All
CPR
Peasant
Landowner
All
EPR
Peasant
Landowner
All
All Producer Regs.
Peasant
Landowner
All
21.93
4.36
26.29
16.04
1.90
17.94
6.17
0.02
6.19
44.14
6.28
50.42
83.42
16.6%
100.0%
89.4%
10.6%
100.0%
99.7%
0.3%
100.0%
87.5%
12.5%
100.0%
12.95
1.41
14.36
10.74
0.60
11.34
5.28
-0.02
5.26
28.97
1.99
30.96
9.00
2.94
11.94
5.30
1.30
6.60
0.88
0.04
0.92
15.18
4.28
19.46
75.4%
24.6%
100.0%
80 . 3%
19.7%
100.0%
95.7%
4.3%
100.0%
78.0%
22.0%
100.0%
41.0%
67.4%
45.4%
33.0%
68.4%
36 . 8%
14.3%
200.0%
14.9%
34.4%
68.2%
38.6%
Source: N.D.Kondratiev, ibid. , pp.212-24.
Note: a negative level of consumption as for landowners in EPR 
simple means that they purchased locally more grain than 
they consumed.
This table indicates several important points:
First, if we take all the producer regions together we see that the 
peasants produce 87.5% of the grain but only 78% of the surpluses, and that 
the landowners^ although they produce only 12.5% of the grain^ produce 
22% of the surpluses. These are proportions that we will see repeated 
later on in connection with another balance .
Secondly, we see that the landowners overall had the commodity shaie 
of their grain production twice as hi^h as the peasants.
Thirdly, in terms of a regional breakdown, we see that the SPR had 
the largest share of landowner produced grain (16-6%),the largest share 
1. See the Stalin/Nemchinov balance on n
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of landovmer produces surpluses (24.6%), but the lowest indicator of 
commodity share for landowners in any region (41%) .
As a comment on these figures it must be remembered that production 
refers to production net of seed, that these figures only cover the producer 
regions, and that Kondratiev himself admitted that they undoubtedly tended 
to over-estimate the commodity share of the landowner producers, because 
the landowner household population was under-estimated.
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iv) The Stalin/Nemchinov grain balance for different producers
This is the most famous, the best known but the least well documented 
of all the balances for the pre-revolutionary period. It was presented by 
Stalin in his speech 'On the grain front' to students at the Institute of 
Red Professors in May 1928 . This balance divided the producers into three 
groups: jbomeshchiki (the landowners), kulaki (the rich and exploitative 
group of peasants) and Serednyaki together with bednyaki 0*)lddle peasant 
and poor peasant). No explanation was given as to how these groups were 
formed. The whole Stalin/Nemchinov balance is given in the following 
table:
Production Commodity part Commodity 
in mln.tons in %% (extra village) share
Pomeshchiki 9.8 12.0 4.6 21.6 47% 
Kulaki 31.1 38.0 10.6 50.0 34%
Serednyaki & ^^ 5Q(0 6 _ Q ^^ u>?% 
Bednyaki
.All 81.9 100.0 21.3 100.0 26.0%
Source: I.V.Stalin, Sochineniya, Tom,11, M.1949, p.85.
This table shows several important points:
First we see again that the peasants are producing 88% of the grain 
and 78.4% of the surpluses, while the landowners are producing just 12% of 
the grain and 21.6% of the surpluses. These proportions are indeed very 
similar to those given by Kondratiev in the previous section, but these 
figures appear to be referring to the entire pre-1939 area of the USSR and 
to all grains. The share of landowner production and commodity production 
could be expected to be much lower in the \TCR and for the minor grains 
1. See I.V.Stalin, Sochineniya, Tom 11, M.1949, pp.84-6.
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(i,e. millet and buckv7heat), and as noted above Kondratiev himself warned 
that his figures had undoubtedly over-estimated the commodity share of 
landowner production, so if the Stalin/Nemchinov division$were based on 
the Kondratiev division, they should be adjusted in order to give the 
landowner a much lower commodity share.
Secondly, we should note the division between kulaks and the rest 
of the population. The kulaks were listed as producing 38% of the 'zrain 
and 50% of the commodity surpluses. No definition of kulak was offered 
and these proportions do seem to be extremely high. They do not corres­ 
pond to any of the divisions between producers that we have so far come 
across, and appear to be based on no statistical materials.
Given our lack of knowledge as to what this balance refers to, and 
the apparent over-estimation of the commodity share of landowners if 
it is partly based on Kondratiev's work, it is recommended that this 
balance should not be accepted as being a reliable indicator of the pre- 
revolutionary division of the grain forage balance according to producer. 
It has been included in this survey purely because of its political 
significance.
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v) Modern Soviet historians on the grain balance for different producers 
in the 1850s.
Several modern Soviet historians have been interested in the question 
of the relative share of the peasantry and the gentry in producing grain 
surpluses in the decade before the emancipation of the peasantry. They 
all attack the view of P.I.Lyashchenko that the peasants supplied less 
than 10% of commodity grain in the 1850s. This opinion of Lyashchenko's
was based on the generally accepted viev of contemporaries . This view
2 was challenged first by V.K.Yatsunskii in 1958, when he wrote ,
that in the more remote regions away from the centre in Vvatka, the Urals, 
in the South and South West Steppe the peasants produced most of the 
commodity grain, and that even in the central producer regions^ the 
Chernozem and the Central Volga the share of the peasants was much larger 
than 10% and closer to 33%
Yatsunskii's position was defended and extended by I.D.Kovalchenko in 
his monograph on Russian serf agriculture in the beginning of the nineteenth 
century , which appeared in 1967. Kovalchenko drew up a rough balance 
of commodity production for landowners and peasants separately, first, 
for all of European Russia and secondly for the major producer regions.
First, I will consider Kovalchenko 1 s arguments for the all European 
data. Kovalchenko constructed a rough undifferentiated balance of extra- 
rural grain utilisation for European Russia in the 1850s, which gave a total
4 figure for extra-rural utilisation of 38 mln.chetverts (about 4.8 mln.tons) .
The gross production of landowner estates at that time was estimated to
1. See P.I.Lyashchenko, Ocherki agrarnoi evolutsii Fossii, M.1925, P.125
2. V.K.Yatsunskii, I 0snovniye etapyi genezisa kapitalisma v Rossii, in 
Istoriya SSSR, 1958, no.5, pp.84-5.
3. I,D.Kovalchenko, Russkoe krepostnoe krestyanstvo v pervoi polovine 
XIX v., M.1967, pp.338-9.
4. See earlier section p"243 for this and other undifferentiated balances.
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have been 45.2 mln.chetverts (about 5.7 mln.tons). Assuming that as a 
maximum the commodity share (tovarnost) of the landowners estates would be 
50%, then the maximum amount of commodity grain that could have come from 
the landowners could only have supplied 59% of all commodity grain. And 
Kovalchenko prefers a slightly lower level of commodity share for the land­ 
owner estates, some 45%. Consequently Kovalchenko estimates that the 
landowners supplied only 53.5% of all commodity grain.
Secondly, Kovalchenko looked at the regional shares of landowner and 
peasant production of commodity grain in this period. The figures that 
he gave are presented in the following table:
Production 
in mln in 
tons %%
Tsent .Prom.
Peasant
Pomeshchik
All
2
0
2
.38
.59
.97
80
19
100
.2
.8
.0
Commodity production 
in mln. in in %% 
tons %% of production
0
0
0
.38
,26
.65
58
41
100
.5
.5
.0
16.
45%
21.
1%
8%
Tsent .Cherno-zem
Peasant
Pomeshchik
All
Nizh.Volzhskii
Peasant
Pomeshchik
All
Sred.Volzhskii
Peasant
Pomeshchik
All
Source :
Note:
3
1
5
1
0
2
1
0
2
.94
.65
.59
.73
.32
.05
.86
.47
.33
70
29
100
84
15
100
79
20
100
.5
.5
.0
.4
.6
.0
.8
.2
.0
I.D. Kovalchenko,
the proportions
from those
there must
given
be a
in
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
ibid
thi
.43
.74
.17
.29
.14
.43
.28
.21
.49
. ,
36
63
100
67
32
100
57
42
100
n.339
.8
.2
.0%
.4
.6
.0
.1
.9
.0-
s table work out
in Kovalchenko'
mi sprint in his
s table
book.
10.
45.
21.
16.
45%
21.
14.
9%
0%
0%
5%
0%
9%
45%
21. 0%
somewhat differently
I assume that
1. See I.D.Kovalchenko, ibid., p.338.
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The production figures are available from Kovalchenko's study of 
the tyove-rnors 1 annual reports . The overall level of commodity share
i.e. 21% in the Volga and Central Chernozem regions and 21.8% in the
2 Central Industrial Region^ were assumed on the basis of Kovalchenko's
analyses of these regions, ctnd the general level of commodity share for 
landowner lands was 45%. Given these figures the other figures in the 
table can be worked out.
This is again a very arbitrary procedure, of doubtful reliability.
More recently, in 1974, another historian, A.S.Xifontov, in a book 
that we have already much used in this thesis, also turned to the question of
the relative share of landowner, serf and peasant in providing commodity
3grain surpluses in the 1850s and produced a much more detailed study .
Nifontov's balance divided the producers between landowners, serfs and 
state peasants. The population data were taken from the returns of the 
IX and X revizi r. as reworked by Kabuzan. The production data were based 
on Nifontov's analysis of the annual governor's reports. And the consump­ 
tion of the different households was worked out in two variants. Variant 
1 had a combined food and forage norm of 2.25 chetverts (about 0.284 tons) 
per head per year for the peasants and 2.5 chetverts (about 0.315 tons) 
per head per year for the landowners. Variant two had a norm of 2.5 
chetverts (0.315 tons) per head per year for peasants in the Chernozem 
region, 2.25 chetverts (0.284 tons) per head per year for peasants in the 
non-Chernozem region and 3 chetverts (0.378 tons) per head per year for 
members of landowner households. The results of this balance are given in 
the following table:
1. See above p . / •' • h""^'
2. In the text Kovalchenko says 18%, but adds that in fact it was no lower 
than the 21% in the Producer regions. And in the table he uses 21.8%.
3. See A.S.Nifontov, ibid. , np.128-35.
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Landowner
0.76 
0.20 
0.56
Serf
1.90 
2.08 
-0.18
State 
Peasant
0.68 
1.05 
-0.37
All
3.33 
3.34 
0.01
The production, consumption and size of grain surpluses for different 
producers of grain in 32 gubernii of European Russia in the 1850s in 
mln.tons.
Variant 1
NCR (N15) 
Production 
Consumption 
Surplus
SPR (N6) 
Production 
Consumption 
Surplus
CPP (N9)
Production
Consumption
Surplus
EPR (N2) 
Production 
Consumption 
Surplus
USSR (N32) 
Production 
Consumption 
Surplus
0.96
0.11
0.85
0.95
1.12
-0.27
0.36
0.57
-0.21
2.27
2.65
0.38
1.51
0.17
1.34
1.84
1.32
0.52
1.73
1.32
0.41
5.08
2.81
2.27
0.01
0.01
-
0.18
0.14
0.04
1.23
0.73
0.50
1.41
0.86
0.55
3.24
0.48
2.76
4.86
-4.75
0.11
4.24
3.91
0.33
12.33
9.12
3.21
Variant 2
NCR(N15) 
Production 
Consumption 
Surplus
SPR (N6) 
Production 
Consumption 
Surplus
CPR (N9) 
Production 
Consumption 
Surplus
EPR (N2) 
Production 
Consumption 
Surplus
USSR (N32) 
Production 
Consumption 
Surplus
0.76
0.25
0.52
1.90
2.08
-0.18
0.68
1.05
-0-37
3.33
3.36
-0.03
0.96
0.13
0.83
0.95
1.35
-0.40
0.36
0.66
-0.30
2.27
2.13
0.14
1.51
0.20
1.31
1.84
1.48
0.36
1.73
1.50
0.23
5.08
3.18
1.90
0.01
0.01
-
0.18
0.14
0.04
1.23
0.73
0.50
1.41
0.86
0.55
3.24
0.58
2.66
4.86
5.04
-0.18
4.24
4.17
0.07
12.33
9.78
2.55
Sources: A.S.Nifontov, ibid., pp.129,134-5
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As regards the relative proportion of grain surpluses produced by the 
different types of producer these figures tend to indicate that Yatsunskii 
and Kovalchenko were wrong and that Lyashchenko was correct in his assess­ 
ment of the predominant importance of the landowner's estates for prod­ 
ucing surpluses. According to the first variant the landowners estates 
produced 86% of the surpluses, the serfs 4.4% and the state peasants 
10.4%, but according to the second variant the landowners produced over 
97% of the surpluses, the state peasants nroduced the rest and the serfs 
were overall short of grain. Furthermore the only peasant surpluses 
which occurred were in the CPR and the EPR, as all peasant groups in both 
variants had a deficiency in the NCR and SPR.
As regards the proportion of commodity shares these figures indicate 
the landowners have a commodity share that averaged between 82% (variant 2) 
and 85% (variant 1), much higher than the figure of 45-50% which 
Kovalchenko had given as the maximum possible. The following table ind­ 
icates the commodity share (tovarnost) for each of the types of producer 
in each region for the two variants, i^ %',
Landowner Serf State peasant All 
variant 1
NCR 
SPR
CPR
EPR
USSR °^5.2 2.3 7.8 26.0
variant 2
NCR 
FPR 
CPR
EPR
USSR 82,1 -3,7 1.7 20.7 
These very large proportional surpluses and deficits are largely an
73.7
88.5
88.7
-
-9.5
-28.4
28.3
22.2
-54.4
-58.3
23.7
40.7
0.3
16.7
44.7
39.0
68,4
86.5
86 . 8
-
-9.5
-42.1
19.6
22.2
-54.4
-83.3
13.3
4X7
-0.9
6.2
37.4
39.0
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indicator of the extent to which it was important for the peasants to work 
for the landowner or get some other employment. In the NCR and SPR 
many serfs and peasants were clearly primarily concerned with work outside 
their own households > While in the CPR and EPR peasant production on their 
own land was far more important. The fact that the landowner producers 
had a larger commodity share than the peasant producers does not necessarily 
ir^ply that they were more efficient. They were using peasant labour to
produce their grain and part of the grain produced would have to be sold
b&
or in some way distributed to the peasants. Most of the peoule who actually
worked the landowner land have not been registered as part of the landowners 
household and included in the landowners balance, but have been included in 
the peasant households where they may not necessarily have been working. 
Lyashchenko is the worst offender at this, but to some extent such a 
procedure is unavoidable. These balances by producer group should therefore 
be treated with care.
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6. Conclusions
The pre-war system of collecting administrative statististics had 
many weaknesses, but it was operating in a relatively stable environment 
in which there were few obvious pressures either for the peasants to 
conceal their real level of production, or for the statisticians to ex­ 
aggerate them. There were consequently few a priori reasons to expect 
a high level of distortion. It is Drobably true that the statistics in 
all primitive economies tend to be only a reflection of realitv and tend 
to suffer from some under-reporting. But inasmuch as there was no fiscal 
reason to conceal grain we may expect this level of under-reporting in 
Russia to have been fairly insignificant.
A detailed analysis of the harvest data from other sources indicates 
that TsSK yield data wereslightly lower than the results from the corres­ 
pondents networks of the Ministry of Agriculture and the local zemstvo. 
But since these latter were in all probability a little high the level of 
yield indicated by the TsSK data is probably fairly reliable.
A slight under-estimate of sown area is to be expected, but there are 
no ways of assessing its exact significance.
The balances of grain utilisation that have been drawn up for this 
period cannot be used to confirm or dispute any hypothesis concerning the 
level of correction required to the production data. "Most of the major 
items in the balance are known with only approximate certainty and the 
reliability of the food consumption component and especially the livestock 
grain fodder component in the balance are not known with anv certaintv 
at all.
The grain food consumption data that were amassed at this time and during 
the War appear to have greatly exaggerated the real level of food consumption
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probably by as much as 10-15%. This was a consequence of a) the 
untypically high level of grain production and consumption in the 
households in x-;hich budget investigations were carried out and b) the 
natural inclination for subjective evaluations of food consumption to be 
exaggerated.
The livestock grain fodder component was known with much less 
certainty a) because of the uncertainty over the amount of livestock and 
b) because of the uncertainty over the amount of fodder fed to the livestock.
These two components in the grain utilisation balance account for 
over 60% of total grain utilisation. Of the remaining elements about 
10-15% of the grain was used as seed. But although seeding rates 
are well known the amount of grain actually sown is of course ultimately 
dependent on the size of sown area and any correction made to the sown area 
will be directly reflected in the amount of grain required as seed.
During the War^especially after the introduction of the grain levy 
in 1916 and fixed price grain purchases, the environment began to change 
for the worse. The level of peasant concealment undoubtedly increased.
The local zemstvo statisticians were naturally reluctant to admit 
that the agricultural censuses that they had carried out in 1916 and 1917 
provided less reliable indicators of agricultural reality than had the 
earlier official TsSK statistics. But with the change in peasant attitudes 
caused by the changed circumstances 1 think that this must have been the 
case. The extent of concealment was however likely to have been less than 
5% more than in pre-war times for sown area and yield, i.e. less than 10% 
for production.
The results of the statistical investigation have been analysed 
in chapters 4 and 5. They indicate:
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1) a relatively low increase in oroduction in the first half of 
nineteenth century and then a rise in the second half after 
the 1860s. There was an increase in the rate of growth 
after the 1890s and especially in the decade before the war. 
Increases in sown area accounted for most of the early growth 
but from the 1890s the growth in grain yields became nore 
important.
In terms of per capita production there was an overall 
decline until the middle of the century and then a growth, 
fairly rapid,after the early 1890s. It was this growth which 
provided the export surpluses. But even when the level of 
exports and the rather small amount of extra-rural marketings 
have been deducted from the gross production figures>there 
still remains an increasing level of overall per capita grain 
production.
The levels of yields fluctuated greatly, causing great 
fluctuations in the level of production. Very low levels 
occurred roughly every 5-6 years with particularly low points 
in 1891, 1897, 1906 and 1^11.
2) In terms of a regional breakdown these data indicate
a) the relatively low growth of production in the NCR, 
caused by a decline in the level of grain sown area offsetting 
part of the increase in yields. Overall there was a quite 
substantial decrease in per capita production which required 
an increase in grain supplies from other regions. By the eve 
of the war as much as 3'-A million tons of 2;rain were being 
imported into this reeion } which was about 30^ of the supply 
needs of this region.
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b) Few data are available concerning the position in 
the SCR* grain oroduction was relatively unimportant here and 
iirroorts of up to half a million tons were sometimes required.
c) The SPP, was a region which experienced a rapid growth 
in production through the nineteenth century. In the first 
half of the nineteenth century the growth was mainly a con­ 
sequence of the increasing settlement of regions in the South 
East (Ivovorossia) and these regions continued tc cause an 
increase in grain sown area throughout this period. But from 
the 1890s there was also a fairly substantial increase in 
yields. Per capita grain production rose dramatically from 
0.35 tons per head in the 1860s to over 0.6 tons per head in 
the decade before the war. It was this large increase 
in per capita production in the south that provided the 
surpluses for the large grain exports. The yields in the SPR 
did fluctuate quite significantly but not as badly as in the 
CPR and they had a different synchronisation than those in the 
CPR. Therefore the growth in importance of the SPR led to 
a slight overall dampening in the harvest fluctuations for 
the country as a whole.
d) The CPPv was the traditional supplier of grain 
surpluses to the NT C^ and the conditions in this region have 
tended to dominate the general conceptions on the state of 
Russian agriculture.
This region was the most over-populated with little soace 
for the further expansion of grain sown area , except at the
1. This does not apply to developments in the more distant parts of the 
CPR i.e. in the Lower volga regions, where expansion continued and new 
settlements x-;ere being founded.
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expense of decreasing the arable land and fallow. The reduction 
in the share of arable caused the reduction in numbers of 
livestock and the reduction in fallow was not accompanied
: much improvement in crop rotations. Th.J s region was con­ 
sequently considered to be in a crisis. There was 
a slight increase in yields and consequently also in the 
level of grain production, but this vas not sufficient to 
produce a rise in per capita nroduction. Yields fluctuated 
greatly in this region with very low levels in 1391 and 1906. 
The 1906 low level of production was much less serious than 
the 1891 case, because it coincided with a relatively normal 
yield in the SPR, and as explained above, the SPR was taking 
a larger share in total production by this date.
e) The EPR was the newest region and relatively un­ 
important in the overall grain balance until the last decade 
before the war when it began to experience a rapid growth. 
Livestock farming was fairly advanced in some regions of the 
EPR on the eve of war and must have consumed some of the local 
surpluses, but in other parts of the EPR (especially in 
Kazakhstan) the amount of grain fed to animals was very low. 
3) The distribution of production between the different 
types of producer is much less certainly known due to the 
poneshchik estates being grouped together with other private 
holdings as distinct from peasant allotments. Only with the 
1916 census are more definite indications available and they 
are possibly not typical of the pre-war situation. Nevertheless 
it is clear that the largest share of pomeshchik land was in 
the SP^ and that thev had yields slightly higher than average. 
In 1916 pomeshchik sowed only 7.5^ of the total sown area so
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they might well have sown 10% of the total sox-m area before 
the war and produced 12% of total grain production as 
Stalin claimed.
The pomeshchik households certainly produced a higher 
share of surpluses than other households. This was mainly 
because of the smaller number of workers per sown area i.e. 
20 workers per 100 desyatinty sown as opposed to 87 workers 
per 100 desyatiny in peasant households. But partly also 
because of their smaller number of horses per sown area 
19,5 per 100 desyatiny as opposed to 41.9 horses for the 
same area in peasant households. But a regional comparison 
of these data would indicate a somewhat less distinct 
difference. Increasing the scale of farms in the less densely 
population areas was likely to do little to relieve the 
problem of over-population in other areas.
4) During the war years there was a slight decrease in sown 
area and production in all regions apart from the EP" which 
experienced quite a rapid growth. The exact timing of the 
decline is somewhat unclear, due to the uncertainty over the 
relative reliability of the earlier TsSK data and the agri­ 
cultural census data for 1916 and 1917. I have suggested that 
the census data was less reliable than the earlier TsSK data, 
due mainly to the increase in peasant hostility and suspicion.
But it is clear that the 1 Q 15 harvest was relatively 
high in all regions and the 191o harvest onlv a little lower. 
The 1917 harvest while also being relatively high in the "'C^l, 
SP1, and EPR T-T as however very low in the CP%.
The war created a large demand for grain surpluses in the
NCR partly for the army but also for the large numbers of 
refugees. Although much grain must have been available 
in the SPR due to the stooping of exports, the 1917 shortfall 
in CPR production was bound to cause an extra strain in the 
NCR. This appears not to have been fully realised by the 
officials V7ho were attempting to plan supplies at this time.
